# nato withdrawal cp

**burn. nato. down. yeah.**



## neg

### cp text

#### Counterplan: The United States Federal Government should withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

### nato collapse good – top level

#### NATO collapse good – prevents structural violence, China and Russia war, and increased militarism

**Benjamin 2019** (Medea Benjamin co-founder of CODEPINK for Peace, is the author of "Inside Iran: The Real History and Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran" and "Kingdom of the Unjust: Behind the U.S.-Saudi Connection.", “Why NATO should be obsolete”, <https://www.salon.com/2019/12/06/nato-should-be-obsolete_partner/?scrlybrkr=4206f050> )//MargaretE

While claiming to “preserve peace,” NATO has a history of bombing civilians and committing war crimes. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. And far from the “North Atlantic,” NATO joined the United States in invading Afghanistan in 2001, where it is still bogged down two decades later. In 2011, NATO forces illegally invaded Libya, creating a failed state that caused masses of people to flee. Rather than take responsibility for these refugees, NATO countries have turned back desperate migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, letting thousands die.

In London, NATO wants to show it is ready to fight new wars. It will showcase its readiness initiative—the ability to deploy 30 battalions by land, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval vessels in just 30 days, and to confront future threats from China and Russia, including with hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare. But far from being a lean, mean war machine, NATO is actually riddled with divisions and contradictions. Here are some of them:

French President Emmanuel Macron questions the U.S. commitment to fight for Europe, has called NATO “brain dead” and has proposed a European Army under the nuclear umbrella of France.

Turkey has enraged NATO members with its incursion into Syria to attack the Kurds, who have been Western allies in the fight against ISIS. And Turkey has threatened to veto a Baltic defense plan until allies support its controversial incursion into Syria. Turkey has also infuriated NATO members, especially Trump, by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system.

Trump wants NATO to push back against China’s growing influence, including the use of Chinese companies for the construction of 5G mobile networks—something many NATO countries are unwilling to do.

Is Russia really NATO’s adversary? France’s Macron has reached out to Russia, inviting Putin to discuss ways in which the European Union can put the Crimean invasion behind it. Donald Trump has publicly attacked Germany over its Nord Stream 2 project to pipe in Russian gas, but a recent German poll saw 66 percent wanting closer ties with Russia. The UK has bigger problems. Britain has been convulsed over the Brexit conflict and is holding a contentious national election on December 12. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, knowing that Trump is wildly unpopular, is reluctant to be seen as close to him. Also, Johnson’s major contender, Jeremy Corbyn, is a reluctant supporter of NATO. While his Labour Party is committed to NATO, over his career as an anti-war champion, Corbyn has called NATO “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security.” The last time Britain hosted NATO leaders in 2014, Corbyn told an anti-NATO rally that the end of the Cold War “should have been the time for NATO to shut up shop, give up, go home and go away.” A further complication is Scotland, which is home to a very unpopular Trident nuclear submarine base as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. A new Labour government would need the support of the Scottish National Party. But its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, insists that a precondition for her party’s support is a commitment to close the base. Europeans can’t stand Trump (a recent poll found he is trusted by only 4 percent of Europeans!) and their leaders can’t rely on him. Allied leaders learn of presidential decisions that affect their interests via Twitter. The lack of coordination was clear in October, when Trump ignored NATO allies when he ordered U.S. special forces out of northern Syria, where they had been operating alongside French and British commandos against Islamic State militants.

The U.S. unreliability has led the European Commission to draw up plans for a European “defense union” that will coordinate military spending and procurement. The next step may be to coordinate military actions separate from NATO. The Pentagon has complained about EU countries purchasing military equipment from each other instead of from the United States, and has called this defense union “a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defence sector.”

Do Americans really want to go to war for Estonia? Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack against one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” meaning that the treaty obligates the U.S. to go to war on behalf of 28 nations—something most likely opposed by war-weary Americans who want a less aggressive foreign policy that focuses on peace, diplomacy, and economic engagement instead of military force.

An additional major bone of contention is who will pay for NATO. The last time NATO leaders met, President Trump derailed the agenda by berating NATO countries for not paying their fair share, and at the London meeting, Trump is expected to announce symbolic U.S. cuts to NATO’s operations budget

Trump’s main concern is that member states step up to the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense by 2024, a goal that is unpopular among Europeans, who prefer that their tax dollars go to nonmilitary items. Nevertheless, NATOSecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will brag that Europe and Canada have added $100 billion to their military budgets since 2016—something Donald Trump will take credit for—and that more NATO officials are meeting the 2 percent goal, even though a 2019 NATO report shows only seven members have done so: the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia.

**In an age where people around the world want to avoid war and to focus instead on the climate chaos that threatens future life on earth, NATO is an anachronism**. It now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing around the globe. **Instead of preventing war, it promotes militarism, exacerbates global tensions and makes war more likely.** This Cold War relic shouldn’t be reconfigured to maintain U.S. domination in Europe, or to mobilize against Russia or China, or to launch new wars in space. **It should not be expanded, but disbanded. Seventy years of militarism is more than enough.**

#### NATO is a tool of imperialism and US heg – disbandment key to peace

**Wight 2022** (John Wight is an author and political commentator based in Scotland, “NATO’s disbandment is long overdue”, <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/02/19/677115/NATO-disbandment-long-overdue-John-Wight> )//MargaretE

The decisive role of NATO in achieving the West’s objectives in the former Yugoslavia need not detain us. The point is that today – bearing in mind NATO’s role in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, its role in helping turn Afghanistan into a failed state, its critical role in toppling Gadaffi in Libya and turning that country into a failed state, and its stance in threatening Russia’s security in Eastern Europe – **it is no longer feasible or possible to harbor any lingering belief that NATO is anything other than a tool of US hard power, deployed not to protect and defend, but to destroy and dominate.**

Whenever you hear Joe Biden and other leaders and officials of NATO-member states advocating diplomacy to resolve the current crisis, it is notable that none advocate the one thing that would not only end the current crisis and avert war in Ukraine, but do much to restore stability and security to a world that has long been desperate for both.

**That one thing is NATO’s immediate disbandment** and the embrace of the principals enshrined in the UN Charter. Because if the decades since the demise of the Soviet Union has confirmed on thing above all others, it is that the overriding challenge facing humanity is not the lack of democracy within certain states, but the lack of democracy between all states.

**Until the latter is achieved the former will always remain the product of the asphyxiating effects of imperialism and hegemony.**

#### NATO obsolete – causes more harm than good

**Jacobs 2022** (Seth Jacobs is a history professor who studies the political and cultural history of the U.S. in the 20th century. His research focuses on the connection between U.S. domestic culture and foreign policy, “On NATO”, <https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/sites/bc-magazine/summer-2022/features/new-world-order-/on-nato.html> )//MargaretE

Three decades on, we are still stuck with the alliance, and as recent events demonstrate, it is no laughing matter. **NATO has become obsolete**. Indeed, Washington’s whole Europe-first orientation is anachronistic, a wasteful, expensive holdover from the cold war that ought to have been abandoned years ago and that distracts us from the true dangers we face abroad.

Mearsheimer, to his credit, deplored this development more vehemently than anyone. A self-described “unrepentant realist,” he had no patience for the aggressive internationalism that defined Western statecraft in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. NATO as an anti-Soviet bloc made sense to him; NATO as an ever-expanding club of vaguely like-minded nations was foolish—and dangerous. According to the tenets of realism, when one great power trespasses upon another’s sphere of influence, the result is nearly always conflict, and Mearsheimer insisted that that was the case with NATO’s eastward march. It did not matter that officials from the United States and its European allies insisted that they had no designs on Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin was not convinced. He perceived their encroachment as an existential threat and responded violently, first by annexing Crimea in 2014, then by invading Ukraine in 2022. While most pundits in the West denounced Putin’s barefaced breach of international law, Mearsheimer proclaimed that **NATO was to blame**, that its leaders ought to have recognized that their apparent intent to incorporate Russia’s bordering countries into their alliance would trigger war, and that Putin was only doing what an American president would do if, say, Iran built a military association and invited Mexico and Canada to join. In a gauntlet-flinging guest essay for the Economist in March and a follow-up interview in the New Yorker, Mearsheimer condemned NATO for naiveté and called for a pragmatic solution to the crisis that would keep Ukraine as a neutral country and leave Putin in power, with Crimea and the Donbas in his grasp.

I am not a realist, repentant or otherwise, and I have problems with Mearsheimer’s glibness and moral relativism. Nonetheless, I agree with him that **NATO no longer serves a coherent purpose**. The principal geopolitical challenge to U.S. primacy in the 21st century comes from China. That is where America’s focus should be. Russia might still qualify as a great power in terms of boots on the ground, but its economy is one-dimensional and shot through with corruption, its population shrinking and aging, its weapons and equipment outmoded, and its troops demoralized. By no stretch of the imagination could it overrun Europe as the old Soviet Union once seemed capable of doing. Britain and France have nuclear weapons. They do not need the United States to defend them. Why, then, does Washington continue to station forces in Europe and bear most of the cost of this transatlantic military partnership?

Institutional factors play a role, of course—NATO employs many bureaucrats who have a stake in its preservation, and no business dissolves itself voluntarily—but the main reason, in my opinion, is that Americans have yet to outgrow the delusions that prevailed in what neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer called the “unipolar moment,” that heady time after the cold war ended and no one appeared to threaten the security of the United States. Flush with victory, Washington policymakers believed that they could use this period of unprecedented economic, military, diplomatic, and geopolitical supremacy to remake the world in the American image, and they thought NATO was the perfect vehicle for accomplishing this goal on the Eurasian landmass. Thus they changed NATO’s original mandate and set about trying to foster liberal democracies in new member states like Hungary, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. (Of course, the War on Terror saw this pattern extended to the greater Middle East, as the George W. Bush administration sought to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq.) A widely held assumption was that increasing the number of liberal democracies would make war less likely, since democracies do not fight one another. NATO aggrandizement would therefore create a broad zone of peace from the Elbe River to the gates of Russia, and perhaps beyond.

Events have not played out in that fashion. Far from nourishing democracy, NATO has seen the rise of far-right nationalist political movements in four of its oldest and most powerful members—Britain, Germany, France, and the United States—while Viktor Orbán’s second term as Hungarian prime minister witnessed an erosion of press freedom, a decrease in judicial independence, and Hungary’s descent by eleven places on the Democracy Index. Similar democratic backsliding has characterized Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey and Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Poland. As for being a force for peace, the carnage in Ukraine serves as eloquent testimony to NATO’s failure in this regard. Mearsheimer’s diagnosis of the origins of the conflict may be wrong—Putin might have tried to integrate neighboring nations into a greater Russia regardless of Western actions—but NATO did nothing to halt his aggression. And, of course, there is the perennial free-riding problem, with America’s allies counting on Washington to protect them even if their economies are robust enough to pay for their own defense. Moving NATO eastward has increased the number of countries America is obliged to safeguard at a time when a COVID-induced recession makes such commitments unaffordable.

Clearly, NATO has outlived its usefulness to the United States**. The Biden administration should disengage from the alliance as soon as practicable.** This can be done diplomatically, with some face-saving rhetoric and assurances that the departure of U.S. troops will not adversely affect Euro-American investment or trade. We could also remind nations like Spain and Turkey that they remain free to arm themselves to the teeth with American-made weapons—provided, of course, that they foot the bill. Then Washington should recalibrate its grand strategy to conform to the changed global balance of power.

#### NATO is outdated, imperialistic, and interferes with the United Nations now – it should be abolished to allow the UN to take its place

**Verma 3/8.** Sudesh, former journalist, he is a member of BJP’s media relations department and represents the party as spokesperson while participating in television debates. “NATO has failed: UN must be strengthened” https://thedailyguardian.com/nato-has-failed-un-must-be-strengthened/

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine has exposed the world’s inability to control the situation if a powerful State decides to use its military power to set things right with its immediate neighbouring countries. The prime reason for this massive failure is the absence of a moral and righteous world body that has the mechanism to implement dharma-based order. NATO clearly does not fit the bill.The only organisation that could do this is the United Nations but it has got weakened due to shadow boxing by major world powers—the Big Five that includes the US, the UK, France, China and Russia. They trust their own military strength and have no reason to strengthen the UN. The veto enjoyed by them ensures that **this body remains defunct to prevent any major crisis** involving any of these players. All these five have developed sophisticated weaponry and are major suppliers of arms across the world. NATO cannot replace the UN since it is a group of countries having a **vested interest to empower itself** and maintain superiority vis-a-vis other countries. The world does not matter to NATO countries if they are not involved in acts of war with non-NATO countries. And if push comes to shove NATO can fight any country or grouping in the world based on its combined military strength and economic might. At least NATO would like to believe this.The fact that three permanent members of the UN Security with veto are members of the NATO—France, the UK and the US—makes it evident that the organisation seeks to be happy with its own enclave where they would enjoy liberty, freedom and democracy and will also have the wherewithal to fight others if these are hurt. Even in the vastly interdependent and integrated world, NATO believes that it can live peacefully even if other countries suffer. The UN has 193 members which means that 163 countries are outside the NATO framework.

Becoming a member of NATO brings in security plus economic empowerment. Actually, the strategy of the British Empire where the military back-up by the Crown was used to further business interests has been emulated by NATO. NATO would intervene if its economic interest is hurt or if it concludes that certain actions of any country are hurting its core held principles. The massive airpower would ensure that NATO troops would not even need to be on the ground if it desires to punish a country. The control over English media by NATO countries both in terms of finance, governmental control and ideology would ensure that a larger legitimacy is provided to its actions. The US intervention in Afghanistan was justified as much as its withdrawal that happened after two decades. The US intervened in Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction but when it did not find any, it blamed intelligence failure. The UN has been **relegated to providing legitimacy to the course of action decided by NATO**. These NATO countries **have enough clout because of their influence** and are able to lobby successfully at the UN and get the support of smaller countries to add to their legitimacy.

One wonders why was NATO not disbanded with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact—a military alliance of former communist countries with the erstwhile USSR as the fulcrum. Both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO were offshoots of the Cold war and hence when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, NATO should have followed the same course. On the contrary, NATO expanded by inducting former Soviets into it. **NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN**. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The world would be divided into exclusive economic and military blocs. Ukraine should serve as a lesson to NATO that it cannot do anything in a war-like situation with a powerful country. Some members of NATO are now realising that economic sanctions are going to hurt their own interests more than the interest of Russia. Had NATO not given false confidence to Ukraine and provoked it to seek NATO membership, the present crisis could have been avoided. You can appreciate the security concerns of other countries only when you understand the vulnerabilities. If you are strongly protected by the umbrella of a powerful security alliance you would not feel the pinch. Ukraine was the best as a buffer country between Russia and Western Europe. When Ukraine was forced to abandon its nuclear arsenals all the powers had ensured that it would stay safe and secure and the world would stand guarantee to its neutrality. Sending arms to that country and trying to influence it to become a member of the European Union and then NATO was a violation of that charter.Russian intervention in Ukraine cannot be justified in today’s world and any issue of provocation must be resolved through dialogues. But when **unbiased history would be written about this crisis**, one would not be able to ignore the fact that Russian **overtures to talks were spurned by an overconfident NATO** led by the US. Was it not provoked to use its military might to set things right from Russia’s perspective?  NATO must ponder over this. The high-sounding words trying to bulldoze Russian President Vladimir Putin have proved to be hollow. NATO cannot get into direct war with Russia since the threat of nuclear weapons poses threat to the entire humanity.

The need for a stronger UN was never felt more acutely than it is today. Panic gripped the world when on 4 March, the Russian military fired at the power units of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—the largest nuclear facility in Europe. Energoatom which operates nuclear plants in Ukraine appealed to the world community saying that heavy shelling at the nuclear plants was “a severe violation of nuclear and radiation safety which can lead to hard and tragic consequences for the whole world!” The world had woken up to the warning that it could witness a tragedy worst than that of Chernobyl. Those who may have forgotten must know what Chernobyl disaster a nuclear accident that happened on 26 April 1984 during a routine checking at one of the nuclear plants at Chernobyl. This generated more radioactive radiation than the two bombs that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

Chernobyl and areas around it were evacuated and largescale relocation of the population took place in affected areas. The radiation led to people getting various diseases, particularly thyroid cancer. An area of 30 sq km around the plant is now made an exclusion zone where people cannot visit. Close to 150,000 Sq Kms of land area in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine were supposed to have been contaminated. Has the world evolved any mechanism to take care of such eventualities? You can blame one country or the other for the tragedy but who will be responsible for the largescale death and devastation resulting from this no gain blame game. Who is responsible for the death and destruction in Ukraine? The US, NATO or Russia? Or is it the entire world that failed to take corrective action in time?

Whether a war or economic sanctions, the result is the same. The common people who have no role suffer the most. If we call ourselves civilised why can’t we evolve a strong mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes? There are few hotspots of the world and immediate attention must be given to them so that rival territorial claims do not become a reason for military conquest.

The UN is the **only institution that promises hope**. A larger role to the UN means that all military alliances or such pacts between countries **must be dismantled**. The UN must be strengthened to use force too if and when needed—not only for peacekeeping but also for bringing an errant country to sense. One factor that has made the UN almost non-functional in matters of such conflict is the power of the veto. Why should any country have a veto?

The permanent membership of the UN Security Council **must be expanded to make the UN more representative**. The UN charter needs to be redrafted to **take care of modern threats to world peace** including cyberwar. Instead of veto by one member, the decision should be taken by a decisive majority. This would ensure that every member would be scared of being on the wrong side. Like on the pattern of NATO, the UN can have its permanent force parked in various countries to be drafted in times of need. And what is the point of having nuclear weapons if you cannot use them? So, there should be complete disarmament and destruction of nuclear weapons. For energy linked nuclear power plants, there should be a strong UN presence so that these are safe and secure. This is not impossible to achieve if everyone realises the futility of war and a permanent resolution to possible conflicts are found out.

Rather than a few regional satraps trying to emerge as saviour of humanity, the UN should aspire for this role. If action is taken after full justification in the right spirit to establish dharma, nobody would complain. This would mean establishing a supranational government to ensure that there is no violation of territorial integrity or violation of established rules.

#### NATO credibility hurts the Global South and wrecks chances for success

Rogers 5/21/22 (Paul Rogers is Emeritus Professor of Peace Studies in the Department of Peace Studies and International Relations at Bradford University, and an Honorary Fellow at the Joint Service Command and Staff College. He is openDemocracy’s international security correspondent, The Ukraine war has given NATO renewed credibility. That’s a problem, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ukraine-russia-war-nato-putin-finland-sweden-problem-strengthened/> )//MargaretE

It is assumed that good times will continue to roll for the military-industrial complexes of Europe, as [countries rush to grow their arsenals](https://declassifieduk.org/does-the-ukraine-war-mean-britain-should-increase-military-spending/) with the latest kit, even if the abject failure of the Russia armed forces hardly suggests that bigger budgets are needed. Not everything fits neatly into place, though, and two very troubling issues lie ahead. The first is that in the past two decades, NATO has been anything but a success. In Afghanistan, it was in charge of the [International Security Assistance Force](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm) from 2003 to 2014 and then the smaller, non-combat force, ‘Resolute Support Mission’, from 2015 through to the end of the disastrous war last year. In 2011, Libya was another NATO failure, where the bloc was said to be involved in a humanitarian intervention but ended up overseeing regime change, leaving a failed state in its wake. Beyond these, though, is the much bigger issue: NATO is well-nigh irrelevant when it comes to the main global security challenges, climate breakdown and the widening socioeconomic divide. Africans support the Ukrainian people, but centuries of experience also make us wary of ‘solutions’ by our former colonisers. We are currently seeing an impact of the [lethal heatwave right across South Asia](https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/18/asia/climate-india-pakistan-heatwave-intl/index.html). Records are being broken daily but the remarkable thing that sets this apart from other serious heatwaves is that it is happening [far earlier in the season](https://www.vox.com/23057267/india-pakistan-heat-wave-climate-change-coal-south-asia) than would be expected. We are also seeing warnings of [an impending global food crisis](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/19/ukraine-war-has-stoked-global-food-crisis-that-could-last-years-says-un), stemming in part from climate factors but also fuelled by market impacts of the Ukraine war. As in the world food crisis of the 1970s, though, it is also down to socioeconomic factors. Now, as then, there are enough grain reserves to go around, but hundreds of millions of people simply cannot afford to pay the soaring prices. Both the heatwave and the food crisis are early signs of what is to come if economic reform and radical decarbonisation are not implemented, and they mean that we are heading for a deeply unstable and insecure world. If the Ukraine war does end soon, NATO will emerge as an increasingly strong and confident alliance, yet it will be close to irrelevant when it comes to the real global challenges. More than that, given its performance in Afghanistan and Libya, NATO will be seen increasingly as a negative influence across the Global South, an alliance dominated by white Western states committed to protecting their own security. [An earlier column](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-joe-biden-west-hypocrisy-war/) commented on the attitude to the Ukraine war in lower-income countries, with tepid support for the West mixed with a ‘plague on both your houses’ mood. If NATO is to be relevant in a fractured world, it will have to evolve very quickly into a different kind of alliance. This must be part of a global transformation of understanding about security that is becoming more and more urgent. It is a lot to hope for, but if NATO doesn’t change, it won’t just be irrelevant, **it will be an increasing part of the problem.**

### withdrawal = collapse

#### US Withdrawal causes NATO collapse – follow on

**Monov 2019** (Lyubomir Monov works for the ministry in defense in Sofia, Bulgaria, “NATO Under Pressure”, https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1702&context=jss )//MargaretE

Are there any scenarios for dissolution of NATO? Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall consider this question in their essay “Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise”. They insist than in the future the fundamental strategic interests of the US and Europe will diverge. The Americans will not be willing to pay billions for the protection of rich European countries. The Europeans will refrain from participating in peacekeeping operations in places such Africa. Europe’s main goal will be to deter the rising power of America. The United States will withdraw their forces from Europe. The United Kingdom is suspicious of its continental allies and generally follows the United States. Consequently, without America and Great Britain, NATO will collapse. 24 The collapse of NATO may be a sequential result from several correlated events. They might include partisan actions from the U.S. leadership and responses from the European states that will increase political and military disparity. For instance, a reason for possible dissolution of NATO could be the difference between America's national interests and those of the European allies especially with regard to military interventions outside the Euro-Atlantic area. America is likely to feel frustrated by the lack of reciprocity, considering the fact that during the last seventy years the United States invested enormous funds in the reconstruction of the European continent. Americans might have some additional disappointments based on the probability that European partners will delay or will not implement the commitment to provide 2 percent of their GDP to mutual defense. Consequently, the probable European failure to commit to the common security may increase the financial responsibility and may raise the military burden on the United States. The latter may increase the level of dissatisfaction with NATO from U.S. citizens. The possibility of a continued lack of European investment in the area of defense will widen the technological gap and will affect the ability of Allied Forces to act as one entity. Conceived in this way, these factors combined with the traditional American rhetoric about isolationism may lead to the withdrawal of the United States from NATO. Canada without the American military machine will not be able to ensure the survivability of the transatlantic link, which means the effective disintegration of NATO. 25 Richard Jordan from the conservative website the Federalist asserts that the Alliance will crumble slowly and gradually. The author claims the world no longer needs the Cold War’s NATO. Furthermore, he insists that NATO has had a privilege to behave irrationally, there are no reasons for its existence, and there is no force, which might transform it. Nowadays the world is in a different paradigm–America is not willing to pay any price and bear any burden. The current Administration sees the world through the prism of realism, which general assumption is that each party acts only in their own narrow interests. Since the United States has a number of domestic political differences and external economic concerns, Washington does not want to invest resources and efforts to subsidize the luxurious European lifestyle. In five to ten years, the writer proclaims, Europe will experience a crisis, which Europeans will not manage to solve. In addition, Jordan thinks that, **due to exhausted political patience the United States might not support Europe which ultimate result is a collapse of NATO.**

### nato unsustainable – collapse

#### Lack of European military spending and shifting US focus collapse NATO

**Olsen 21.** Henry, Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. “The crisis in Afghanistan is shaking NATO. Its foundation was already weakening in Europe.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/27/crisis-afghanistan-is-shaking-nato-its-foundation-was-already-weakening-europe/ JH-NCP

The problem comes when pollsters dig a bit deeper. The central feature of any military alliance is that all members come to the aid of one another in case of attack. That unified stance — collective defense in strategic parlance — is what makes the alliance credible. If one or more parties won’t defend other members, the whole enterprise falls apart. Indeed, that is what many European leaders fear as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan raises questions about its ability to live up to its commitments.

Whether that fear is justified or not, the fact is that majorities in most European nations already oppose the use of their troops to aid a NATO ally. That startling finding comes from a February 2020 Pew Research poll. The survey asked respondents from 16 NATO nations whether that nation should use military force to defend a NATO ally in a serious military conflict with Russia. Majorities of only five nations — the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and Lithuania — answered yes. Pluralities or majorities in every other nation surveyed opposed coming to the ally’s assistance, with opposition rising to 60 percent among Germans.

One might wonder why NATO is viewed favorably given this response, but another question from the 2020 poll provides clarity. The same people were also asked whether they thought the United States would use military force to aid a NATO ally under attack by Russia. Majorities or pluralities in every European nation surveyed said it would, with percentages rising above 70 percent in Italy, Spain and Britain. Many Europeans clearly believe that NATO is a **device to ensure U.S. protection** for them rather than a collective alliance whereby all support all. This underlying belief might be a reason only 10 of NATO’s 30 members currently meet the alliance’s target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense each year.

This finding alone is troubling, but another poll points to other worrisome signs. The United States increasingly views China as an existential threat. This is why it is shifting military resources to the Pacific theater to combat China’s rise and working to persuade U.S. allies to resist Chinese efforts to make those nations’ economies dependent upon Chinese consumers and companies. This means that NATO allies will increasingly be asked to shoulder some of the burden in a de facto anti-Chinese alliance at the same time as NATO itself deploys against Russia.

Europeans do not want to do that. A January 2021 poll from the European Council on Foreign Relations found 60 percent of Europeans want their nation to remain neutral in any conflict between China and the United States. The poll also found that 59 percent of those surveyed believe that China will be more powerful than the United States in a decade; only 19 percent vouched for continued U.S. supremacy. Finally, 67 percent said that Europe could not always rely on the United States and had to look after its own defense. Each of these trends points to electorates that won’t back the United States in the conflict that U.S. leaders of both parties see as most important.

None of this is written in stone. European leaders could try to persuade their voters of the enduring value of a strong, global, Western alliance. Barring that, however, European leaders will likely continue to follow their voters, underinvesting in defense and avoiding the strong anti-China stances U.S. leaders want. If that happens, presidents from both parties will likely regretfully conclude that substantial European military involvement no longer serves American interests. Europe’s worst nightmare would thus become true more because of its own inclinations than because of American fecklessness.

#### NATO’s in decline now – authoritarianism and disagreements fracture the alliance BUT there’s no way to fix them

**Ellehuus and Morcos 21.** Rachel, Pierre, “NATO SHOULD FINALLY TAKE ITS VALUES SERIOUSLY” https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/ JH-NCP

The Threat from Within

Over the past decade, several NATO allies have taken a turn **away from democracy**. Hungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism, while the rule of law has long since unraveled in Turkey. In Greece and Slovenia, press freedom is rapidly deteriorating. NATO’s newest members made substantial progress since the end of the Cold War, but democracy remains fragile in Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. As a result, internal corruption or malign influence could readily unleash new instability.

From the beginning, NATO has faced tensions over how much emphasis to put on democratic values. On one hand, NATO has always been more than just a military alliance. Its strength and resilience have long derived from the shared commitment of allies to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble to this document stresses democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law while its second article explicitly commits to “peaceful and friendly international relations.”

But the alliance has not always lived up to these ideals. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO debated how to deal with authoritarianism in Portugal and Greece as well as multiple coups in Turkey. Ultimately, members decided not to address the problem, instead prioritizing cohesion and geopolitical interests during a tense Cold War period. As explained by then-National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, “[T]he time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics.”

This was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations.

Today, though, ignoring democratic decline carries **new risks**. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.

In this context, democratic decline has **empowered the leaders of some NATO states** to take self-serving decisions **at the expense of the alliance’s collective interests**. In both Turkey and Hungary, for example, hypernationalism and corrupt ties with Russia have led to decisions that have compromised NATO decision-making and weakened the alliance’s military readiness. Turkey recently acquired a Russian S-400 missile system, for example, which can undermine NATO’s integrated air defense, and then launched an invasion of northeast Syria that endangered NATO countries’ forces on the ground. More recently, Turkey also blocked a defense plan for the Baltic states and Poland on the grounds that NATO did not sufficiently support its war against Kurdish separatist forces. Hungary has helped hamstring NATO, as well. In 2019, Budapest blocked Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan and canceled meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission over a bilateral dispute regarding Kiev’s treatment of the country’s ethnically Hungarian minority.

When Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed experts to examine NATO’s future, they noted that a “drift toward NATO disunity … must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” To date, allies have lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. The European Union can theoretically address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism and conditionality on its funding. NATO, by contrast, has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally that violates the alliance’s founding principles and no financial carrots that might incentivize good behavior.

#### The US is drifting apart from European NATO allies – tensions over spending, Chinese tech, and American focus pivot to Asia

**Caroll 20.** Richard, holds two degrees, one in Economics and another in the Liberal Arts. Richard is a retired economist from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and a retired soldier. His focus was in administration and intelligence. “The End of NATO?” https://intpolicydigest.org/the-end-of-nato/ edited for gendered language JH-NCP

NATO was founded in April of 1949. NATO was formed as a counterweight to the growing political and military power of the then Soviet Union. From 1949 until the fall of the Soviet Union, the purpose of NATO had been to prevent an invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in October of 1991 the rationale behind NATO rendered the organization moot. Yet, like all large bureaucracies, NATO lived on.

The main impetus that the United States became involved in NATO had been the threat of communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent fall of communism worldwide as a threat against the capitalistic United States, the new economic, political and military situation no longer justifies the expenditure of funds and military resources by the United States as was necessary during the Cold War.

In 1949 the United States identified its economic, political and national security interests as being aligned with Europe. It’s 2020 and the interests of the United States are not so much in Europe anymore. The United States, since the Obama administration, has been diverting its attention and military resources to Asia and its concern with the rise of China. With the political and economic independence of Europe no longer being such a chief concern of the United States, the eventual withdrawal of the United States from NATO is **only a matter of time**. Indeed, Europe is looked upon in many quarters in the United States more as a competitor than as an ally.

The economic, political and national security interests of Europe and the United States are no longer the same.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has been in search of a reason for its existence. The terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, for a time, gave the organization a new lease on life, but with the United States coming to an agreement with the Taliban, this reason will soon be gone as well. With the United States becoming increasingly preoccupied with China, there is a growing feeling in the Trump administration that NATO is no longer a burden the United States should have to bear.

There are several reasons that NATO is breaking down. The United States has become increasingly exasperated by the refusal of the majority of NATO countries to shoulder their fair share of the economic burden of NATO. Each NATO member is required to contribute a minimum of 2 percent per annum to the NATO budget. Yet, since the end of the Cold War many nations have failed to contribute the two percent requirement, with only seven of the twenty-nine members meeting this requirement. In 2019, France only contributed 1.82 percent of its GDP, with Germany coming in at 1.23 percent, which is virtually unchanged since 2014. The United States has long complained of the European members of NATO not meeting their financial obligations, but the Trump administration has gone further than complain. The Trump administration has reduced the contributions of the United States to the level of contributions made by Germany. President Trump has made no secret of his belief that NATO is no longer a viable entity and his belief that the United States should withdraw from the alliance.

The ongoing controversy of Europe allowing the Chinese telecom giant Huawei to build a 5G network in Europe has also increased tensions between the United States and Europe. The United States and China have begun a geopolitical war, with both sides jockeying for advantage on the world scene. Huawei, which has over $75 billion in subsidies from the Chinese government, has been accused by the United States of being an agent for Chinese intelligence and has installed spyware in its equipment which would allow Chinese intelligence of obtaining crucial technology by stealth, and to obtain human intelligence on all users of Huawei technology. Europe, despite strong pressure from the United States, has moved forward in allowing Huawei to develop 5G technology in Europe. France has gone so far as to allow Huawei to establish a manufacturing plant in France.

Russia has begun construction on the Nord Stream gas pipeline which will carry natural gas from Russia to Europe. With Europe already receiving 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia, the United States is concerned that too much reliance on this energy source would leave Europe subject to geopolitical pressure in any confrontation between Russia and the West. While Nord Stream Two is currently on hold due to economic pressure from the United States, eventually this natural gas pipeline will be finished, and the amount of natural gas exports from Russia to Europe will double. Russia expects to finish Nord Stream Two in the first quarter of 2021.

In an ominous sign of the differences between the main powers of the EU and the United States, both France and Germany ruled out purchasing the American made F-35 to replace the aging European fighter, the Tornado.

With the United States withdrawing from being the police~~man~~ of the world commons, and its determination to pivot from Europe to Asia, the alliance which has lasted since 1949, is coming to an end. The United States under the Trump administration does not consider the alliance to be in the economic, political or national security interests of the United States. There have been rumors that if President Trump is re-elected than the United States will withdraw from NATO in the early stages of a second Trump term.

#### NATO’s fracturing – spending, beef with Turkey, and American dominance all cause friction

**Kulikov 20.** Valery, “NATO in danger of falling apart” <https://www.newagebd.net/article/117263/nato-in-danger-of-falling-apart> JH-NCP

However, a significant number of European politicians today are more inclined to reduce the military budget of their countries, especially given the current financial and economic problems. In addition, an increasing number of politicians (especially in the Baltics) who recently started to actively offer their countries for the deployment of American troops, naturally at the expense of ‘American security guarantees’, see in this an opportunity to reduce their national military spending and to transfer budget funds to other domestic expenses instead. Thus, according to err.ee., an Estonian information resource, the Minister of Finance of the country Martin Helme (Conservative People’s Party, EKRE) recently proposed to cut the state’s military spending by € 50 million.

Alliances and security guarantees were once viewed as the most serious obligations a state can undertake. Today, however, Washington is handing out security guarantees like a hotel administrator — **candy to its guests**: everybody gets one, plus an extra piece to anyone who asks for it. However, it is believed that such obligations are worthless, notes The National Interest.

And this circumstance was confirmed in light of recent events in the Eastern Mediterranean and the attitude of the alliance countries to the policies and actions of Turkey. As a result of Ankara’s recent actions, Turkey has made its presence felt from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, which has increased the risk of confrontation and friction within NATO.

Since early summer, after the contradictions arose in relation to the conflict in Libya, which reached the level of aggressive actions undertaken by the crews of the warships of the Turkish and French navies, mutual claims of the two countries intensified. They then escalated further over the manoeuvres that the French undertook jointly with the Greeks and Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, Ankara accused Paris of violating the agreements on military presence in Cyprus, stepping up its manoeuvres in the Eastern Mediterranean region in response. After that, the French president, commenting on the situation, said that the actions of Turkey ‘are not like the actions of a NATO ally’, and added that Turkey has been acting this way for several years, ignoring allied relations within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Recently, a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and another NATO member, Greece, due to gas deposits in the disputed Mediterranean region, has been added to the contradictions between Turkey and France. The conflict continues to escalate, dividing Europe into two camps.

But it turned out to be difficult for the alliance to resolve the internal crisis, as it always withdrew from solving Turkish problems. Against the backdrop of the risk of a military escalation between NATO members, its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has so far limited himself to calls for ‘dialogue’ and ‘de-escalation.’ And the members of the alliance do not show unity in assessing Ankara’s actions, which, in particular, is evidenced by the refusal of 22 out of 30 NATO members to support France’s demand to take a more firm position on Ankara.

A potential conflict, the likelihood of which at the moment is high enough, indicates that NATO is going through far from the best times. One can get the impression that the NATO leadership is either openly disregarding the interests of the European allies, who are already ready to take up arms, or Brussels is following the secret instructions of Washington, which intends to benefit from Europe weakened by a potential war.

### nato = freeloading

#### NATO’s bad – European countries freeload on US defense capabilities BUT the alliance is fine without the US

**Kazianis 18.** Harry J., Senior director at the Center for the National Interest, a Washington, D.C.-based national security think tank founded by President Richard Nixon. He also serves as executive editor of its publishing arm, The National Interest. In the past, Harry served as a foreign policy adviser to the 2016 presidential campaign of Sen. Ted Cruz and as editor-and-chief of The Diplomat. “Trump is right -- NATO is obsolete, and he's delivering that message loud and clear” https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/trump-is-right-nato-is-obsolete-and-hes-delivering-that-message-loud-and-clear JH-NCP

President Trump continued his criticism of NATO Tuesday before he headed to Europe for a meeting of leaders of the 29-nation alliance Wednesday, trading barbed tweets with European Council President Donald Tusk. The testy exchange was further evidence that the president is right when he says that NATO – created in 1949 – has become obsolete.

The U.S. president understands one of the great cardinal rules of geopolitics that others seem to have forgotten: no alliance lasts forever. After almost 70 years, America and its NATO partners in Europe may be heading for a new relationship, while still remaining friends.

In an early morning tweet Tuesday, President Trump wrote: “Getting ready to leave for Europe. First meeting - NATO. The U.S. is spending many times more than any other country in order to protect them. Not fair to the U.S. taxpayer. On top of that we lose $151 Billion on Trade with the European Union. Charge us big Tariffs (& Barriers)!”

And in another tweet President Trump wrote: “NATO countries must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!”

Tusk responded with a tweet of his own: “Dear @realDonaldTrump. US doesn’t have and won’t have a better ally than EU. We spend on defense much more than Russia and as much as China. I hope you have no doubt this is an investment in our security, which cannot be said with confidence about Russian & Chinese spending.”

History teaches us obvious reasons for the breakup of alliances. Circumstances and threats change. One country’s mortal enemy one day could be the nation’s best friend the next. Just look back at World War II – our enemies Germany, Japan and Italy are our allies today. Our ally Russia (part of the Soviet Union back then) is our adversary.

There is only one constant when it comes to smart foreign policy. A nation seeks allies and partnership where it has common interests. Sometimes those alliances lose their value or importance over time and break up.

NATO was formed to defend against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. But the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact died in 1991 – and NATO’s original mission died then as well. Soviet tanks are no longer primed to head into Europe to conquer our NATO partners. NATO is now a world-class military alliance looking for a mission.

**China is the national security challenge of our time**. Russia does not even come close.

To be clear, Moscow is certainly a dangerous adversary. Its occupation and annexation of Crimea – thanks to its growing military might – as well as brutal chemical weapons attacks on British soil prove a rogue Russia needs to be deterred and confronted if need be.

But today’s Russia is not the superpower threat that the Soviet Union was. Over the long-term, demographic issues, economic stagnation and questions of who succeeds Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly ensure Moscow is not the boogeyman it once was.

Russia’s economy is roughly the size of Italy. But thanks to a tremendous amount of natural resources (particularly oil and natural gas) that it can sell, along with a military inheritance from the Soviet Union – including a large nuclear arsenal – Russia clearly poses a real threat to Europe that can’t be wished away.

But as President Trump has pointed out, if Europe really wanted to defend itself – and all NATO nations spent 2 percent their gross domestic products on defense, as they are supposed to be doing in the next few years – Russia would be no match for the might of just Britain, France and Germany alone.

Add in the capabilities of all the other members of the alliance – with America playing a small role as well – and Putin would, at least in theory, have every incentive to play nice for as long as he stays in power.

Instead, we have a situation where many of Europe’s major powers have armed forces that can barely do anything anymore. Having focused on developing expensive social welfare programs that cost billions of dollars every year, Europe has instead outsourced its defense to the U.S. military and U.S. taxpayers.

This forces America to put vital resources into Europe that are sorely needed elsewhere – **especially in Asia**. **Even having a military with a $700 billion annual budget** that is the best in the world **does not mean America can defend all our allies all over the world**. They have a responsibility to pay their fair share for their own defense and fill the ranks of their own armed forces, as President Trump has repeatedly pointed out.

America’s power and might must be focused on the greatest of all threats, with our partners and friends taking on the burden in other areas of the world that are closer to their doorstep.

With Chinese economic and military power on the rise, the U**.S. must concentrate its efforts on the rising Asian superpower** that **seeks to overthrow the international order** in the Asia-Pacific and turn large sections of the sea into **its own sovereign territory**. China is the national security challenge of our time. Russia does not even come close.

And then there is North Korea. As the world witnessed last weekend, Pyongyang will not be handing over its nuclear bombs anytime soon. Washington must focus as much of its diplomatic attention – and if need be, military might – on ensuring that we find a long-term solution to deal with North Korea. If we fail to do this, we are doomed to increased tensions like those that nearly brought East Asia to the brink of nuclear war last summer.

All this means that America’s available diplomatic and military bandwidth that it can devote to Europe must change. We must face up to the fact that **NATO**, in its present form, **is obsolete.** The alliance must evolve into an organization led and mostly resourced by Europeans.

So, is America going to quit NATO and go back across the Atlantic or abandon its allies in Europe? Never. Does that mean a wave of isolationism has infected Washington and we won’t honor our treaty commitments or push back against Moscow in another crisis? Not at all.

But it does mean a fundamental shift in burden that a Europe blessed with wealth and riches can easily maintain. However, if Europe is unwilling or unable to field a credible armed force to take on challenges from Russia or elsewhere, we must question the utility of an alliance that is a shell of what it used to be.

During World War I, the U.S. Army produced an iconic recruiting poster showing Uncle Sam pointing a finger at the viewer saying: “I WANT YOU FOR U.S. ARMY.” We could use a similar poster today for our NATO allies, saying: “I WANT YOU FOR YOUR OWN ARMIES.”

This is the message I expect President Trump will deliver in Europe. And it’s one our partners on the continent need to listen to.

### nato = russia expansionism

#### NATO expansionism led to the conflict in Ukraine – experts

**Boyle 3/8.** Francis A., professor of international law at the University of Illinois. “NATO expansion triggered Russia-Ukraine conflict” https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202203/08/WS6227091ba310cdd39bc8b3d0.html edited for gendered language JH-NCP

Given the United States’ numerous illegal invasions of other countries, especially its invasion of Iraq, based on lies conjured up by the US administration and institutions, it is in no position to lecture other countries on protecting human rights or abiding by international law.

People should understand the root cause behind the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The **bid to expand NATO poses is a serious threat to Russia**. A couple of days ago the Ukrainian leadership even called for immediately making Ukraine a NATO member so it can get direct military support from the cross-Atlantic alliance and acquire nuclear weapons, which would effectively reverse the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that facilitated the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state.

The situation in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine is grave, with the Ukrainian leadership refusing to implement the Minsk Agreement, which Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe signed in 2015 to end the ethnic conflict there in the region.

No Russian leader would have accepted the continuous eastward expansion of NATO. **Imagine what the US would do if Mexico were inclined to join a military alliance** led by a rival power and talk of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Former US president John Kennedy was prepared to invade Cuba if he could not get the missiles out of that country through negotiations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the world waited, seemingly on the brink of a nuclear war, hoping for a peaceful resolution. Thankfully, better sense prevailed over the US and Soviet leaders.

But Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t get a similar response from his US counterpart Joe Biden. Putin held negotiations with Western leaders, particularly Biden, to elicit a promise that NATO would not accept Ukraine as a member. But Biden ignored Russia’s concerns. As such, the **US and its allies don’t have good reason** to condemn Russia.

However, the military conflict in Ukraine must be immediately terminated, lest it expands and sucks in the European member states of NATO and the US. Toward that end, Biden must publicly announce that NATO will not expand eastward, and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova will not be made NATO members.

Biden must also call an international peace conference which will establish the permanent neutrality of Ukraine guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Following that, negotiations can take place between the US and Russia over the de-nuclearization of Europe including the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from NATO states which violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and restoration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that was recklessly terminated by the Donald Trump administration.

The origins of World War I and the World War II **hang like twin swords of Damocles** over the heads of humankind. So, concerted efforts should be made by all parties, the US in particular, to prevent another [hu]man-made disaster.

#### Integrated NATO escalates Ukraine war – western neoliberal expansionism into Russia’s backyard forces Putin to lash out.

**Awan 5/31/22.** Zamir Ahmed, Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan, Sinologist (ex-Diplomat), Non-Resident Fellow of CCG (Center for China and Globalization), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. “NATO EXPANSION IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF UKRAINE CRISIS” https://strafasia.com/nato-expansion-is-the-root-cause-of-ukraine-crisis/ JH-NCP

**NATO expansion is the root cause** which triggered Russia’s attack on Ukraine. The Eastern European countries which had formerly been party to the Warsaw Pact and had remained poor under USSR influence were tempted with lucrative incentives offered by NATO. In fact, **NATO was encircling Russia and squeezing it** from all possible directions, having deployed their defense forces and weapons around Russian territory and creating a genuine concern for the latter.

Russia had been trying to convince the US, UK, and EU to refrain from deploying NATO forces in its neighborhood. It **tried to resolve situation peacefully** and through diplomatic channels for eight years, but the West did not bother with it. The Second Minsk Agreement was a document aimed at resolving the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. It was agreed to on February 11-12, 2015 at a summit in Minsk by the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia in the Normandy Four format, and was signed by the Contact Group for the Peaceful Settlement of the Situation in Eastern Ukraine, consisting of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and the unrecognized Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. Later, the Minsk agreements were approved by a special resolution of the UN Security Council. However, **since the signing of the Minsk agreements, not one of their points has been implemented** by the Ukrainian side.

Western countries pushed the Ukrainians to avoid implementing these agreements as they needed another hot spot close to Russia. And they **were continuing to train Nazis, indoctrinating an anti-Russian policy and killing civilians**, including children, women and the elderly.

The Western media has launched a **massive campaign against Russia, distorting facts, spreading fake news, and malign narratives and fueling the situation**. The current irresponsible actions and statements from the EU, the UK, and the US have **forced** President Putin to put his nukes on high alert. The ill-motivated policy of arming civilians for a guerrilla war has also forced Russia to target the civil population in Ukraine. Initially, Russia was avoiding collateral damage and was focused only on command and control of security forces, but, with the distribution of arms to civilians, the targets of Russian forces grew to include the civilian population too.

War is never appreciated in any part of world. The loss of human lives is regretted; whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine etc., all human beings are same and deserve equal respect. In fact, human beings are the most precious thing in this universe and must be respected, protected and taken good care of, irrespective of race, nationality, religion and ethnicity. All humankind is equal and all mothers bear the same pains.

Events during the past few months constituted the last chance to avoid a hot war in Eastern Europe. Putin demanded that NATO provide guarantees on several security issues. Specifically, the Kremlin wanted binding assurances that the alliance would reduce the scope of its growing military presence in Eastern Europe and would never offer membership to Ukraine. He backed up those demands with a massive military buildup on Ukraine’s borders. The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s quest for meaningful Western concessions and security guarantees was **tepid and evasive**. Putin then clearly decided to escalate matters. Washington’s attempt to make Ukraine a NATO political and military pawn (even absent the country’s formal membership in the alliance) may end up costing the Ukrainian people dearly.

History will show that Washington’s treatment of Russia in the decades following the demise of the Soviet Union was a **policy blunder of epic proportions**. It was **entirely predictable that NATO expansion would ultimately lead to** a tragic, perhaps violent, breach of relations with Moscow. Perceptive analysts warned of the likely consequences, but those warnings went unheeded. The world is now paying the price for the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s **myopia and arrogance.**

#### NATO’s global expansionism forces Russia’s hand – leads to Russian expansionism and conflict

**Achcar 6/23/22.** Gilbert, professor at SOAS, University of London. “NATO From Bad to Worse” https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/ JH-NCP

Supporters of NATO’s eastward expansion wanted the US empire to encompass a large chunk of the former Soviet empire in the belief that, sooner or later, post-communist Russia would seek to revive its long imperial tradition. It was therefore necessary to preempt this inevitable development by securing US control of as much of the former Soviet empire as possible. Since Putin’s regime has indeed engaged in predatory behavior since 2008 in what has traditionally been regarded by Russia as its imperial “near abroad”—intervention in Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas in 2014, attempted invasion for “regime change” in Ukraine in 2022, and ongoing efforts to occupy the whole of Donbas and adjacent areas—one would be tempted to believe that those who advocated NATO’s enlargement have been proven right.

The truth is, however, that this outcome is **precisely what those who opposed the enlargement** had cautioned against. They rightly predicted that the Russians would see NATO’s eastward expansion as a hostile gesture and that it would therefore breed revanchist attitudes among them. In other words, they warned that **enlarging NATO in preemption of Russia’s return to imperial behavior would actually act as a self-fulfilling prophecy**.

The 1997 summit officially invited Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance. The three Eastern European countries’ accession was completed two years later at the Washington summit that celebrated NATO’s 50th anniversary. It happened at a time when the alliance was bombing Yugoslavia in contravention of international law, in the first post-1990 US-led war not authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

Along with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that circumvented yet again the UNSC, and NATO’s subsequent enlargement in 2004 to seven more East European countries, including the three Baltic states, which were formerly part of the USSR, this sequence of events was **decisive in creating the animosity between Russia** and the West that was a **prelude to the invasion of Ukraine.**

The forthcoming summit in Madrid will be the occasion of a major qualitative leap in the definition of NATO’s ~~raison d’être~~ [purpose], no less consequential than the 1997 summit. This is not an allusion to the formal invitation of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, although this development is certainly very significant, more so perhaps than all previous rounds of enlargement, because it will considerably lengthen NATO’s direct border with Russia (Finland’s border with Russia is 1,340 kilometers long). On this issue, the only question mark is Turkey’s position, since any new membership offer must be unanimously approved by all existing NATO members, a principle that grants each one of them an actual veto right. Ankara wants the two Nordic states to take measures against the Kurdish movement, strongly represented among refugees in both countries.

But the most dangerous novelty at the Madrid summit consists of a major qualitative extension of NATO’s purpose. Originally founded as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union and its subordinate states, NATO has mutated after 1991 into a “security organization”—meaning that it has been involved in military actions (NATO as such did not formally engage in any war in the USSR’s days)—and redefined its purpose in ostracizing post-Soviet Russia by expanding toward its borders. The NATO-Russia Council created in 1997 was a meager consolation given to Moscow in lieu of inviting it to join the alliance. Nobody was fooled. From tacit, NATO’s hostility to Russia became explicit after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The forthcoming Madrid summit is going to directly involve NATO in open hostility to China, far beyond the alliance’s original area of relevance. This area is defined in the 1949 treaty constitutive of NATO as comprising “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO’s post-1991 mutation led it to intervene beyond its members’ territory—first in the Balkans, then much further from its original area, in Afghanistan, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Participation in the organization’s meetings has nevertheless remained restricted to Europe and North America. No longer. Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the Madrid summit as NATO “partners” in the Asia-Pacific region—a very serious provocation to Beijing. It can only **interpret this invitation as a step toward the consolidation of US-led alliances** in a single global network opposed to both Russia and China. After the preliminary meeting of NATO’s defense ministers held on June 16, the organization’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, declared that the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted at the Madrid summit will set out the alliance’s position “on Russia, on emerging challenges, and for the first time, on China.”

From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June.

From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow.

These developments bring the world closer to a **conflagration** that could **dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine** and **endanger the future of humankind.** It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.

#### NATO expansion antagonized Russia but stretched resources too thin to combat resulting Russian agression

**Walt 18.** Stephen M., columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “NATO Isn’t What You Think It Is” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/ JH-NCP

3. NATO expansion was a mistake. Really.

If Trump is mostly confused about NATO, its most ardent defenders remain committed to a set of truisms and dogmas that were questionable when first advanced and have become less and less defensible with time. Chief among these myths is the idea that NATO expansion would create a vast zone of peace in Europe and give the alliance a new and lofty purpose in the wake of the Cold War.

It hasn’t quite worked out that way. For starters, NATO expansion poisoned relations with Russia and played a central role in creating conflicts between Russia and Georgia and Russia and Ukraine. It’s not the only reason, of course, and I’m not saying Moscow’s responses were legal, proper, justified, or based on an accurate perception of NATO’s intent. I’m only suggesting that **Russia’s response was not surprising**, especially in light of Russia’s own history and the George H.W. Bush administration’s earlier pledges not to move NATO “one inch eastward” following German reunification. The architects of expansion may have genuinely believed that moving NATO eastward posed no threat to Russia; unfortunately, Russia’s leaders never got the memo (and wouldn’t have believed it if they had).

Furthermore, expanding NATO increased the number of places the alliance was formally obligated to defend (most notably the Baltic states) but without significantly increasing the resources available to perform that task. Once again, proponents of expansion assumed these commitments would never have to be honored, only to wake up and discover they had written a blank check that might be difficult to cover. And we now know that expansion brought in some new members whose commitment to liberal democracy has proved to be fairly shallow. This situation may not be a fatal flaw, insofar as NATO has tolerated nondemocratic members (e.g., Turkey) in the past, but it undermines the proponents’ claim that NATO is a security community based on shared democratic values and an essential element of a liberal world order.

#### Pro-democracy NATO movements tilted Russia – it set the floor for the war

**Mearsheimer 14**, John J. Mearsheimer is a political scientist and IR specialist who started the offensive realist school of thought. (“Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” Hein Online. August 18th, 2014. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf) CTF

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian **leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement**, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, **the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected** and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” - - was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.

Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twentyfirst century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.

But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.

#### NATO caused European instability, violates ILaw, and refuses to enforce democracy – it fails at every goal

**Mahbubani 1/1** - Kishore Mahbubani is a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute. (“Asia, Say No to NATO,” Springer Link. January 1st, 2022. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-6811-1\_15) CTF

Something very dangerous happened a few weeks ago when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its meeting in Brussels. In its communique after the meeting on June 14, it identified China as a “systemic challenge” to areas “relevant to Alliance security”. The implicit message was clear: NATO would like to expand its tentacles beyond the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. All of us who live close to the Pacific Ocean, especially in East Asia, should be deeply concerned. If NATO comes to the Pacific, it only means trouble for us. Why? Three reasons. First, NATO is not a geopolitically wise organization. It did a brilliant job in the Cold War, deterring Soviet expansion into Europe. During the Cold War, it was careful and restrained, building up military capabilities and avoiding direct military conflicts. The Cold War ended 30 years ago. In theory, after “mission accomplished”, NATO should have shut down. In practice, it desperately looked for new missions. In the process**, it destabilized Europe**. It bears remembering that relations between Russia and NATO used to be much better, so much so that in 1994, Russia officially signed up to the Partnership for Peace, a program aimed at building trust between NATO and other European and former Soviet countries. But things fell apart because NATO rejected Russia’s repeated requests to refuse to accept new members in its “backyard”. Then, in April 2008, NATO pushed things further, opening the door to membership for Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. As US commentator Tom Friedman noted: “There is one thing future historians will surely remark upon, and that is the utter poverty of imagination that characterized US foreign policy in the late 1990s. They will note that one of the seminal events of this century took place between 1989 and 1992—the collapse of the Soviet Empire Thanks to Western resolve and the courage of Russian democrats, that Soviet empire collapsed without a shot, spawning a democratic Russia, setting free the former Soviet republics and leading to unprecedented arms control agreements with the US. And what was America’s response? It was to expand the NATO Cold-War alliance against Russia and bring it closer to Russia’s borders.” The result was inevitable. Russia had tried to be a friend of the NATO countries after the Cold War ended. Instead, it was slapped in the face with NATO expansion. Many Western media reports portray Russia as a “belligerent, aggressive actor”. They fail to mention that NATO actions generated this response. A truly dangerous moment surfaced in 2014 when it looked as if NATO was about to encroach into Ukraine with the ouster of its pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych by Western-supported demonstrators. For President Vladimir Putin, that was the last straw, and soon after came the seizure of Crimea, which the Russians consider part of their cultural heartland. The dangers of Western expansion into Ukraine were well known. Dr Henry Kissinger had pointed out that the Ukrainians “live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60% of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east is largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other—as has been the pattern—would lead eventually to civil war or break-up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East–West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and theWest—especially Russia and Europe—into a cooperative international system”. Sadly, since 2014, Ukraine has become a divided country. If NATO had shown greater geopolitical restraint, these problems could have been avoided. The second major weakness of post-Cold War NATO is that its behavior reflects the old adage: If you are a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Curiously, during the Cold War, NATO dropped very few bombs on foreign countries. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dropped a massive amount of bombs on many countries. Between March and June 1999, NATO bombing campaigns were estimated to have killed 500 civilians in the former Yugoslavia. NATO also dropped several thousand cluster bombs there, despite their use being illegal under the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions Treaty. NATO airstrikes in Libya in 2011 resulted in 7700 bombs dropped, and killed an estimated 70 civilians. Many of the bombing missions were illegal under international law. I vividly remember having dinner at the home of a former Canadian diplomat in Ottawa when NATO decided to bomb Yugoslav forces in 1999. This Canadian diplomat was deeply worried. Since this military campaign was neither an act of self-defense nor authorized by the United Nations Security Council, it was clearly and technically illegal under international lawIndeed, Ms Carla Del Ponte, a former special prosecutor in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, tried to investigate whether NATO committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Even though most NATO countries believe in the sanctity of international law, they applied so much political pressure that Ms Del Ponte could not carry out her investigations. Even worse, NATO has often started a military campaign and then walked away from the disastrous consequences of its intervention. Libya is a classic example of this. The NATO countries were exultant when Muammar Gaddafi was removed from Libya. However, after the country split apart and became caught up in a civil war, **NATO just walked away**. Many years ago, a wise former US secretary of state, Mr Colin Powell, warned against such military interventions by citing a common statement in crystal shops: “If you break it, you own it.” NATO failed to own the wreckage it left behind. This leads to the third danger: East Asia has developed, with the assistance of ASEAN, a very cautious and pragmatic geopolitical culture. In the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dropped several thousand bombs on many countries. By contrast, in the same period, no bombs have been dropped anywhere in East Asia. This is therefore the biggest danger we face in NATO expanding its tentacles from the Atlantic to the Pacific: It could end up exporting its disastrous militaristic culture to the relatively peaceful environment we have developed in East Asia. Indeed, if NATO was a wise, thinking, and learning organization, it should actually be studying the East Asian record—especially the ASEAN record of preserving peace—and learning lessons from it. Instead, it is doing the opposite, thereby creating real dangers for our region. In view of the risks to East Asia through the potential expansion of NATO culture, all of East Asia should speak with one voice and say no to NATO.

#### NATO expansionism and blundering made Putin feel surrounded and caused him to lash out

**Ullman 5/18/22.** Harlan K., Ph.D, is senior adviser at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the primary author of “shock and awe.” “Did NATO cause the war in Ukraine?” https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3484182-did-nato-cause-the-war-in-ukraine/ JH-NCP

In an interview last week with the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera, Pope Francis said that “NATO barking at Russia” caused the Kremlin “to react badly and unleash the conflict.” Yet, entirely dismissing the pope’s stunning remark might be short-sighted because, certainly, some U.S. and NATO actions **did indeed cause the Kremlin to “react badly.”**

Over the past 22 years in particular, several of America’s policies, miscues and miscalculations towards Russia have backfired. None can be used as an excuse for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal and horrific war in Ukraine. But a brief review of U.S.-Russian relations underscores the power of unintended consequences.

Putin became acting Russian president on New Year’s Day 2000, the same year George W. Bush would be elected America’s 43rd president. The Boris Yeltsin presidency left Russia in dire straits, psychologically damaged by the demise of its once superpower status. In his Millennium Address that day, Putin provided the outlines of how he would restore Russian greatness.

Initially, Bush and Putin got along. But the new administration’s obsession with Iran as the enemy led Bush to focus the Pentagon on missile defense and space. One consequence was that Bush announced America’s intent to withdraw from the 1974 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that had been central to the U.S.-USSR strategic relationship. Abrogating the treaty did not go down well in Moscow, especially given the the huge military technological lead the Kremlin believed Washington had after the 1991 Gulf War. That was before 9-11.

When America intervened in Afghanistan in late 2001, Putin was irritated because the Bush team rejected Russian advice based on its decade-long failure in that country. In 2003, Putin strongly counseled Bush against invading Iraq, as the Russian leader feared the region would be thrown into turmoil. And the continuing expansion of NATO was neuralgic for Russia. A series of U.S. administrations downplayed or ignored how serious this issue was for Russia.

At the Munich Security Conference, Putin unleashed an angry broadside against the U.S. as a “uni-power” and against NATO expansion. Participants were shocked by the intensity of Putin’s attacks but otherwise largely dismissed them. That was a mistake. It was clear that Putin believed he was being disrespected and marginalized by the U.S. and NATO, adding to his growing resentment about the patronizing treatment he believed Russia was receiving.

The 2008 NATO Summit at Bucharest was perhaps the turning point. Georgia and Ukraine had applied for NATO MAP — Membership Action Plan, the roadmap to full membership. Blocked by France and Germany, MAP was denied. But in a throwaway line, President Bush stated that Georgia and Ukraine could at some date join. That “promise” was included in the final summit report so as not to offend the American president.

Putin was outraged and told Bush “this will not stand,” echoing George H. W. Bush’s response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Bush dismissed the warning.

In 2008, Putin provoked Georgia to respond to a Russian “false flag” operation and subsequently occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia. With contested borders, Georgia was technically ineligible for NATO membership. Six years later, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine following the Maidan Square protests and the unseating of pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych, accusing Washington of abetting regime change.

In 2016, Russia was charged with interfering in U.S. presidential elections and widespread hacking operations. Despite President Trump’s attempt to improve relations with Putin, at best they remained frozen. Some Democrats accused Trump of being Putin’s “useful idiot.” And relations were made more toxic by a series of U.S. defense strategies, beginning with the Obama administration targeting Russia as one of five potential adversaries to be “deterred and, if war came, defeated.”

Perhaps the incompetent U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 convinced Putin he could take bold action in Ukraine without much risk. After massing troops on Ukraine’s borders, Russia subsequently sent demands to the U.S., NATO and EU calling for a new European security framework; NATO retraction to the West; and  denying Ukraine NATO  membership. Each was rejected.

Instead, the U.S. proposed talks on strategic stability and arms control, ignoring Putin’s key demands. When Putin decided to invade Ukraine is unclear. But from his perspective, he was left with no choice. Ukraine was a vital Russian interest to be resolved by war if necessary. The West failed to comprehend that.

Could any U.S. actions have prevented war? Probably not. But failure to consider unintended consequences is a lesson that should not be forgotten. Perhaps that is what the pope meant.

#### NATO expansionism since the end of the Soviet Union led up to the war in Ukraine

**Carpenter 2/24/22.** Ted Galen, Senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of 12 books and more than 900 articles on international affairs. “Ignored Warnings: How NATO Expansion Led To The Current Ukraine Tragedy” https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/02/ignored-warnings-how-nato-expansion-led-to-the-current-ukraine-tragedy/ JH-NCP

George Kennan, the intellectual father of America’s containment policy during the Cold War, perceptively warned in a May 2, 1998  New York Times interview about what the Senate’s ratification of NATO’s first round of expansion would set in motion. ”I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” Kennan stated. ”I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.  No one was threatening anybody else.”

He was right, but U.S. and NATO leaders proceeded with new rounds of expansion, including the provocative step of adding the three Baltic republics. Those countries not only had been part of the Soviet Union, but they had also been part of Russia’s empire during the Czarist era. That wave of expansion now had NATO perched on the border of the Russian Federation.

Moscow’s patience with NATO’s ever more intrusive behavior was wearing thin. The last reasonably friendly warning from Russia that the alliance needed to back off came in March 2007, when Putin addressed the annual Munich Security Conference. “NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders,” Putin complained. NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?  And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”

In his memoir, Duty, Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, stated his belief that “the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after [George H.W.] Bush left office in 1993.”Among other missteps, “U.S. agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation.” In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.” That move, he contended, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.”

The following year, the Kremlin demonstrated that its discontent with NATO’s continuing incursions into Russia’s security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Moscow exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro-Western government to launch a military offensive that brought Russian troops to the outskirts of the capital. Thereafter, Russia permanently detached two secessionist-minded Georgian regions and put them under effective Russian control.

Western (especially U.S.) leaders continued to blow through red warning light after a red warning light, however. The Obama administration’s shockingly arrogant meddling in Ukraine’s internal political affairs in 2013 and 2014 to help demonstrators overthrow Ukraine’s elected, pro‐​Russia president was the single most brazen provocation, and it caused tensions to spike. Moscow immediately responded by seizing and annexing Crimea, and a new cold war was underway with a vengeance.

Could the Ukraine Crisis Have Been Avoided?

Events during the past few months constituted the last chance to avoid a hot war in Eastern Europe. Putin demanded that NATO provide guarantees on several security issues. Specifically, the Kremlin wanted binding assurances that the alliance would reduce the scope of its growing military presence in Eastern Europe and would never offer membership to Ukraine. He backed up those demands with a massive military buildup on Ukraine’s borders. The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s quest for meaningful Western concessions and security guarantees was tepid and evasive.  Putin then clearly decided to escalate matters. Washington’s attempt to make Ukraine a NATO political and military pawn (even absent the country’s formal membership in the alliance) may end up costing the Ukrainian people dearly.

The Ukraine Tragedy

History will show that Washington’s treatment of Russia in the decades following the demise of the Soviet Union was a policy blunder of epic proportions.  It was entirely predictable that NATO expansion would ultimately lead to a tragic, perhaps violent, breach of relations with Moscow. Perceptive analysts warned of the likely consequences, but those warnings went unheeded.  We are now paying the price for the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s myopia and arrogance.

#### NATO cooperation worsens deterrence and provokes Russia war

**Carpenter 2022** (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies”, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-security-dependents-are-not-useful-allies> )//MargaretE

SINCE THE end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, the so‐​called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations.

Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better.

TROUBLING PROMISCUITY about acquiring weak U.S. security partners was evident even during the Cold War, and the tendency has become even more pronounced in the post‐​Cold War era. As the fiasco in Afghanistan (and its ugly predecessor in South Vietnam) confirmed, that problem with U.S. foreign policy has existed in multiple regions. However, the defect has become most acute with respect to Washington’s campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Since the mid‐​1990s, U.S. administrations have worked to add a menagerie of new NATO members, and it has done so with even less selectivity and good judgment than some people use to acquire Facebook friends.

Many of those new members have very little to offer to the United States as security partners. Indeed, some are mini‐​states, bordering on being micro‐​states. Such lightly armed Lilliputians would add little or nothing to Washington’s own capabilities—especially in a showdown with another major power.

As economic assets, their importance is decidedly limited, and militarily, they are even less valuable. It’s hard to see how new NATO allies such as Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia enhance America’s power and security. That point should be apparent based on size of population alone. Albania’s 2.87 million, North Macedonia’s 2.1 million, and Slovenia’s 2.07 million people put those countries squarely in the mini‐​state category, while Montenegro’s 628,000 barely deserves even that label. It doesn’t get much better with respect to either annual gross domestic product or size of military forces. Even Slovenia’s $52.8 billion GDP puts that country only eighty‐​sixth in the global rankings. Albania’s $15.2 billion (125th), North Macedonia’s $12.26 billion (135th) and Montenegro’s $4.78 billion (159th) are even less impressive.

The military forces that our new NATO allies can field are not likely to strike fear into Russia or any other would‐​be aggressor. Albania’s armed forces consist of 8,500 active‐​duty personnel, Slovenia’s consist of 8,500, and North Macedonia has 9,000 available. Montenegro’s active‐​duty force totals 2,400. In comparison, the Austin, Texas, police department has 2,422 people in its ranks.

Granted, the Cold War edition of NATO also had some mini‐​states as members, most notably Luxembourg and Iceland. However, those members were located within a stable, democratic Western Europe. Their defense also was geographically inseparable from Washington’s mission of protecting important military and economic players, such as West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, from what appeared to be a totalitarian superpower with expansionist ambitions. That situation was qualitatively different from Washington’s gratuitous post‐​Cold War decision to manage the security of quarrelsome mini‐​states in the chronically volatile Balkans. Since the mid‐​1990s, the United States has entangled itself in the region’s parochial spats, but giving some of the countries NATO membership intensified America’s exposure to needless risks and burdens.

THE RISK-BENEFIT calculation is even worse with respect to some of the other small nations that have joined NATO in the post‐​Cold War era. Those partners are not merely irrelevant from the standpoint of U.S. security; **they are potentially dangerous tripwires that could trigger a conflict between the United States and a nuclear‐​armed Russia.**

That point underscores one very important difference between individuals casually amassing Facebook friends and the United States promiscuously adding new security mendicants. Facebook friends do not have the ability to entangle anyone in armed conflicts; irresponsible security dependents definitely can do so. Indeed, there are multiple examples throughout history of such clients snaring their patrons into devastating, unnecessary wars. One notable example was how Tsarist Russia’s fateful decision to give strong backing to Serbia in the latter’s escalating quarrel with Austria‐​Hungary following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand helped ignite World War I—and caused the utter ruin of the Russian empire.

The United States is flirting with a similar danger today regarding its small clients in Eastern Europe. President George W. Bush’s decision to support the NATO membership bids of the three Baltic republics was—and remains—highly provocative to Russia. One crucial way to reduce the danger of armed clashes between great powers is to show mutual respect for respective spheres of influence. Washington has repeatedly violated that principle by pushing NATO to expand right up to Russia’s border.

#### Putin’s main concern is NATO – existence fuels his militarism and it’s a huge risk

Bender 2015 (Jeremy Bender eceived a BA in Middle Eastern Studies and religion from Rutgers University. He went on to teach English at Inonu University in Turkey through the Fulbright Program. He wrote briefly at BuzzFeed before coming to Business Insider, This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO, <https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2> )//MargaretE

For Putin, the peeling away of countries from Russia towards NATO comes as both an existential threat and a personal insult. As a former agent in the KGB and an avowed nationalist, Putin has dreams of resurrecting the glories of Imperial Russia — a goal that is seriously hampered by the inclusion of what Putin would deem rightful Russian lands, such as the Baltics, into the NATO alliance.

With this in mind, it is easy to see why Putin signed off on Russia's new military doctrine in December 2014. The doctrine, which placed explicit focus on **NATO being Moscow's main existential enemy** and threat, called on the **further militarization** of three geopolitical frontlines: the Russian Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland, the annexed Crimean peninsula, and the Arctic.

Putin almost certainly saw the uprising in Ukraine — during which the country's pro-Russian leadership was replaced in favor of a more western-friendly one in the beginning of 2014 — as the last straw. The subsequent annexation of Crimea and the backing of separatists in the east served to delay Ukraine's eventual pivot towards the European Union and NATO.

"**Expanding NATO further into post-Soviet space is a red line with Russia, and the US is frankly not in a position to challenge it without running a huge risk,"** Greg Scoblete of RealClearWorld told Forbes. "Put bluntly, Russia will be able to invade eastern Ukraine faster than the West could admit Ukraine into NATO to deter Russian aggression."

Indeed, Ukraine called for full integration into NATO in August 2014 once Russian armaments began to freely enter into the country. But NATO has steep membership requirements and there's no current timetable for admitting Ukraine into the alliance.

Today, Putin continues to consider the change in leadership Ukraine to be illegitimate and yet another tool of NATO expansion aimed at hemming in Russia.

"This is not the army, per se, this is a foreign proxy, in this case a foreign NATO legion, which, of course, doesn't pursue the objective of national interests of Ukraine," Putin said at the end of January. "They have entirely different goals, and they are tied with the achievement of the geopolitical goals of containing Russia."

#### Russia-NATO nuclear war causes extinction – scientific studies

Lynas 2022 (Mark Lynas s a British author and journalist whose work is focused on environmentalism and climate change. He is a contributor to New Statesman, The Ecologist, Granta and Geographical magazines, and The Guardian and The Observer newspapers in the UK, What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and Russia?, <https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2022/03/what-the-science-says-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/> )//MargaretE

Russian leader Vladimir Putin has suggested that he would consider using nuclear weapons if confronted with a NATO military response in Ukraine, or if faced with a direct threat to his person or regime. If the war spreads to a NATO country like Estonia or Poland a direct US-Russia confrontation would take place, with a clear danger of runaway nuclear escalation. **The world is therefore arguably now closer to nuclear conflict than at any time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis**. So what would a full-scale nuclear exchange look like in reality? Is it truly global Armageddon, or would it be survivable for some people and places? Many scientists have investigated this question already. Their work is surprisingly little known, likely because in peacetime no one wants to think the unthinkable. But we are no longer in peacetime and the shadows of multiple mushroom clouds are looming once again over our planet. Current nuclear weapons inventories The latest assessment of Russian nuclear military capability estimates that as of early 2022 Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,477 nuclear warheads — nearly 6,000 if “retired” warheads are included. The US maintains a similar inventory of 5,500 warheads, with 3,800 of those rapidly deployable. The explosive power of these weapons is difficult to comprehend. It has been estimated that about 3 million tons (megatons or Mt) of TNT equivalent were detonated in World War II. For comparison, each of the UK’s Trident submarines carries 4 megatons of TNT equivalent on 40 nuclear warheads, meaning each submarine can cause more explosive destruction than took place during the entirety of World War II. Hiroshima and Nagasaki In 1945 the US attacked the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, giving us two real-world examples of the effects of nuclear weapons on human populations. A total of 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 73,000 in Nagasaki died instantaneously or within five months due to the nuclear blast, intense radiant heat from the fireball and ionizing radiation. Many people caught within 1km of ground zero were carbonized by heat rays, and those up to 1.5km away suffered flash burning with large areas of skin later peeling off. Some, especially those inside buildings, were reduced to white bones as all flesh was vaporized by the intense heat. Many survivors, later to become known as hibakusha in Japanese, suffered acute radiation sickness (ARS) from neutron and gamma rays released by nuclear fission in the blasts. Symptoms included bloody diarrhea, hair loss, fever and intense thirst. Many later died. As well as direct radiation from the fireballs they were also exposed to radioactive fallout from the bomb. The longer-term effects of radiation experienced by the hibakusha have been intensively studied, and include increased levels of leukemia and solid cancers. However, experiencing an atomic bombing was not an automatic death sentence: among the 100,000 or so survivors the excess rates of cancer over the subsequent years were about 850, and leukemia less than 100. Hiroshima and Nagasaki show that — apart from short-term ARS — long-term radiation from fallout will be the least of our problems following a nuclear war. **Much more serious will be social collapse, famine and the breakdown of much of the planetary biosphere.** ‘Limited’ nuclear conflict – 100 warheads between India and Pakistan Prior to the Ukraine war it seemed very unlikely that the superpowers would confront each other again, so many researchers turned to studying the impacts of more limited nuclear conflicts. One study published two years ago looked at the likely impacts of a nuclear exchange of about 100 Hiroshima-sized detonations (15 kt yield each) on the most-populated urban areas of India and Pakistan. Each detonation was estimated to incinerate an area of 13 square km, with this scenario generating about 5 Tg (teragrams) of soot as smoke from wildfires and burning buildings entered the atmosphere. Direct human deaths in this “limited” nuclear war scenario are not quantified in the study, but would presumably number in the tens to hundreds of millions. The planetary impacts are also severe: as the soot reaches the stratosphere it circulates globally, blocking incoming solar radiation and dropping the Earth’s surface temperature by 1.8C in the first five years. This would be a greater cooling than caused by any recent volcanic eruption, and more than any climate perturbation for at least the last 1,000 years. Rainfall patterns are drastically altered, and total precipitation declines by about 8 percent. (These results come from widely-used climate models of the same types used to project long-term impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.) Food exports collapse as stocks are depleted within a single year, and by year four a total of 1.3 billion people face a loss of about a fifth of their current food supply. The researchers conclude that “a regional conflict using <1 percent of the worldwide nuclear arsenal could have adverse consequences for global food security unmatched in modern history.” A 2014 study of the same scenario (of a 100-weapon nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan) found that the soot penetrating the stratosphere would cause severe damage to the Earth’s ozone layer, increasing UV penetration by 30-80 percent over the mid-latitudes. This would cause “widespread damage to human health, agriculture, and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems,” the researchers wrote. “The combined cooling and enhanced UV would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine.” Full-scale nuclear exchange If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia? One 2008 study looked at a Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100 weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories held each by Russia and the US. Nuclear weapons held by other states were not used in this scenario, which has a 440-Mt explosive yield, equivalent to about 150 times all the bombs detonated in World War II. This full-scale nuclear war was estimated to cause 770 million direct deaths and generate 180 Tg of soot from burning cities and forests. In the US, about half the population would be within 5km of a ground zero, and a fifth of the country’s citizens would be killed outright. A subsequent study, published in 2019, looked at a comparable but slightly lower 150 Tg atmospheric soot injection following an equivalent scale nuclear war. The devastation causes so much smoke that only 30-40 percent of sunlight reaches the Earth’s surface for the subsequent six months. A massive drop in temperature follows, with the weather staying below freezing throughout the subsequent Northern Hemisphere summer. In Iowa, for example, the model shows temperatures staying below 0°C for 730 days straight. **There is no growing season. This is a true nuclear winter.** Nor is it just a short blip. Temperatures still drop below freezing in summer for several years thereafter, and global precipitation falls by half by years three and four. It takes over a decade for anything like climatic normality to return to the planet. By this time, most of Earth’s human population will be long dead. The world’s food production would crash by more than 90 percent, causing global famine that would kill billions by starvation. In most countries less than a quarter of the population survives by the end of year two in this scenario. Global fish stocks are decimated and the ozone layer collapses. The models are eerily specific. In the 4,400 warhead/150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario, averaged over the subsequent five years, China sees a reduction in food calories of 97.2 percent, France by 97.5 percent, Russia by 99.7 percent, the UK by 99.5 percent and the US by 98.9 percent. In all these countries, virtually everyone who survived the initial blasts would subsequently starve.

### china heg turn

#### EU-China cooperation on security and infrastructure is halted by US NATO presence

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The PR China had opened wide door to European military technology to invade into PR China’s defense sector since the economic embargo was lifted to transfer advanced military technology. Financial dynamic invested into PR China’s defense sector had completely changed situation over the past five years into military modernization process of the PR China’s army. Chinese President Xi Jinping has put an end to the practice of making any progress on international security cooperation with Europe conditional on the lifting of the embargo. This is the result of the PR China’s arms industry’s progress (Duchatel, 2018). The PR China had access to critical technologies that had speed up modernization process for ten years, and beside it had created main conditions for advanced innovation and leadership for the next generations of arms toward C4I updated technology. The PR China had paid off for some advanced hi-tech licensed equipment – those are being incorporated into Chinese military helicopters, ships and submarines, and were needed to speed up modernization process of China army but it seems that the EU thoughts ongoing into direction to prevent all transfers of dual-use technology to the PR China as to protect Europe’s critical technology. China’s economic intensions became doubtful about financial influence to invest more money by spending into common hi tech military projects together with Europe champions into defense sector as the PR China tries to increase pressure by lifting economic barriers to arms transfers and export controls. **The main barrier to deepening of the EU-PR China defense cooperation is the will of NATO allies and especially of the US** to preserve sensitive hi-tech military technology, whilst the PR China is still accused for industrial espionage and steeling military patents. Arms control measures among transferring hi – tech military technology to third states could not be secured by NATO protocol of regime export mil technology or under the PESCO projects carried out by the EDA control. The PR China may use hi-tech military projects to benefit itself to modernize own army into all military branches by following up European modernization process under Horizon 2020 projects. The defense companies from the EU shall take decision, if cooperate or not cooperate into the joint EU-PR China defense cooperation. The PR China had pleased the EU member states to fully participate into the Eurasian megaproject and invest more money to rebuild the Silk Road strategy toward the western part of Heartland. This invitation was referred on the defense cooperation too if EU states did not decide for protectionism. It was likely seen that the EU had been stuck between US and PR China’s economic influence from foreign geoeconomic investments. The PR China, meanwhile, “is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to re-order the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage,” the Strategy declares. And the Chinese military modernization program, it adds, is designed to achieve “regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the USA to achieve global pre-eminence in the future” (Morgan, 2018).

The EU and China signed a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2003, and adopted 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation in 2013. These agreements resulted from a mutual commitment to cooperation and signal an interest to further advance ties” (Dorussen, 2017: 2). Prominent role from EU states those had invested more money into defense sector into foreign business had cemented economic benefit in the PR China defense sector for some EU defense firms, to expand the global market for selling military goods out of the EU market, that became more relevant on global market inside the EU-PR China defense relation. Solidarity and unity were cracked down into one voice while decision making process inside European NATO pillar had been divided into two political blocks. Atlantic hub encountered against European hub for more centrists reproach toward federalization process to form the EU super state. Political dwindling, dividing and disunity (3D) had brought NATO alliance to crack solidarity and unity apart between Europe and the USA, only media black coverage had been disseminating lies into publicity that was everything fine within the EU-US bilateral cooperation under the NATO alliance but this was false flags signal to sweep rubbish under the political carpet. Those political, economic and defense cooperation for 3D reasons had worsened fragility under the NATO alliance. Otherwise, an alternative was opened as China signaled to EU states as to re-join Silk Road strategy on continent. China is willing to invest more money into EU critical infrastructure to reconnect roads and rails guided from Peking to Europe by transiting Russian territory.

Why is the EU important for PR China’s geoeconomic interests? Truly answer singles out: **the PR China wants Europe to counterbalance American power** while Europe is a softer partner than the US. The EU is weak, politically divided and militarily non-influential (Hanso, 2017: 125). China plays on the weakest point into the EU fragility while it knows well how to approach with multilateral diplomatic step as Beijing treats the relationship like a game of chess with 27 opponents crowding the other side of the chess board.

#### China leadership is key to solve warming

**Ballard 19** – Eden Ballard is a journalist at The Generation. (“CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC HEGEMONY,” The Generation. April 29th, 2019. <http://the-generation.net/climate-change-and-economic-hegemony/>) CTF

Where the US is stepping down, China is stepping up. One reason China is motivated to take action when the US is not lies in the fact that China, infamous for its unbreathable air, has already paid dearly for its dependency on coal. The International Energy Agency in Paris reports that fossil fuel emissions in China have close to tripled since 2000. This is mainly a reflection of China’s large population as per person emissions are lower than those in the US. In 2009, 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities8 were in China. Today only the bottom four cities on the top 20 list are in China because the government has been investing in sustainable technology such as electric cars, wind and solar energy, as well as implementing emission reducing legislation.

In 2013 and 2014, the Chinese government encouraged several pilot cap and trade programs that generated close to $680 million in the 2017 fiscal year. In December of 2017 China announced a new plan9 for an even more comprehensive nationwide market focusing on their power generation sector to trade emissions credits that allow businesses to buy and sell the credits that allow them to emit planet-warming greenhouse gases. Cap and trade programs10 are one of the most talked about ways to combat climate change using the free market. They incentivize business that use clean energy by limiting the total amount of emissions allowed to all companies and then allowing those that have not used all of the emissions they are allotted to sell them to companies that continue to pollute. Hypothetically, this incentivizes companies to go green by ensuring that eco-friendly policies save them money. The challenge with a cap and trade program is closing the loopholes so that heavy polluters cannot skirt around the issue and do, in fact, take initiative to limit emissions. Though there is room for some refinement, the existing measures are indicative of China’s awareness and sense of urgency around the issue of climate change.

China’s shift away from coal is not only environmentally responsible, it is also economically shrewd as they are setting themselves up for financial success for decades to come and effectively leaving the United States to wallow in what remains of their 20th century glory. The World Health Organization has acknowledged China’s efforts in curbing pollution and hopes that other nations will take a cue from their actions. In order to stay economically relevant, nations need to invest in sustainable energy sources. The Visual Capitalist cites the “the Green Revolution” as one of the 8 major forces shaping the future11 of the global economy as well as the fact that by 2040, a total of $10.2 trillion will be invested in new power generation capacity worldwide. Nations that chose to live in denial of their impact on climate change are also in denial of the fact that they are simultaneously becoming relics from a pre-climate change era.

**It’s time for nations around the world to follow China’s lead** and start thinking about negative externalities regardless of the scale of the project; inaction only exacerbates the issue. Each day is an opportunity for nations to redefine themselves and prepare for the future. As there are no binding international climate treaties already in existence, we don’t have the privilege of taking the time to reach a global agreement on what actions should be taken. Individual nation states must act rapidly and prudently to lead the charge by investing in sustainable practices by being practical and responsible inhabitants of Earth in order to both prevent further environmental damage and stay economically relevant.

### climate turn

#### NATO defense spending trades off with warming – keeping the alliance leads causes them to miss climate marks – the UN is key

**Lorincz 19** - Tamara Lorincz is a PhD candidate in the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University, and member of the Canadian Voice of Women for Peace. (“NATO is a threat to the climate.” Ricochet. December 19th, 2019. <https://ricochet.media/en/2859/nato-is-a-threat-to-the-climate>) CTF

Earlier this month, the 29 leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) went to London to celebrate their alliance’s anniversary but snubbed the opening of United Nations climate conference, where the other 164 world leaders and their delegations were meeting in Madrid.

Despite several scientific reports urgently warning about the devastating impacts and security implications of rising carbon emissions, climate change was not even on the NATO agenda.

Instead, the alliance leaders discussed Russia and China as adversaries, space as a new warfighting domain, greater warfare readiness and more defence spending.

Yet the Euro-Atlantic alliance instigates conflict with its combat troops along Russia’s borders and its containment measures against China. Space is a fragile global common that is already contaminated by debris and should be protected, not weaponized.

It is **NATO that is dangerously diverting our attention and resources to war and away from the grave threat of global warming**.

NATO members spend approximately $1 trillion annually on their militaries, which is more than 50 per cent of global military spending. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, members made a commitment to spend 2 per cent of their GDP on defence by 2024 with 20 per cent of that amount to be on equipment.

At this year’s London summit, Canada was repeatedly admonished for not spending enough on defence. However, the latest NATO expenditure report shows that Canada spent $29 billion on the Department of National Defence, which is 1.31 per cent of GDP. On a cash basis, Canada is now ranked 6th-highest among NATO members and 14th-highest in the world for military spending.

By contrast, according to the Public Accounts of Canada, the federal government spent only $1.8 billion on the Department of Environment and Climate Change, which is 0.08 per cent of GDP. Very little is allotted to the principal department tasked with protecting our natural environment.

Moreover, under the 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean Growth and Climate Change, $132 billion of new spending over the next 11 years was announced by the federal and provincial governments. However, Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong Secure Engaged, promised more than $553 billion to maintain “high-end warfighting” to meet NATO’s requirements.

To stay interoperable, NATO members have to constantly upgrade their military capabilities. This procurement primarily benefits the big U.S. arms manufacturers, which is why President Trump pushes alliance members to spend more on defence.

Yet fighter jets, attack helicopters, warships and armoured vehicles are petroleum powered and notoriously energy inefficient. Within NATO countries, it is the military that is the largest institutional consumer of oil and largest emitter of greenhouse gases.

Worse, in Canada like in other NATO members, the armed forces are exempted from reducing emissions from their military vehicles and operations.

On the eve of the Madrid climate conference, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said, “Our war against nature must stop.” It is NATO that is perpetuating this war against nature by fuelling a carbon-intensive arms race and fomenting an expensive new Cold War.

Unsurprisingly, the recent UN emissions gap report explains that Canada and the other **NATO countries are not on track to limit the global mean temperature** rise to 1.5C. This past decade while NATO has fought its deadly and destructive global war on terror, the planet has warmed to the hottest on record.

Shamefully, **NATO countries have also failed to meet their climate financing commitments**. These wealthy, polluting countries have not adequately invested in the UN Green Climate Fund and have pledged only a paltry $7.5 billion over the next four years to help poor, developing countries adapt to climate-induced droughts, fires and flooding.

Outside the NATO Summit, thousands of people from across the United Kingdom and Europe converged to call for the dissolution of the military alliance and for greater climate action. In Canada, people demonstrated in Toronto in solidarity against the NATO Association of Canada, an institution funded by U.S. weapons giants Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics.

As revealed by a recent YouGov poll, support for NATO is waning in key member states: the U.K., France and Germany. People are starting to see the military alliance as an aggressive, unaffordable anachronism that is polluting the climate and impeding progress on the Paris Agreement.

**A rapid reduction of greenhouse gases and a robust green new deal are not possible with rising military emissions and expenditures**. We must work peacefully and cooperatively through the UN system with Russia, China and the entire international community on solving our common security challenge — averting catastrophic climate change.

#### Global warming causes extinction through nonlinear feedback loops

**Ng 19** - Yew-Kwang Ng is an emeritus professor in the Department of Economics, a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and a member of Advisory Board, Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University. (“KEYNOTE: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” Wiley Online Library. February 7th, 2019. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12647>) CTF

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non-linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including: • the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming; • the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and • higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’

The threat of sea-level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of and rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

### bri turn – 1nc

#### US security pledges hinder Sino-EU cooperation

**Kuo 19** - Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting. (“Assessing the EU-China-US Triangle,” The Diplomat, November 5th, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/assessing-the-eu-china-us-triangle/>) CTF

\*\*\*BRI=Belt and Road Initiative: A global infrastructure project China created\*\*\*

Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Frans-Paul van der Putten – senior research fellow at Clingendael and co-coordinator of the Clingendael China Center in The Hague – is the 211th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain Brussels’ strategic objectives for EU involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The European Commission’s first significant response to the BRI was its agreement in September 2015 with China to set up a bilateral Connectivity Platform. As part of this platform, each year a high-level meeting takes place between the Chinese government and the European Commission. These meetings are aimed at improving Sino-EU cooperation on transport corridors within and between Europe and China. Although the connectivity platform continues to function, it does not appear to have resulted in any major practical instances of European engagement with or involvement in the BRI.

In September 2018 the EU published its Connectivity Strategy for Europe and Asia. This constituted a major shift in its approach to the BRI. The main aim of the EU’s Connectivity Strategy is not engagement with China: the strategy document refers to China only as one among many relevant parties and there is no mention of the BRI at all. And yet the EU Connectivity Strategy is primarily a response to the BRI, aimed at promoting a European alternative to the Chinese approach. The main concern of the European Commission appears to relate to China’s growing influence in the non-EU countries of the Western Balkans, but to a lesser extent also to Chinese influence within the EU, in particular in its eastern half, and in Asia. The Connectivity Strategy of the European Union entails technical cooperation on and financing of cross-border infrastructure ̶ transport, energy and digital ̶ that is based on the EU’s competition, environmental, and transparency standards. By taking this approach the EU is not only responding to the rise of China but also to the increasing importance of great power politics to the detriment of international rules and cooperation. Through its Connectivity Strategy the EU tries to strengthen its economic and diplomatic involvement in Eastern Europe and Asia, and its geopolitical relevance at the global level.

The EU took a further step in this direction in September 2019 when it convened the Europa Connectivity Forum to bring together stakeholders from a broad range of nationalities and sectors. The most important outcome of this event was an agreement by the EU and Japan to commence a bilateral “partnership on sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure.” This agreement is aimed at improved coordination between the EU and Japan in regard of their respective responses to China’s BRI.

The EU’s strategic objectives in regard to the BRI combine engagement with China on cross-border transportation, while pushing back China’s growing overall influence and strengthening the visibility and role of the EU as an autonomous actor among other great powers.

What is the impact of the U.S.-China trade dispute on Germany and the Netherlands as EU economic and export engines?

Uncertainty resulting from the U.S.-China trade dispute, along with Brexit, has contributed to the difficulties that German export-oriented industries are currently experiencing. The German economy is contracting and appears to be falling into a recession. Also, in the Netherlands exports and investments are suffering from the dispute. Dutch economic growth remained stable in the first half of 2019, but is expected to decline in the second half and beyond. Some Dutch companies have been directly affected by the trade dispute. For instance, Philips recently announced that profits for this year will be lower due to the trade dispute. The company produces goods in the U.S. for the Chinese market and vice versa. Restructuring its production base takes time and is costly.

Assess whether EU-U.S. tariff tensions would compel Brussels and Berlin to rebalance toward China and Asia.

The EU and its member states are not likely to rebalance towards China and Asia, but they are looking for ways to increase European “strategic autonomy.” Through NATO, the U.S. continues to be Europe’s main security provider. Europe needs the U.S. as a counterbalance to Russia. **As long as this remains so, the EU and its member states will remain geopolitically much closer to the U.S. than to China**. Nevertheless, the European Union is likely to look for ways to diminish its economic and financial dependence on the United States. EU and U.S. interests are often aligned but not always, and from a European point of view the U.S. is less dependable as a long-term partner than it used to be. In my view, EU-U.S. tariff tensions are not a crucial issue, but an escalation of U.S.-China geopolitical competition would be. Potential U.S. pressure, at some point in the future, on Europe to decouple economically from China, to end cooperation with China within international organizations, or to participate in military activities directed against China would probably create severe transatlantic tensions.

#### BRI is K2 the international economy

**Hillman and Sacks 21** – Jennifer A. Hillman is a senior fellow for trade and international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relation. David Sacks is a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Co-chairs were Jacob J. Lew (former Secretary of Treasury) and Gary Roughead (former Navy Admiral). (“China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States,” Council on Foreign Relations. March 23rd, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/findings>) CTF

BRI’s size and scope give it the potential to boost global gross domestic product (GDP) by as much as $7.1 trillion by 2040 and reduce global trade costs by up to 2.2 percent.30 It promises to provide much-needed financing to developing countries, helping build the infrastructure necessary to erase blackouts, ease transportation bottlenecks, and make many economies more globally competitive. The United States, even if not formally part of BRI, would likely benefit in some ways if BRI builds infrastructure that accelerates global economic growth.

Were U.S. companies able to sell equipment and material required in the production, maintenance, or operation of the infrastructure built in BRI countries, those U.S. firms would stand to profit. To the extent that modern infrastructure lowers transportation and communications costs in BRI countries, U.S. producers trading with and operating out of those countries would also benefit. Global political stability usually accompanies sustained economic growth, and the United States would benefit from greater stability throughout the developing world.

#### Economic interdependence stop wars

**Tanious 19** – Mina E. Tanious is a political science expert. (“The impact of economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states: The case of “American–Chinese relationship on Taiwan since 1995,” Enmerald Insight. January 23rd, 2019. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-10-2018-010/full/html#:~:text=Liberals%20argue%20that%20economic%20interdependence%20lowers%20the%20likelihood%20of%20war,would%20rather%20trade%20than%20invade>.) CTF

Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression; interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism (Copeland, 1996, p. 5).

Liberals view that increasing ties between countries in some fields encourages them to achieve greater cooperation in other fields. These linkages are supposed to strengthen communication and reduce misunderstandings which may cause tension and creates cultural and institutional mechanisms capable of mediating conflicts that may arise between them. At the same time, mutual recognition of mutual benefits enhances peace.

Liberals believe that economic relations between nations lead to peace, with liberals pointing to three important points (Korbel and Chen, 2009, p. 15):

The costs of waging a war against state’s economic partner are very high because fighting against a partner with which the state trade and invest, the state actually fights against itself because a war between the state and its partner must have a negative effect on the state’s economy.

Economic ties change states’ preferences when economic ties between two states become stronger and these two states become more economically interdependent or even integrated, economic interests – compared with other national interests such as military buildup – become the most important.

Strong economic ties make non-military threats such as economic sanctions credible. Therefore, when there is a conflict between two states that have strong economic ties, a non-military threat is more likely to be the choice.

### bri turn – 2nc

#### The European market is the key destination for BRI BUT US driven political differences inhibit BRI progress

Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinas-approach-belt-and-road-initiative-and-europes-response-25980>) CTF

During the last four decades, China experienced impressive economic growth, becoming one of the leading powers of the global economy. After a century of humiliation imposed by Western and Japanese colonial powers, today the country is demonstrating a strong desire to achieve its national rejuvenation (guojia fuxing). Indeed, under the iconic leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is adopting an increasingly assertive international behavior, balancing the need to protect its sovereignty and strategic interests related to economic and security issues, and the ambition to restore its role of a great power[1]. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - a massive infrastructure project to improve connectivity between the East and the West, increase regional cooperation and facilitate trade and investments - has been described as China’s grand strategy championing its global governance ambitions[2]. Indeed, BRI-participating economies represent more than one-third of global GDP, and over half of the world’s population (OECD 2017).

From the perspective of the Western world, the BRI has been the most highly debated, heavily criticized and poorly understood policy framework of the 21st century. Considering that **the European market is the key strategic destination** for the BRI, the Chinese project and a new manifestation of China’s soft power have been perceived as a threat to a global order shaped by the US’ hegemony. In the past two decades, China and the European Union, two of the three largest economies in the world and major trading partners, increasingly tightened their economic and political relations[3]. However, promising potential for cooperation is repeatedly undermined by major political differences (Farnell & Crookes 2016), and EU member states failed to adopt a common response to the Chinese initiative.

#### NATO causes skepticism over BRI

Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinas-approach-belt-and-road-initiative-and-europes-response-25980>) CTF

Main reasons behind the EU’s skepticism about China’s BRI

The reasons explaining the weak engagement and scarce enthusiasm of the EU towards the Chinese BRI are related to the lack of mutual trust and a general sentiment of skepticism about China’s increased assertiveness, mainly justified by the huge divide in terms of values, ideologies and political systems. The BRI has been presented as a strategic “bag” or “container” into which virtually everything can be thrown (Yu 2018). Although the media and official papers linked several projects to the BRI, like German and Polish railway connections or the Piraeus port in Greece as the 21th century Maritime Silk Road’s access to the European Market[27], the links of the BRI to Europe have not been clearly defined by China, resulting in an unclear understanding by the EU of the role and the ambition of the Chinese projects. Internally, the BRI is suffering from a lack of policy and bureaucratic coordination (Yu 2018), reinforcing this lack of clarity in the eyes of foreign investors and partners. Indeed, no clear responsibilities have been assigned among central committees, local government bodies, SOEs and so forth, and no clear framework or guidelines have been designed to categorize BRI investments, creating bureaucratic opaqueness and scarce transparency on how and who makes decisions about BRI-related investments[28].

Also considering the EU’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its historical transatlantic partnership with the US, the EU-China relationship and the EU approach to the BRI also have important geopolitical implications in the balance of powers and policy-making of these great powers. In today’s global order, where new rising powers like China are gradually weakening the US’ hegemony and creating an increasingly multilateral system, the EU’s economy and security are still very much dependent on the US. However, considering also that the impact of the BRI on Sino-European economic relations remains limited, the main significance of the BRI for transatlantic relations is symbolic (Kuo 2019). In other words, the need to show a single and strong voice to respond to Chinese assertiveness and protect EU values and standards is aimed at avoiding potential transatlantic frictions, even in the present historic moment where the EU and the US have increasingly divergent interests and the EU is likely to diminish its economic and financial dependence on the US in this new multilateral global order[29].

#### The BRI spread Chinese messages of peace and diplomacy

Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinas-approach-belt-and-road-initiative-and-europes-response-25980>) CTF

Background: China’s Belt and Road Initiative

On 7 September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched at Nazarbayev University in Astana (Kazakhstan) the idea of building a new “economic belt along the Silk Road”[8] to connect China, the Middle East and Europe through economic and cultural corridors. Mainly framed as a policy to promote friendship and people-to-people exchanges and build a bright future by reinforcing multilateral collaboration and cultural relationships in the region[9], the BRI is an ambitious and China-sponsored project of massive infrastructure investments and trade agreements aimed at improving connectivity along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

China designed the BRI to achieve important national economic and geopolitical objectives such as maintaining sustainable economic growth, expanding its export markets for hi-tech sectors developed under “Made in China 2025”, escaping the middle-income trap and boosting the economic development of its rural and internal regions. However, defining the BRI as a mere strategy to build infrastructures and improve trade connectivity would be absolutely reductive.

Thanks to its impressive economic growth, which started after its opening up in 1979, China is today one of leading powers reshaping the new 21st century world order and the dynamics of the global economy, shifting the balance of power from the West to the East. With the ambition to replace today’s global leadership vacuum, **China designed the BRI as a vision to spread its benevolence around the world and build a community of common destiny**. To build a diplomatic umbrella, China used images and ideas aligned with Chinese strategic thoughts and national narratives. Indeed, the country’s rhetoric is based on the idea of spreading unity and harmony and creating a new “all-under-Heaven” [10] where every country can achieve prosperity through win-win cooperation, trust and friendship.

Moreover, the ambitions behind the BRI cannot be fully explained without referring to the charismatic leadership of President Xi Jinping and his modern Chinese “philosophy” explained in a set of policies and ideas titled “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Since the beginning of his mandate, President Xi emerged as a paramount leader, striving to achieve China’s Dream through the consolidation of his power. His political reform agenda and its anti-corruption campaign reinforced the central role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and consolidated his power by reducing internal factional politics and critics. For instance, the constitutional reform, which abolished the two-term limit of the presidential mandate, clearly shows the desire to extend Xi’s mandate beyond 2023. As a chairman of the newly established National Security Commission and the Leading Small Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, he de facto controls strategic economic policies and decisions related to domestic and external security, and as a Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, his role is strongly legitimized by the Chinese military. It is not surprising that the BRI has been widely described as President Xi’s flagship policy to reaffirm the role of China as a great global power.

#### BRI increases the attraction of China as a geopolitical actor

Grimes 16 - William W. Grimes is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. (“The Belt & Road Initiative as Power Resource: Lessons from Japan,” The Asian Forum. April 15th. <https://theasanforum.org/the-belt-road-initiative-as-power-resource-lessons-from-japan/>) CTF

Of course, BRI is not just an economic exercise. The promise of trillions of dollars in new investment and a reordering of production networks on a regional basis will necessarily have significant political effects. But what will they be? While it may appear obvious that such a large venture would create political benefits for China, it is worth examining how it might do so. There are three main ways in which economics translates into power: transactional power, structural power, and “soft power.”6 Here, I consider each, in turn, as it applies to BRI.

Transactional power is, at its core, a quid pro quo.In economic terms, a transaction implies a price at which an exchange takes place. This makes for a fairly simple measure of power—having sufficient resources to pay a counterpart the price it requires to forgo its own preferred course of action in favor of the payer’s preferred course of action. In the political economy literature, such transactions are often referred to as “side payments,” and are described approvingly as a way to induce cooperation. More broadly, a powerful actor can shape the behavior of its counterpart by promising benefits for compliance or threatening consequences for non-compliance. A classic example at the international level is aid—by offering grant aid (or even loan aid, if it is concessional or if the recipient is credit-constrained), the aid provider may be able to affect either specific behaviors (e.g., an infrastructure project that privileges firms based in the providing country) or more indirectly buy “friendship,” in the form of political support or security cooperation.

Many of the political analyses of BRI and AIIB focus on their potential for providing China with substantially expanded transactional power. The logic is simple. On an absolute basis, China will be providing large amounts of funding for infrastructure, which can benefit the recipient, regardless of whether “recipient” is defined as the economy, the government, particular interest groups, or even specific individuals. From the point of view of the United States and Japan, the relative dimension is, perhaps, equally important: assuming that neither the United States nor Japan will be ramping up their own economic contributions to the same extent, **China’s relative attractiveness** as a political and economic partner would grow. Moreover, this effect would be compounded if Chinese money were to come with fewer strings attached. (In economic terms, this both lowers the cost of accepting funds, and potentially increases the likelihood that the recipient’s utility will be increased because the projects chosen are more likely to reflect its preferences than those of the providers.)

BRI might also contribute to Chinese structural power—particularly regionally, but also, perhaps, globally. A variety of scholars have written about structural power, with occasionally differing emphases or understanding.7 While the definition and measurement of structural power remain contested, there are two strands that are relevant to this discussion. The first can be summarized as “dependence” or “entrapment.” Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s analysis of pre-WWII German economic activities in Central and Eastern Europe (particularly infrastructural development and changing shares of trade and investment), this strand argues that economies that are particularly dependent on a much larger economy become vulnerable to its blandishments and threats. In this version of structural power, because of the path dependence of some economic activities such as connectivity, the stronger economy gains enormous potential transactional power. Regardless of whether threats are actually made or carried out, the dependence of the weaker economy tends to change its behavior to meet the preferences of its stronger partner.

The other version of structural power operates at the systemic level. As Gilpin and others have written, this is a story of how the great powers create rules and systemic incentives that shape the behavior of others in the system. The classic example is the postwar global system, whose rules and institutions (e.g., free trade and capitalism, as embodied and supported by institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization) profoundly shape international and transnational interactions. These institutions reward compliance with prosperity and threaten obsolescence (what Garrett and Lange call the “costs of closure”) for states that reject those norms and rules. **The apotheosis of structural power is hegemonic power**, where a single state has disproportionate influence on the rules and institutions, affecting the behavior of every state and economic actor in the system. A variety of Chinese official pronouncements have suggested dissatisfaction with the existing, US-created system, which suggests that China might seek to erode the monopoly of the Bretton Woods institutions, and, thus, US global hegemony. The BRI and AIIB could also be seen as an attempt to create a regional order, in which China sets rules and norms for neighbors, particularly in Central and Southeast Asia

The final lens through which to analyze the effects of OBOR and AIIB on China’s regional power is the concept of “soft power.” Soft power has become a common and often misused term, with some writers using it to describe nearly everything short of military action and others valorizing the pursuit of likeability over interests. At its core, however, soft power is the ability to attract and persuade others, i.e., to provide a model that is compelling enough to others that they voluntarily choose actions or policies that are preferred by the leading power. As Joseph Nye puts it: “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”8 In this conception, the power of the United States rests at least to some extent on the attractiveness of its culture, ideals, scientific accomplishments, material prosperity, or other values besides its ability to reward or punish specific behavior or to set the rules that others must follow. As Evelyn Goh has perceptively written, international order cannot be understood only in terms of leadership, but quite crucially as a relationship between the leader(s) and followers.9 This is true of all forms of political power, which are inherently relational, but the sentiments of followers are particularly crucial to the operation of soft power.

#### The BRI is key to Chinese geoeconomics influence and hegemony

Beeson and Crawford 2/10 – Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia in Perth. Corey Crawford is a professor at the University of Western Australia. (“Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony and Geoeconomics,” Springer. February 10th, 2022. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y>) CTF

The ‘rise of China’ or—more accurately—China’s re-emergence as the most important actor in what we now think of as East Asia is one of the most important developments in world history. This may strike some readers as an extravagant claim, but it is not without foundation. Not only is the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on track to overtake the United States’ (US) as the world’s largest economy in the near future (Cheng and Lee 2021), but it is the first credible candidate to become a non-Western hegemonic power. The fact that it is from Asia is noteworthy enough; the idea that it is a ‘communist’ power that subscribes to a very different idea about the best ways of organising social, political, economic, and strategic activities is even more remarkable. At the very least, the PRC’s ascension provides a striking illustration of the possibility that very **different routes to global power are conceivable**. The key questions in this context are not just whether ‘Chinese hegemony’ is possible, but how it might differ from the more familiar American variety that has dominated the international system and the world views of nearly everyone alive today.

To try and answer these questions, we focus on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). If successfully realised, the BRI will be the most ambitious and expansive developmental project the world has ever seen. While there has been an unsurprising flurry of interest inside and outside China about the development of the BRI (Beeson 2020a, b; Clarke 2017; Winter 2019), there have been few attempts to place the BRI in comparative perspective, or to consider it as an expression of possible hegemonic influence. Given that the BRI is not unprecedented, this is surprising. After all, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US developed what was then an equally unprecedented and ambitious initiative designed to simultaneously facilitate the (re)development of some of the world’s key economies and reinforce its own position as the leader of the non-communist world (Pollard 1985).

Both the American Marshall Plan and China’s BRI are, therefore, important expressions of what has been described as ‘**geoeconomic’ influence and power** (Blackwill and Harris 2016; Luttwak 1990). In what follows, we compare the two projects to try and gauge the prospects for the BRI and some of its associated institutions. Significantly, the BRI lacks the same sort of compelling geopolitical imperatives and narrative that the emerging Cold War provided for the US and its allies (Gaddis 1982). At this point, at least, the Chinese project also lacks the comprehensive institutional architecture that facilitated American ‘hegemonic’ influence. Consequently, we argue that it may prove more difficult for China to impose or develop the same sort of coherent vision and geopolitical goals that the Americans did, raising doubts about its long-term significance, despite its unparalleled ambitions (Beeson 2009).

#### BRI solves southeast Asian stability

Wuthnow 17 – Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University. (“Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative:

Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications,” INSS “China Strategic Perspective” Chapter 12. October 2017. <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ChinaPerspectives-12-1.pdf>) CTF

One common argument in Chinese analyses of the BRI is that regional integration will contribute to a more stable security environment, especially around China’s southern and western periphery. This argument both reflects and supports Xi’s broader vision for a new regional order—often described as a “community of common destiny” or “community of shared interests”—in which economic development and cooperative security reinforce each other.27 China’s 2017 white paper on Asia-Pacific security explains the logic:

Security and development are closely linked and mutually complementary. Equal consideration should be given to both a security framework and an economic framework—the main components of the entire regional structure—to ensure their parallel development. On the one hand, the improvement of the security framework will help ensure a peaceful and stable environment for economic development; on the other, faster regional economic integration will provide solid economic and social support for the development of the security framework.28

This is not an abstract goal but rather vital to the mitigation of a range of security challenges within and around China’s borders, including terrorism, separatism, and extremism (known as the “three evils”), territorial disputes with India in the Himalayas and with several Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea, and the alleged fomenting of “color revolutions” by the United States.29 Along these lines, Chinese scholars argue that the BRI can help improve stability in several ways:

Mitigating the sources of violence in fragile states. Retired Major General Wang Haiyun, a senior advisor at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), claims that economic growth created by the BRI will “eradicate poverty,” which is a “root cause” of terrorism and extremism, and play a role in “diffusing clashes of civilization that should actually never happen, and calming the restless social sentiments of Islamic regions.”30 This could reduce perceived threats such as those posed by Uighur separatists and militants of the so-called Islamic State (IS) infiltrating into China.31

Ameliorating territorial disputes. Wang Junsheng, a scholar at the CASS National Institute of International Strategy, argues that the BRI will help resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea by moving leaders away from a “zero sum” mindset. As evidence, he claims that Vietnam’s participation in BRI projects has lowered tensions between Beijing and Hanoi in the South China Sea, and led to stronger overall Sino-Vietnamese relations.32 Hu Bo, a research fellow at Beijing University, similarly argues that one goal of the BRI is to alleviate maritime disputes, though this does not imply that China will “sacrifice” its “legal rights” to enforce territorial claims.33

Increasing mutual trust.34 Li Gang, a scholar at the Central Party School’s Institute of International Strategy, argues that the BRI will exhibit China’s virtues of “openness, trustworthiness, inclusivity, and development,” and thus convince other states of its peaceful intentions.35 Renmin University professor Wang Yiwei likewise contends that trust gained through “civil and local interactions” in creating the BCIM economic corridor will help Beijing and New Delhi overcome historical suspicions.36

Building more effective security partnerships. Central Party School scholar Sun Xianpu argues that China can expand CT intelligence sharing, training, and technical exchanges under the BRI framework, citing closer CT cooperation with Pakistan as an example. Sun also anticipates greater cooperation in the areas of counternarcotics in Southeast Asia, and counterpiracy in South Asia.37 Senior Colonel Meng Xiangqing, a professor at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) NDU, similarly argues that the BRI will lead to closer CT cooperation among Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, which is needed to address violent extremism and to stabilize Afghanistan following a reduction of U.S. forces.38

A weakness of the Chinese literature is that it tends to assert rather than substantiate a causal relationship between development and security. This tendency underscores official rhetoric promoting the “community of common destiny,” but ignores contentious debates in international relations and policy circles about the linkages between regional integration and conflict. Many studies, of course, support the argument that regional trade integration helps reduce conflict.39 Others, however, have found either no relationship or suggest that high levels of economic interdependence could even increase the chance of interstate militarized disputes in some cases.40 Moreover, Chinese analyses often fail to consider how regional integration may be increasing transnational security threats, such as facilitating international crime.41 By ignoring these perspectives, China’s security community might not have adequately considered the possible externalities of BRI projects.

#### Chinese heg good

Jing 15 – Lu Jing is the director of the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University. (“China’s rise will restore history of peaceful benefits for its neighbors,” The Global Times. February 15th, 2015. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/907832.shtml>) CTF

Early this year, a special seven-part series of documentary titled Super China, which was produced by the state-run Korean Broadcasting System, have sparked South Korean discussions about the "China threat."

The "China threat" theory has been widely circulated and constantly hyped by Western countries during China's rise and is often cited by China's neighboring countries. It typically reflects the Western thinking of realpolitik in international relations.

In fact, be it in history or in the current stage, a powerful China has never posed a threat to the peace and stability of its neighboring countries or the whole world, but instead it has created a positive influence.

People may infer that a mighty China will manifest its identity by all means based on their memory of the Middle Kingdom or the tributary system.

However, looking back, China in its powerful times was always favorable to others in economic ties, adhered to the principle of benevolence in political relations and was cautious about resorting to force. Having been through harsh humiliation in recent history, today's China holds firmly that one should not impose his or her beliefs on anyone else.

Today, a rising China is determined to guide and exercise its relations with the outside world by using new diplomatic mind-set focused on win-win cooperation. China has realized that if a country wants to seek development, security and well-being, it has to allow others to have them.

It is out of this concept that China has taken on more and more duties as a big power to safeguard the prosperity and stability in the region and the world.

While China has proposed to build a new type of major power relationship, it also adopts the principles of closeness, sincerity, sharing in prosperity and inclusiveness in fostering neighborhood relations to make neighbors benefit from China's development. China has become the largest trade partner and export destination and exporter of many neighboring countries.

China has proactively joined the efforts to address global issues that range from the UN peacekeeping missions, prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, climate change, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons to a series of regional hot-spot issues. Its roles are highly recognized.

China remains a developing country faced with arduous development problems and needs a stable international environment. It means a lot for China to prevent the world from falling into violence and tumult.

A weak China will actually serve as a threat to the neighborhood stability. China's feebleness in recent history not only invited a century-long humiliation for itself, but it also drew in the countries around. If China with its more than 1.3 billion population is still mired in poverty and turbulence or even undergoes internal collapse, the resulting problems of refugees and emigrants will pose a threat to the neighborhood and the rest of the world.

As President Xi Jinping noted in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2013, a well-developed China with over 1.3 billion people will bring tangible benefits to the world. On the contrary, if China becomes feeble, it will be a matter of grave concern for the world.

The rising might of a country can't decide whether it will bring threats or opportunities to the outside world. The key lies in the diplomatic mind-set it advocates and in what ways it carries out its diplomacy.

#### Current mechanisms for trade fail

Donato 20 – Giulia Di Donato is a journalist at ISPI. (“China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s Response,” ISPI. May 8th, 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinas-approach-belt-and-road-initiative-and-europes-response-25980>) CTF

Today, the European Union, as the final destination of the BRI and a key targeted export market for Chinese products, has critical strategic importance for the success of this ambitious Chinese project. Although the ports of Piraeus in Greece and Venice in Italy have been indicated in the official maps as the main end points of the BRI, it still remains unclear whether Chinese interests could be further expanded into other routes and whether other terminals will be targeted as entry points in the EU and the Mediterranean[15].

In 2015, Hungary was the first European country to sign a MoU with China under the BRI and, by 2019, another 22 European countries had signed BRI co-operation agreements, with the latest being Luxembourg and Italy[16]. However, leaders of countries like France and Germany, which refused to officially participate in the BRI, adopted a more cautious approach and expressed their concerns about the Chinese-sponsored project. In particular, they advocated for more balanced rules to avoid a “one-way trade road” and the increase of China’s influence in the Balkans[17].

In 2013, the same year the BRI was launched, the EU and China adopted the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, calling for increased cooperation to promote peace, prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges[18]. Nonetheless, in 2015 the EU launched the “EU-China Connectivity Platform”, the European Commission’s first significant response to the BRI (Kuo 2019). Established by the European Commission and the National Development and Reform Commission of China, this bilateral platform was aimed at improving transparency, reciprocity in market access and a level playing field for businesses in the area of transport infrastructure, as well as enhancing synergies between the EU’s connectivity projects, including the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)[19] and China’s Belt and Road Initiative[20]. The main tangible result of this platform relates to the organization of annual high-level meetings bringing together chairpersons and expert groups from both sides to foster their collaboration on transport infrastructure projects. However, although the connectivity platform continues to function, it does not appear to have resulted in any major practical instances of European engagement with or involvement in the BRI (Kuo 2019).

### finland/sweden turn

#### Turkey objects to NATO membership for Finland and Sweden now but the plan smooths out relations among NATO allies and allows them to join

**Turak 5/17.** Natasha, Correspondent, CNBC. “WORLD POLITICS ‘The stakes here are now massive’: Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland” https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/will-turkey-block-nato-membership-for-sweden-and-finland.html JH-NCP

Why is this so crucial?

Sweden and Finland are on the brink of applying for membership in NATO, after the governments of both countries expressed their support for the move to abandon their traditional positions of nonalignment between the alliance and Russia.

This would expand the Western defense organization’s clout and territory and make a dramatic statement in pushing back against Russia, and has already **spurred anger and threats** from Moscow. Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, but not NATO, and the latter shares an 830-mile border with Russia.

The two countries joining NATO would give Moscow “more **officially registered opponents**,” its former president and high-ranking security official Dmitry Medvedev warned in mid-April.

But NATO ascension for a new member state requires consensus approval from all existing members.

While NATO’s leadership has welcomed the news, suggesting the applicants could be accepted into the group quickly, one of its most militarily **powerful members stands in the way: Turkey.**

Turkey, which joined the alliance in 1952, is a crucial player in NATO, boasting the second-largest military in the 30-member group after the United States.

For both Sweden and Finland, the decision to apply for NATO membership is monumental and was triggered by Russia’s brutal invasion of its neighbor Ukraine, which itself had aspirations to join NATO. Not until after the invasion did public opinion in both countries soar in favor of joining the 73-year-old defense alliance.

The stakes here are now massive,” Timothy Ash, emerging markets strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, said in a note Tuesday. “It feels like **a major crisis is looming in Turkey-Western relations over Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid**.”

“Other NATO members will be furious with Turkey given the now clear and present danger to Europe presented by Putin in Ukraine,” Ash added. “Turkey will be seen an an unreliable partner. This will leave even more bad blood/faith between the two sides — gone will be any remnants of a Turkish EU accession bid.”

Turkey’s highly strategic Incirlik air base is home to 50 of the U.S.′ tactical nuclear weapons, which some U.S. officials have suggested removing due to increasing tensions with Washington and Ankara in recent years. Those tensions were centered partly on Erdogan’s warming ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and its controversial decision to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which saw it kicked out of NATO’s F-35 program.

While Turkey has supported Ukraine by sending it weapons, in particular its lethal Bayraktar drones, and has tried to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv, it has so far refused to join its NATO allies in sanctioning Russia.

Just tough talk?

Some analysts are skeptical of Erdogan’s tough talk, convinced he won’t actually block the NATO membership bids — rather, they predict he will simply use his country’s leverage to extract concessions and boost his own waning popularity at home.

“Despite its objections, Ankara will not block the countries’ entry into NATO,” analysts at political risk consultancy Eurasia Group wrote in a research note late Monday.

“Erdogan is likely looking for concessions for green-lighting NATO’s expansion, mainly from Sweden. These might include the easing of Stockholm’s bilateral arms embargo on Turkey and some recognition of PKK as a terrorist organization to curtail its fund-raising and recruitment activities,” the note said.

Erdogan’s top foreign policy advisor, Ibrahim Kalin, over the weekend reassured allies by saying in an interview with Reuters: “We are not closing the door. But we are basically raising this issue as a matter of national security for Turkey,” concerning NATO accession for Sweden and Finland.

Weapons deals will likely play an important role in whatever negotiations take place. The Biden administration is currently seeking approval from Congress to finalize a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, for which Ankara will likely seek assurances.

But a more pressing reason behind Erdogan’s brinksmanship may be the need to boost his weakening popularity domestically, amid an inflation and cost-of-living crisis. Opinion polls in Turkey have hit their lowest in years.

Turkish inflation hit an eye-watering 70% in April, due in large part to years of refusal by Erdogan to raise interest rates while burning through currency reserves. The country of 84 million has been hit hard by the global rise in the cost of energy and basic goods, with fuel and agricultural commodity prices skyrocketing thanks in part to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“There are two things which rally the nation in Turkey,” Ash wrote. “Opposition to the PKK and perceived Western hypocrisy.”

#### Finland membership causes destabilization, miscalculation and the expansion of hybrid warfare – extinction

**Kendall-Taylor 5/13.** Interviewed by Steve Inskeep. Andrea, enior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “With Finland poised to join NATO, how will Russia respond?” https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735670/with-finland-poised-to-join-nato-how-will-russia-respond JH-NCP

INSKEEP: A strange question to ask, I suppose, given the rhetoric of the last several months, but I'm going to ask it. Does Vladimir Putin really care about NATO expansion? And here's why I say this. He gave NATO expansion as a reason for invading Ukraine, but he seemed to have all these other reasons for invading Ukraine about history and Ukraine being a part of Russia and his idea of Russia. Does he even care if Finland joins NATO really?

KENDALL-TAYLOR: Yeah, I do think he cares. I mean, for a very long time - Finland has been neutral for 80 years. I think both the Finns and the Russians view that neutrality as one reason why they've had such a stable and pragmatic relationship. So this is really a sea change, and I would expect that **this will lead to a fundamental change in that historically very stable Russia-Finnish relationship**. And, you know, it could lead to things like the greater militarization along that border there. So it will be consequential. And for Putin, it does underscore this idea, this fear that he has long held that Russia is being encircled by NATO. And so it will amplify those concerns.

INSKEEP: Well, let's talk about years to come then. As that border gets more militarized, as the relationship maybe gets more and more tense, Finland becomes a NATO nation, which means the U.S. would be obliged to defend it if it were attacked. Does this, at least a little bit, increase the risk that the United States might have to go to war sometime?

KENDALL-TAYLOR: Well, we know that - you know, that when Putin looks at NATO, he views it as a credible military force. He understands that Russia cannot compete with NATO. And it's one of the reasons why Putin, too, has been so reticent to risk a direct military confrontation in Ukraine with NATO. And so, you know, does it increase the risk? I would say so just because we will see kind of NATO's infrastructure closer to Russia's border. If **we do see things like the militarization of that border**, it raises the risk of **accidents that could unintentionally spiral into conflict**. And I think that would be the most likely pathway, rather than a Russia that feels it would want to take on NATO as an adversary.

INSKEEP: We just got about 20 seconds here, but I'll ask this also. If Putin wanted to widen this conflict somehow, what is a way anywhere in the world that he realistically could?

KENDALL-TAYLOR: I think cyber is the most likely way at this point. That's the kind of shoe that hasn't dropped and something that many of us expected would come. So I think that would be the most likely. If he feels that he wants to widen the conflict, I - my sense is that he will still come for the United States and potentially Europe using those cyber tools.

### econ turn (needs terminal !)

#### NATO defense commitments limit US markets

**Eland 12** – Ivan R. Eland is Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty. (“The US Should Leave NATO, Not Shore It Up,” Independent Institute. May 23rd, 2012. <https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=3343>) CTF and MargaretE

The recent intervention in Libya, ostensibly with the United States following the Europeans’ lead, actually proved the indispensability of American military power. Since 9/11, as the NATO “free rider” problem got worse with American defense budgets exploding and those of allied countries contracting, the gap between U.S. and allied military capabilities has widened. In Libya, the Americans had to undertake the heavy lifting of initially knocking down the Libyan air defenses. After the United States set up the allies to take over airstrikes, it then had to provide surveillance, intelligence, logistics, and refueling for allied air operations. The meager allied surveillance capability is the reason President Obama wants NATO to buy five Global Hawk surveillance drones.

And the free riding is not going to get any better with the Europeans in worse fiscal shape—at least for the moment—than the United States. Thus, the Europeans will continue to enjoy a U.S. nuclear and conventional shield while not even fully opening their markets to American goods and services—as has always been the case in the post–World War II world. American defense contractors do get a little back from the Europeans, as do U.S. policymakers, who get vague “influence” in European capitals, but the American taxpayer, as usual, gets the short end of the stick by funding the defense of countries that can afford to do so themselves.

As NATO’s Afghanistan mission winds down, to save money to prevent its own financial meltdown, the United States needs to withdraw from the alliance and let Europe defend itself from a now manageable threat. Alas, the United States seems unable to give up its addiction to meddling in and attempting to control the affairs of Europe.

### china deterrence turn

#### US troops need to be focused on Taiwan – prevents China escalation in the SCS

Feng 6/1/22 (John Feng is a contributing editor for Newsweek in their Asian research department, “Will China Invade Taiwan?” <https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-invasion-joe-biden-1711647> )//MargaretE

Chen believes Xi will secure an unprecedented third term in office this November, but says the legitimacy of his rule "will be greatly challenged" as a result of an economic downturn, created in part by Xi's sweeping zero-COVID policy. "This mounting internal pressure is pushing Xi and the CCP leadership to divert internal opposition through more external aggression," Chen says. "There are signs that China will escalate and cause conflicts," she notes. This is the backdrop against which Biden's comments should be read. That China will "go the military route on Taiwan" isn't an inevitability, argues Bryce Barros, an analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a think tank at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. "However, I do think hawks within the CCP and PLA might become more emboldened to take military action against Taiwan in some way as it becomes more apparent that Taiwan will not peacefully unify," he says. Taiwan's public has shown little interest in being governed from Beijing, and its government has gradually increased the country's defense spending in recent years. Clear commitments from Washington, like the one given by Biden, may reinforce China's belief that the U.S. plans to foil any military action by Beijing, Barros says. Whether China invades Taiwan will revolve around the central theory of deterrence, chiefly as it pertains to the United States, postwar Asia's foremost power. To deter Beijing from a course of military action, both Taipei and Washington will need to have a clear understanding of Chinese interests and motives, and seek to shape China's own perceptions of a potential attack by raising the costs of war. According to Washington-based defense analyst Gerald Brown, a **commitment to defend Taiwan on paper isn't enough—it must be matched by capabilities.** "We definitely need to worry about having the capability to beat back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and we must actively ensure we rapidly work towards this," he tells Newsweek. "Simultaneously, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is already incredibly difficult and costly for the PRC, and while **U.S. forces are not where they need to be**, a U.S.-Chinese war is something the PRC desperately wants to avoid if possible," says Brown, who advocates "strategic clarity" to reinforce deterrence. "Now, having the capability is critical here, but, if the CCP is unsure that the U.S. would step in and it has no commitment to do so, not having the proper capability to defend Taiwan plus having room to back out would actually serve as a far less effective deterrent," he says. "The CCP may well assume that without a definitive capability to defend Taiwan and with the lack of a formal commitment allowing room for the U.S. to maneuver out and not defend Taiwan, if the PRC launched an attack the U.S. would be compelled to stay out, encouraging Chinese aggression," Brown says.

#### Experts say CCP invades Taiwan by 2027 if not sooner

Hille and Sevastopulo 6/7/22 (Kathrin Hille is a Greater China Correspondant and Taiwan Correspondant for the Financial Times, Demetri Sevastopulo served as Washington Bureau Chief from 2015 to 2021, covering the White House, Trump administration and the 2016 and 2020 presidential races. During his more than 13 years reporting from Washington, he spent six years covering the Pentagon and intelligence agencies during the Bush and Obama administrations, “Taiwan: Preparing for a potential Chinese Invasion” <https://www.ft.com/content/0850eb67-1700-47c0-9dbf-3395b4e905fd> )//MargaretE

Although there is growing concern about a possible invasion, the timeframe of any military action — and China’s real intentions — are still the subject of intense debate. The year Davidson sees as the potential time horizon for a Chinese attack, 2027, is the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army. In November 2020, the Chinese Communist party said it wanted to “ensure that the 100-year military building goal is achieved by 2027”, called for faster military modernisation and reiterated the goal of making the Chinese military fit for networked, “intelligentised” warfare. Although those are stock phrases China has used before, the Pentagon calls 2027 a “new milestone”. “If realised, the PLA’s 2027 modernisation goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency,” it said in its annual report on the Chinese military last year. Some analysts doubt Davidson’s date. But one year on from his testimony, **government and military officials in both Taipei and Washington say the window from now to 2027 is a genuine threat.** Last October, Taiwan’s defence minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said the PLA would have the “complete capability” to attack Taiwan by 2025. “The current situation is really the most dangerous I have seen in my more than 40 years in the military,” he told lawmakers. Avril Haines, the US director of national intelligence, recently told Congress that the threat to Taiwan was “acute” between now and 2030 — lending credence to Davidson’s sense of urgency. John Aquilino, the current head of Indo-Pacific command, recently told the FT that the invasion of Ukraine underscored that the Chinese threat to Taiwan was not abstract. Taiwanese **experts see 2024 and 2025 as a particularly dangerous period**. They believe Xi might be tempted to use force if the ruling Democratic Progressive party, which insists on preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence, wins again in the next presidential election in early 2024, or if he senses a political vacuum in the US after its next presidential election in late 2024.

#### NATO response to China fails – their focus is too narrow and article 5 mutual defense ensures Taiwan war escalates

Binnendijk 2021 (Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as the U.S. National Security Council’s senior director for defense and arms control and as director of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, “NATO’s focus on China is too narrow”, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/04/03/natos-focus-on-china-is-too-narrow/> )//MargaretE

At the recent NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, China was on the front burner. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that China is not considered by NATO to be an adversary, but that China’s rise has direct consequences for alliance security. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken listed China first when speaking of major power threats to other countries. China will have a prominent place in NATO’s emerging new Strategic Concept. But many of America’s trans-Atlantic partners still take a fairly narrow view of China’s military impact on the alliance. The focus tends to be on security aspects of Chinese investments in European infrastructure, the vulnerability of defense supply chains containing material made in China, the consequences of Chinese technology embedded in communications systems, China’s political influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and small-scale Chinese naval exercises in European waters. Europe is now taking constructive steps to deal with many of these critical problems, but NATO also needs to open its aperture beyond Europe as it assesses the broader security challenge posed by China. A report released recently by the Atlantic Council, called “The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition,” makes the case that this Euro-centric view misses four interrelated elements that could have a profound impact on NATO. First, the United States will increasingly focus on China as the pace-setter for its own military modernization. China’s defense budget measured in purchasing power parity may soon approach that of the United States. China’s time and distance advantages, its focus on a naval and missile buildup, and its growing tactical nuclear capabilities have already created a major challenge for America’s forces in the Indo-Pacific theater. **With future U.S. defense budgets likely to be flat, at best, America’s defense priorities may need to concentrate on China.** The European theater may get less attention than when Russia presented the primary major power threat. Next, the ever-growing Sino-Russian defense relationship portends further difficulties for the alliance. While a formal Sino-Russian defense alliance may not be in the cards for now, the two nations are toying with the idea. Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “we don’t need it [an alliance], but, theoretically, it’s quite possible to imagine it.” China reacted warmly. The two nations hold multiple joint military exercises and conduct intense defense-industrial cooperation. Russia’s ability to produce military platforms coupled with Chinese digital capabilities will provide both nations with better weapons systems to confront America’s allies. And having strong Chinese support, Russia may become more assertive in its military activities in Europe. Third, Chinese behavior in the global commons plus the security implication of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its Polar Silk Road, and its Digital Silk Road all have negative consequence for Europe beyond NATO’s borders. Whether it is efforts to limit freedom of the seas, malign cyber behavior, creating digital dependencies or growing anti-satellite capabilities, the challenges China poses in the global commons are relevant to all trans-Atlantic partners. Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, investments and debt traps create coerced political influence. Along the Polar Silk Road, investments in resources and science are laying the groundwork for greater future Chinese involvement. Finally, and perhaps most important, **aggressive Chinese sovereign claims in the South and East China seas and on Taiwan could lead to unwanted conflict between the United States and China**. Should this happen, Europe would be far from immune. A Sino-American war would probably not be regionally contained, as were America’s previous Asian wars in Korea and Vietnam. At a minimum, Europe would find itself in a costly economic confrontation with China. NATO’s mutual defense clause, Article 5, could be triggered. And the United States would probably need to pivot significant military assets to Asia, leaving Europe more vulnerable to Russian adventurism. Several suggestions for NATO flow from these four broader concerns. Europe should enhance its own military capabilities so that Europe has effective defenses, should conflict in Asia divert U.S. forces. Europe should contribute to deterrence in Asia by clarifying to China that NATO allies would, at a minimum, take political and economic action should China attack U.S. forces in Asia. NATO needs to seek ways to help defend international freedoms in the global commons. Europe should limit further Chinese strategic investments in NATO countries that would stall NATO decision-making or mobilization during a crisis. And NATO needs to create new mechanisms to strengthen its ties to America’s Asian allies. These steps are in Europe’s interest. They need not be seen as belligerent, but rather steps to avoid Chinese miscalculation and to further deter Russia. They can be combined with U.S.-European Union-China cooperative measures in areas like managing global warming, fighting pandemics and reducing nuclear proliferation.

#### US needs to shift focus away from NATO and towards China – now is key

Chellaney 2022 (Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), “America is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy”, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-threat-to-us-global-leadership-is-china-not-russia-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-02?barrier=accesspaylog> )//MargaretE

This may explain why US President Joe **Biden is treating a “rogue” Russia as a peer competitor, when he should be focused on the challenge from America’s actual peer, China.** In comparison to Russia, China’s population is about ten times bigger, its economy is almost ten times larger, and its military expenditure is around four times greater. Not only is China more powerful; it genuinely seeks to supplant the US as the preeminent global power. By contrast, with its military buildup on Ukraine’s borders, Russia is seeking to mitigate a perceived security threat in its neighborhood. Hastening the decline of US global leadership is hardly the preserve of Democrats. A bipartisan parade of US leaders has failed to recognize that the post-Cold War unipolar world order, characterized by unchallenged US economic and military predominance, is long gone. The US squandered its “unipolar moment,” especially by waging an expensive and amorphous “Global War on Terrorism,” including several military interventions, and through its treatment of Russia. After its Cold War victory, the US essentially took an extended victory lap, pursuing strategic maneuvers that flaunted its dominance. Notably, it sought to expand NATO to Russia’s backyard, but made little effort to bring Russia into the Western fold, as it had done with Germany and Japan after World War II. The souring of relations with the Kremlin contributed to Russia’s eventual remilitarization. So, while the US remains the world’s foremost military power, it has been stretched thin by the decisions and commitments it has made, in Europe and elsewhere, since 1991. This goes a long way toward explaining why the US has ruled out deploying its own troops to defend Ukraine today. What the US is offering Ukraine – weapons and ammunition – cannot protect the country from Russia, which has an overwhelming military advantage. But US leaders made another fatal mistake since the Cold War: by aiding China’s rise, they helped to create the greatest rival their country has ever faced. Unfortunately, they have yet to learn from this. Instead, the US continues to dedicate insufficient attention and resources to an excessively wide array of global issues, from Russian revanchism and Chinese aggression to lesser threats in the Middle East and Africa and on the Korean Peninsula. And it continues inadvertently to bolster China’s global influence, not least through its overuse of sanctions. For example, by barring friends and allies from importing Iranian oil, two successive US administrations enabled China not only to secure oil at a hefty discount, but also to become a top investor in – and security partner of – the Islamic Republic. US sanctions have similarly pushed resource-rich Myanmar into China’s arms. As Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, whose country has faced a US arms embargo over its ties to China, asked last year, “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?” Russia has been asking itself the same question. Though Russia and China kept each other at arm’s length for decades, US-led sanctions introduced after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea drove President Vladimir Putin to pursue a closer strategic partnership with China. The bilateral relationship is likely to deepen, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. But the raft of harsh new sanctions the US has promised to implement in the event of a Russian invasion will accelerate this shift significantly, with China as the big winner. The heavy financial penalties the US has planned – including the “nuclear option” of disconnecting Russian banks from the international SWIFT payments system – would turn China into Russia’s banker, enabling it to reap vast profits and expand the international use of its currency, the renminbi. If Biden fulfilled his pledge to block the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is set to deliver Russian supplies directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, China would gain greater access to Russian energy. In fact, by securing a commitment from Putin this month to a nearly tenfold increase in Russian natural gas exports, China is building a safety net that could – in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – withstand Western energy sanctions and even a blockade. China could also benefit militarily by demanding greater access to Russian military technology in exchange for its support. For the US, a strengthened Russia-China axis is the worst possible outcome of the Ukraine crisis. The best outcome would be a compromise with Russia to ensure that it does not invade and possibly annex Ukraine. **By enabling the US to avoid further entanglement in Europe, this would permit a more realistic balancing of key objectives – especially checking Chinese aggression** in the Indo-Pacific – with available resources and capabilities. **The future of the US-led international order will be decided in Asia, and China is currently doing everything in its power to ensure that order’s demise.** Already, China is powerful enough that it can host the Winter Olympics even as it carries out a genocide against Muslims in the Xinjiang region, with limited pushback. **If the Biden administration does not recognize the true scale of the threat China poses, and adopt an appropriately targeted strategy soon, whatever window of opportunity for preserving US preeminence remains may well close.**

#### NATO fails to deter China – lack of focus and planning capabilities

Odgaard 2022 (Lisa Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on US-China-Europe relations, NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145> )//MargaretE

**NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing**. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions. With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it. Compared to the United States, Europe took a long time to acknowledge its stake in managing security challenges from China. As Beijing pushed beyond its traditional zones of interest in East and Southeast Asia toward the Indian Ocean in the 2000s, US security policies began to focus more on China as Washington sought a new geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.2 Since 2014, France and the UK have spearheaded Europe’s naval diplomacy to counter the displays of force and increasing tensions in maritime Asia to which China contributes. This engagement has focused on regular exercises with the US and its Asian allies, operations in support of freedom of navigation, and base-sharing agreements. 3 In 2021, the EU recognized that these geopolitical dynamics directly impact its security and announced the establishment of supportive mechanisms in its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, NATO has been conspicuously absent in these transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security. Reflecting NATO’s absence from the main arena of US-China strategic competition, the alliance is hardly ever mentioned in off-the-record conversations on Indo-Pacific security between diplomats and think tank personnel. NATO’s reluctance to take on the China challenge is perhaps not surprising, given its inherent assumption that the European continent is the jewel in the crown of the US alliance system, which is thought to guarantee US assistance in the event of a military threat against Europe. This assumption was challenged during the Trump administration, which openly questioned the US commitment to Article Five’s collective defense obligation. The invasion of Ukraine has given NATO a new lease on life and put it at the frontlines of transatlantic cooperation on deterring Russia from further military action in future. However, **NATO’s focus on its eastern frontline carries the risk that the alliance turns into a Russia-focused European institution and ignores that China is a global great power competitor which also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states.** Washington increasingly looks to the EU rather than NATO for guidance on Europe’s future security policy. One reason is that NATO’s toolbox is lagging in domains such as cyber and outer space, although cyber and outer space operations are key enablers of actions in all domains including air, sea, and land. One indication of this is the US-EU negotiations surrounding a common response to cyber threats which took place during the first US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2021. In addition, during Trump’s presidency, longstanding US dissatisfaction with Europe’s modest defense spending threatened to put NATO on the backburner in transatlantic security debates.5 Since then, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elicited a sea change in German defense policy with the announcement in February 2022 that defense spending will increase to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic output annually.6 While this may be a convincing signal that Europe will finally devote the resources required for its own defense and revive NATO’s central role in transatlantic security, there is also a risk that China will be moved to the periphery of the alliance’s agenda.

### fill in - osce

#### OSCE solves fill-in concerns – key to stop war with China and Russia

**CND 2021** (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is a UK based organization that researches best ways to avoid nuclear conflict in Europe, “No to NATO”, <https://cnduk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/No-to-Nato.pdf> )//MargaretE

CND believes that a vital step towards global nuclear disarmament would be achieved with the removal of all US nuclear weapons from European bases. Britain should withdraw from NATO, and all foreign military bases on British soil should be closed. Working to prevent cold war and war with Russia and China remains a strong focus for our work. The UK should be opting for diplomatic solutions to complex political problems, not participating in an alliance that is backing Russia and China into a corner through military expansionism. This will not help stop a war, instead the danger is it will start one. **NATO should not be expanded but rather disbanded and the influence**, resources and funding of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) extended towards a nuclear-free, less militarised and therefore more secure Europe.

### fill in - eu

#### Double bind – either NATO collapse is inevitable and the aff fails OR CP solves with EU fill in

**Nestoras 3/28/22** (Dr. Antonios Nestoras is head of policy and research at the European Liberal Forum and adjunct professor at VUB Brussels School of Governance, “The EU must replace the US as a security provider in Europe”, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/28/the-eu-must-replace-the-us-as-a-security-provider-in-europe> )//MargaretE

Lately, however, Europe has been waking up to a new reality. From Obama to Trump to Biden, US foreign policy has been steadily looking for a way out of Europe. With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict dating from 2014, Russia has been looking for a way back in. Finally, the EU has been talking for years about becoming an autonomous security provider, which requires Germany to rise above its self-absorbing pacifism. After a period of gradual transformation, **Russia’s war on Ukraine is a tipping point** that makes Lord Ismay’s one-liner seem genuinely outdated. When a threshold is reached, expect the system to change rapidly. This is exactly what seems to be happening in Europe after Putin invaded Ukraine. Judging from a common, united, and firm response to the war, the Versailles Declaration, and the EU’s Strategic Compass, both the EU and the national capitals are in tune with the historic shifts in the post-war order in Europe. With the Americans on their way out, and the Russians on their way in, the EU will have to imagine a new European security order. Two weeks into the war, and after Russia became the most-sanctioned country in the world, the French president invited the other 26 heads of EU states and governments for a two-day informal summit in Versailles. The EU leaders adopted a strong declaration against Russian aggression and committed to the broadest possible diplomatic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The Versailles declaration – which was then added to the Annals of the European Union – talked about the common responsibility to “protect EU citizens, values and democracies and the European model”. It also described the new fundamentals of European security focusing on three key dimensions: “bolstering EU defense capabilities, reducing energy dependencies, and building a more robust economic base”. 10 days later, the EU approved the strategic compass, probably the most ambitious plan for a common foreign and security policy in the history of European integration. On March 25, in Brussels, the European Council endorsed it. Self-described as a “quantum leap forward” the compass aims to improve the EU’s ability to “act decisively” and turn the EU into “a stronger and more capable security provider”. The document is a roadmap for developing military capabilities, improving defence spending and cooperation, responding to information-based threats, and strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries. The Versailles declaration and the strategic compass have set the agenda for future EU action and geopolitical orientation. However, they likely understate or disregard even the long-lasting and possibly permanent effects of the changes that the post-war order is undergoing.

#### The European army is hindered by NATO and fills in for it

Rayess 21 – Rami Rayess is a Lebanese writer and journalist, a University Instructor and translator, and holds a master’s degree in political science from the American University of Beirut. (“The proposed European Army with global influence will replace NATO,” Al Arabiya English. September 2st, 2021. <https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2021/09/28/The-proposed-European-Army-with-global-influence-will-replace-NATO?fr=operanews>) Edgemont PF

NATO is in its death throws with Russia and China looking on happily, but **not that this military force was ever a real threat** to either country.

When you have Estonia and Lithuania and all the other former Eastern Bloc countries as powerless NATO members it isn’t of great concern to Moscow.

As the US constricts from its former global dominant position, **it’s time for Europe to rethink the best way to face existential threats** from an increasingly polarized world.

The idea of establishing a unified European Army has been proposed time and again, and the push for one, along with its validity is clear.

It will happen.

The basis behind NATO was a noble one, and made sense, but there has always been conflicting views about strategies, troop deployment and who contributes to what.

A heavy reliance on the US hasn’t helped, and it’s clear that with **the organization’s slow demise** running in parallel to Washington’s reserved stance to international relations, new friends and alliances are needed.

At the moment, Europe dances to Washington’s tune. The debacle of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan revived the debate about the necessity for a European Army. It is time for Europe to have strategic autonomy over its decisions.

A European Army can act as the crux on which Europe broadens its reach, and establish military alliances in strategic locations across the globe.

Western defense for Europe can **no longer be confined to the North Atlantic**, and the inclusion of the US should be as an equal partner, and not based on an overreliance on them.

The number of NATO members that include so many Baltic nations suggests the continuous fear of Russia, accompanied with a willingness to engage in defensive collaborations. Proper execution of strategic defense can only properly happen when it’s in play with other global players.

Including India in an international military defense group would set the cat amongst the pigeons. China would become increasingly nervous.

What about Japan as a member? The Pacific country is concerned with China’s growing presence on the high seas and its territorial claims too. Strategically Japan can prove problematic for Russia too.

Egypt too is well positioned to become involved. The Suez Canal is a vital trade route for the transport of Chinese goods.

All of these countries can contribute troops and military hardware, along with intelligence gathering.

Fostering military partnerships between Europe and specific Asian nations offers the existing European NATO members with the opportunity to have a seat at any table set up to address global dilemmas.

It’s been put forward that a European Army could number 50,000 troops to defend its own borders, but by engaging with India and Egypt strong bases in both the Far East, the Middle East and Africa are accessible.

Egypt will welcome any approach to join. It needs to diversify its alliances with alternatives that run in parallel with its strategy to position itself as a key powerhouse in both Africa and Arabia. An Egypt holding a position of such stature is then of course appealing to Europe.

With so many pluses for the presence of a European military force, there are lots of obstacles yet to be overcome. There is French and Italian enthusiasm, German consent, but other European countries appear indifferent.

French President Emmanuel Macron endorsed the European Army idea in 2018 on the back of policies pursued under Donald Trump’s administration that barely took note of American’s profound partnership with Europe.

**The main hindrance to having a European Army in place is NATO itself**. Monopolizing security issues in continental Europe throughout the cold war era, NATO fell short in many campaigns, including the Crimea, Libya, and most recently Afghanistan.

It is true that an effective EU foreign policy must always play a role in a Western orchestra. A partnership with Washington is fair, but obedience is something totally different.

A Europe capable of intervening anywhere in the world where its interests are endangered, or indeed any of its global partners’ interests face problems, puts it on the front foot.

No permission needed from Washington. Following the Second World War Europe has been beholden to the US. This situation must change. It will.

The submarine deal led by the US and UK with Australia reflect a policy of indifference towards France and Europe.

The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini has said that the group’s security policy should handle global pressures and local dynamics. Within this mix lies the super-powers along with “increasingly fractured identities.”

Europe has no choice but to become a player in unfolding global scenarios. Gone are the days of individual empires kidding on they can influence the politics in former colonies. It’s now time for a unified powerful and efficient military arm.

**The European Army will fill the void left by a retreating NATO**, but although it will play a crucial role, it is the global security and military partnerships it establishes that will position the EU as a global super power in its own right.

### eu solvency – generic

#### EU is key to security cooperation

Cicarelli et al. 21 - Siena Cicarelli is a Research and Program Associate at the Center of American Progress. Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. James Lamond is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. (“The Case for EU Defense,” Center for American Progress. June 1st, 2021. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/>) CTF

The state of European defense is not strong.

The level of Europe’s defense spending and the size of its collective forces in uniform should make it a global power with one of the strongest militaries in the world. But Europe does not act as one on defense, even though it formed a political union almost 30 years ago. Europe’s military strength today is far weaker than the sum of its parts. This is not just a European failure; it is also fundamentally a failure of America’s post-Cold War strategy toward Europe—a strategy that remains virtually unchanged since the 1990s.

Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security means that the United States possesses a de facto veto on the direction of European defense. Since the 1990s, the United States has typically used its effective veto power to block the defense ambitions of the European Union. This has frequently resulted in an absurd situation where Washington loudly insists that Europe do more on defense but then strongly objects when Europe’s political union—the European Union—tries to answer the call. This policy approach has been a grand strategic error—one that has weakened NATO militarily, strained the trans-Atlantic alliance, and contributed to the relative decline in Europe’s global clout. As a result, one of America’s closest partners and allies of first resort is not nearly as powerful as it could be.

European militaries have now experienced decades of decline. Today, much of Europe’s military hardware is in a shocking state of disrepair. Too many of Europe’s forces aren’t ready to fight. Its fighter jets and helicopters aren’t ready to fly; its ships and submarines aren’t ready to sail; and its vehicles and tanks aren’t ready to roll. Europe lacks the critical capabilities for modern warfare, including so-called enabling capabilities—such as air-refueling to support fighter jets, transport aircraft to move troops to the fight, and the high-end reconnaissance and surveillance drones essential for modern combat. European forces aren’t ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isn’t good enough.

This is a European failure—but Washington has played a critical, if underappreciated, role in precipitating this failure. The American answer to European weakness has been to push NATO member states to spend more on defense.1 As a result, defense spending has become the defining issue of trans-Atlantic relations in the 21st century. For more than two decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have vigorously pressed European capitals to bolster their national forces in support of NATO. No other topic has so consumed Washington’s engagement with Europe than the state of Europe’s defense forces.

In the view of Washington, the only way to address Europe’s defense shortfall is for European nations to spend more. However, this focus on national defense spending levels—embodied by NATO members’ 2014 commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense—simply has not worked. European defense today remains anemic despite noticeable increases in spending.

In a departing speech to NATO allies in 2011, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lamented:

The non-U.S. NATO members collectively spend more than $300 billion U.S. dollars on defense annually which, if allocated wisely and strategically, could buy a significant amount of usable military capability. Instead, the results are significantly less than the sum of the parts.2

Yet for Gates and U.S. policymakers, there was no other way than European states spending more:

In the final analysis, there is no substitute for nations providing the resources necessary to have the military capability the Alliance needs when faced with a security challenge. Ultimately, nations must be responsible for their fair share of the common defense.3

As this report argues, there is another way. **There is no better vehicle to integrate European defense than the EU**. Seven decades ago, Europe began a project that has integrated sector after sector, forging a common market and an economic union. Then, after the end of the Cold War, Europe took another transformative step, forming a political union with the creation of the European Union. The EU set out the goal of developing a common security and defense policy, but progress has been slow. It is time for the EU to accelerate the process of forming a defense union.

#### eu solvency – generic EU security cooperation is possible

Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. <https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/a-new-and-better-security-order-for-europe>) CTF

UPDATE OUR COLD WAR STRATEGY FOR TODAY’S GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES

The premises and practices that underpin current U.S. strategy toward Europe amount to a tweaking of those that prevailed during the Cold War, never mind that the conditions in Europe are now wholly different. Europe has long since become an economic and technological powerhouse, even a rival of the United States in global markets. No country with military power comparable to the Soviet Union now threatens the European balance of power (Ukraine is not critical to that balance). The European Union, most of whose members also belong to NATO, has a GDP that is more than nine times larger than Russia’s: €13 trillion versus €1.4 trillion. Europe is also technologically far superior to Russia.10 Clearly, then, Europeans have the material wherewithal to develop the capacity to deter Russia.

PERILS OF PRIMACY: WEALTHY ALLIES CAN OUTSOURCE NATIONAL DEFENSE

Now is the time for the United States to champion Europe’s strategic autonomy. Not only has it failed to do so, but it has also steadfastly opposed the idea. Instead, it complains intermittently about the inequitable defense burden within NATO while allowing it to persist.11 Rather than harping on burden sharing, the United States should move toward “burden shifting” that begins with reductions in American forces and eventually leads to European self-sufficiency in defense and the elimination of a permanent U.S. military presence. That change need not involve the jettisoning of NATO.

Because the United States has not demanded more of its European NATO allies, their progress toward meeting the benchmarks adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit for national defense spending (2 percent of GDP) and military procurement (20 percent of the military budget) has, unsurprisingly, been spotty at best, something NATO’s most recent figures make clear.12 Moreover, Germany, Europe’s wealthiest state, is among the biggest laggards. Not only has Germany still not met the Wales targets, but the Bundeswehr is also inadequately funded, understaffed, and lacks all manner of equipment and spare parts.13 Had the Wales benchmarks been met, European defense spending would have increased by billions of dollars.

The curious upshot has been that an increasing preoccupation with the Russian threat coexists with Europeans’ failure to take the steps needed to address it.

CODEPENDENCY AND THWARTING “STRATEGIC AUTONOMY”

Europeans have become accustomed to a regional security order that has persisted for over seven decades and features a permanent U.S. military presence and security guarantee.14 If one is a European, what’s not to like?

This arrangement goes beyond European dependency on the United States. It resembles what psychologists call codependency, with a provider and a recipient, each locked into their roles and unable to construct an alternative. The dynamic persists because American leaders do not want a change in the status quo. One of the enduring legacies of post-World War II American primacy is the U.S. foreign and national security community—the executive and legislative branches of government, the media, academic specialists, and think tanks—remains convinced a stable world order cannot exist unless the United States maintains, and regularly displays, its preponderance, lest adversaries become challengers and dominoes start to fall. The habitual invocation of “credibility” owes to this mindset.15

A NEW, STRONGER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE

BURDEN SHIFTING: EUROPEANS ARE WEALTHY AND CAN FIELD MODERN MILITARY POWER

Europe can defend itself and should do far more for its own defense than it does now.16 In addition to spending more on their own defense, European countries should develop an independent conception of security that progressively moves their continent toward autonomy. First, they should eradicate the problems that impair military effectiveness. A case in point: the shortage of the most basic equipment and essential parts for warships, warplanes, and submarines that plague the Bundeswehr, the army of Europe’s richest nation.17 Next, Europe should develop plans to harmonize defense production, especially by coordinating defense spending and replacing duplicative weapons production with a European-wide division of labor based on comparative advantage. This will not be easy because of the pressure leaders will inevitably face to keep production and jobs within their countries and to support national defense industries. Still, there is a difference between defense production based on national autarchy and a collective approach. The latter would exploit opportunities for various forms of collaboration, including coproducing armaments, divvying up different parts of the production process, and exploiting comparative advantages.

Whether and to what degree greater European strategic self-sufficiency is worked out in cooperation with the United Kingdom should be a matter for Europeans to decide. The same goes for whether strategic autonomy coexists with a reformed NATO or eventually replaces the alliance. The change should be implemented through close consultation between the United States and its allies and at a pace that does not create needless disruptions.

A NEW REGIONAL ORDER

Because of the economic and military distribution of power in Europe, Germany, the continent’s wealthiest country, and France, its sole full-service military power (the pair have a GDP 87 percent greater than Russia’s but combined spend more than $60 billion less on military expenditures based on Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP), will have to take responsibility for ushering Europe toward strategic autonomy.18 It is desirable for them to work in tandem because of the residual suspicions that linger about a Europe dominated by Germany. Under French President Emmanuel Macron at least, the French government has forcefully advocated for European strategic autonomy (most recently during the 2021–2022 Ukraine-Russia crisis), arguing Europe should have an independent voice and collective vision on continental security.19

As part of a new strategy toward Europe, the United States should help create a new regional order—one that integrates, rather than estranges, Russia. Alienating Russia, as it has been for most of the post-Cold War decades, has resulted in steadily increasing crises in eastern Europe.

The expansion of NATO—which has grown from 16 members at its Cold War highpoint to 30 in 2022—is but one part of the problem between Russia and the West, but it is a big one. Influential Americans nevertheless insist Russia’s concerns about the advance of a Cold War alliance toward its borders are contrived and unrelated to security. They regard the Russian president’s objections as a ruse to mask his (“real”) fear, namely that democracy could spread to adjacent countries and eventually threaten Russia’s authoritarian political order.20 While this may be true in part, a sound grand strategy must include an awareness that other countries may not share American perceptions and indeed may reject them wholesale.21

What the United States sees as benign (NATO expansion or European missile defense) Russia regards as threatening. A sound strategy also requires the willingness and capacity to understand how other countries perceive one’s actions and the humility to resist the urge to believe that you know what other countries’ actual interests and fears are. None of this means conceding what rivals want, let alone appeasement; it does mean a willingness to understand the world as they see it so that pathways can be found to advance U.S. interests and avoid crises and war through reasonable compromise.22 As former Secretary of State James A. Baker put it, “I would have to say that if there was one key to whatever success I’ve enjoyed in negotiating…it has been an ability to crawl into the other guy’s shoes. If you understand your opponent, you have a better chance of reaching a successful conclusion. That means paying attention to how they view issues and appreciating the political constraints they face.”23

#### NATO needs to let EU security coop happen

Belin 19 - Interim Director at the Center on the United States and Europe. (“NATO matters, but the EU matters more,” Brookings. April 2nd, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/02/nato-matters-but-the-eu-matters-more/>) CTF

As it turns 70 this week, the Atlantic alliance has no shortage of champions in Washington, even if it lacks one in the Oval Office. Yet, the focus on NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—alone can be misleading by magnifying the importance of the defense alliance in the European project. In reality, the trans-Atlantic community has relied on two pillars: a successful defensive alliance and an even more successful project of European integration.

Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later—and 16 new members later—the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans.

Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group—as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations.

The neighbors of the European Union are no fools. Those who seek prosperity and stability hope to join the EU club. Those who reject the model set by the West and liberal democracies feel threatened by the European Union—it is the prospect of Ukraine moving into the EU’s orbit through an Association Agreement that triggered Russia’s hostility and ultimate aggression, not NATO. The power of attraction of the European Union, at least as much as the security guarantees of NATO, has helped stabilize Eastern Europe.

Despite these realities, Americans often indulge in a scornful disregard for the EU. Recently, benign contempt has taken an ugly turn. Since taking office, President Trump and his administration have attacked the European Union and individual member states repeatedly, with near impunity.

At first sight, American complaints appear to be centered on the issue of Europe’s trading power, which rivals that of the United States. For Donald Trump, the EU was created to “take advantage of” the United States and it is “worse than China.” Early in his mandate, the American president pushed for tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatened to go after automobiles, until a meeting with EU Commission President Juncker put a brake on the downward spiral.

However, a deeper look reveals a fundamental ideological contention: The brand of nationalism and populism that defines this administration stands in direct contradiction with the very existence of a liberal, supra-national body such as the European Union.

As laid out by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Kiron Skinner in December 2018, the administration holds the view that “international institutions have steadily encroached on the rights of sovereign nations” and that “nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests”—an indictment of the EU’s very existence. The ideological clash is reminiscent of older times. Addressing a crowd in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump likened the European Union to the Soviet Union, criticizing a similar “steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people,” an equivalency popular in conservative circles. Similarly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested in a December 2018 speech in Brussels that EU bureaucrats were not really working for the interests of European citizens.

By making no secret of his personal support for euroskeptic forces, Donald Trump has become an active political opponent of the European Union in its existing form. He celebrated the Brexit vote, expressed support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen ahead of the French presidential elections, disparaged Angela Merkel repeatedly, and appeared to rejoice at the Yellow Vests protest movement. He criticized Theresa May for negotiating a “soft” Brexit, and even recommended to Emmanuel Macron that France leave the EU. The American president has nominated ambassadors famously critical of the EU, and his administration demoted the EU ambassador’s status without notification, before reversing under criticism.

As Donald Trump torments both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, all rush to NATO’s bedside, and few worry about the EU. Truthfully, Atlanticists love to love NATO. It stands for values, valor, unity, solidarity. NATO won the Cold War. Celebrating NATO is celebrating the military. It is much harder to love the EU, the bureaucracy, the politics, the regulations. The EU lacks democratic appeal, and its slow-moving decisionmaking process create many frustrations. Unlike in NATO, the United States sits on the sidelines, it does not control who enters, or who stays in. The EU is also an economic peer competitor, a tough trading partner, and a sovereign international actor, at times non-compliant with American demands.

Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO—or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake. In a world where the strongmen are striking back, Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond.

#### The US leaving NATO is k2 European stability and resolves all the NATO bad stuff

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It is today sadly forgotten, that NATO was created not with one, but with two objectives. The second objective of NATO was to retain inner peace, that is, keep the peace amongst NATO’s own members. When NATO was created, future peace between Germany and its neighbors was yet far from secured, especially as seen from the perspective of Germany’s neighbors at the time, not least France. Thus, the saying of NATO-creator Lord Ismay included that NATO should “keep the Soviet Union out”, but also “the Germans down”, that is, to keep NATO members safe, also from themselves. NATO was never only about Russia.

Today Germany is a great and constructive neighbor in Europe. But Europe sadly still sees other inner-neighbor relations, which unfortunately cannot yet be considered absolutely stable. One only needs to refer to the afterglows of the Yugoslav wars. From that perspective, it can be argued that all Balkan countries should be part of NATO — not to protect them against “Russia”, or to strengthen NATO externally for that matter, but simply to enhance the safe development of all the Balkan countries concerning one another. Bosnia-Herzegovina is especially relevant here since the country is not even fully stabilized internally yet. There are also other less warm neighbor issues, but still potential minority-heats, notably related to eastern NATO members. NATO keeps all such inner-relations from potentially flaring up, which may also be said to be in the interest of Russia, and of Russia’s partner in the Balkan area, Serbia. We should note too, that the EU also has a vital and overlapping interests to co-work in this region.

The Caucasus is here another and very separate question. **It is difficult to see any possible NATO enlargement** in the Caucasus as stabilizing, perhaps somewhat on the contrary. And the EU is also a more distant partner in the Caucasus. Turkey is, on the other hand, a new and also interesting discussion. Some (perhaps even a kind of “choir”) have started to discuss, whether Turkey still “fits” into NATO. On the other hand, to retain peace (again, not in relations with Russia, but here Turkey-Greece and even Cyprus), there is still an argument that peace can be best served with Turkey continuing as partner in NATO (no matter which nationality of weapons Turkey should wish to buy, actually).

An important discussion can start to revolve around whether the USA still belongs to NATO. Right-sizing is not enlarging; it is a change of configuration. Such a change in configuration is possible in that the USA (and we already see increasing Atlantic fractions) could leave NATO, and let the Europeans (including East-European states) take full responsibility for their own safety (including allowing all the Balkan countries into such an EU-NATO arrangement).

Letting the USA out of NATO would imply subsuming the European part of NATO into the EU. Such a possible development can have many advantages for the countries concerned, as well as for Russia.

First of all, subsuming a “NATO-excluding-the-USA” into the EU would, as mentioned, force the Europeans (including the eastern ones) to take full responsibility for their own security. This will prevent “moral hazard” of political escalations in the hope that the USA will “save” them or spend money on them for new US bases in their location. An EU-NATO (without the USA) would have to find new ways of working with the UK as well as with, of course, Russia.

Second, there is sometimes a profound need for measures outside Europe, where security and civilian efforts need to be thoroughly coordinated. Using NATO “out-of-area” tends to be a recipe for disaster today, and the NATO-bombing creating a collapse of Libya was one such catastrophic example. Complex civilian needs during conflict basically cannot be taken care of by NATO, because NATO as an organisation (though big enough in bureaucracy) is simply not designed for civilian efforts in connection with conflict. NATO was created to deter an all-destructive war, which would probably not have left much civilian life left to “reconstruct” afterwards. The cold-war scenario was therefore so totally different from the many extremely complicated social-economical-etchnical-religious-resource-climate-poverty types of civilian-military problems, which we see around in the world of today. That is why NATO interventions automatically, because of the organization’s outdated design to focus so heavily on a now defunct “all-or-nothing” type of armagedon-conflict tends to create purely military, and hence quite destructive, approaches. NATO is still so much designed as a hammer, that sadly too many problems seem to be perceived as if they had the shape of nails. As another example of the results of this, take a look at Afghanistan, where most of NATO’s “military-civilian” approaches in reality tended to become too much “military-more-military” approaches.

NATO is designed as a pure military organization, an by all means, militaries are (still) designed only to destruct, not to construct. NATO simply does not have notable resources for civilian efforts to go with its military efforts. In parallel to this, we regrettably also see in the USA a very unfortunate long-term general tendency to militarize US foreign policy, sometimes at the expense of resources and focus for civilian US foreign policy. Tools should be designed for situations, not the other way around. But instead of embarking on the long overdue redesign of the setting of NATO, a lot of western politicians instead sadly try to redesign perceptions of today’s security-realities in Europe, trying to make the modern world’s security perception look more like the old “them-or-us” type, which existed during the cold war. But there is a better road, which can be taken. The EU does have a constructive other tradition than NATO’s “all-out-war-preparedness” to build on, and the EU is still totally far from the over-militarized development path, which the USA unfortunately has taken. The EU has developed a robust and broad civilian-oriented conflict management capability. The EU already has quite a range of experience with civilian “out-of-area” missions. And the EU is already developing in a direction to integrate all these political management dimensions: The civilian capabilities, and now increasingly upcoming, also an EU military dimension.

We must remember, that military is politics with other means, and military should not be a destructive stand-alone option, but part of as a series of differentiated political tools. Not just a “hammer”, but very varying shades and shapes of tools, within a fully integrated political civil-military toolbox. It therefore can make enormous sense to leave the NATO fully over as a new institutional part of the EU. To enable the EU to manage the full range of all political dimensions, in case a non-European conflict might benefit from European assistance: military, civilian and economical.

Some caveats here include the potential issues this would involve especially in relation to France, but a broader context to all the EU countries. An EU-NATO without the USA will, of course, be centered on France, a country with archaeological remains of imperial thinking and ambitions, and its own possible “military-industrial-political” complex, which might take on an arms race of its own. It is also to be avoided to intervene just for the sake of it — be it under “do-good” or imperial intentions. Because once bureaucratic institutions have been erected for any purpose whatsoever, their inner dynamic is that they urge their surroundings to be made use of. These effects cannot be entirely avoided, but might (hopefully) be mitigated by the full range of EU member countries.

Therefore, even taking account of the caveats just mentioned above, there is a possibility that a lot of positive things could potentially be achieved by letting the USA leave NATO and allowing for the rest of NATO to be subsumed into the EU.

#### AT: Affs Answers to EU Bad

Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. <https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/a-new-and-better-security-order-for-europe>) CTF

There are two commonplace objections to the idea of European strategic autonomy. The first is that without the American defense guarantee Europe will revert to disunity, even conflict. The other is that the large number of European states will bedevil regional cooperation on security. But instability in Europe, while a possibility, is but one conceivable outcome. The extensive interdependence within Europe (intra-E.U. exports approached $300 billion in 2020, and for most members, exports within the European Union accounted for between 50 and 75 percent of their total exports), the continent’s embrace of democracy, and the European Union and its supranational organizations will, together, help prevent conflict and ease cooperation.32 The European Union has central institutions and a common currency (within the eurozone) and bank; and the European states party to the Schengen Agreement have eliminated border controls—all while increasing the number of member states. This achievement demonstrates a multiplicity of sovereign states can in fact cooperate extensively, indeed to a point verging on integration. Besides, the claim that Europeans cannot manage their own affairs without an American military presence amounts to saying that current American strategy toward the continent must continue indefinitely, regardless of changing conditions on the home front and the redistribution of power in the world.

### eu solvency -- cyber

#### EU coordination solves hybrid responses

Atlamazoglou and Moyer 6/1 – Constantine Atlamazoglou works on transatlantic and European security and holds a master's degree on security studies and European affairs. Jason C. Moyer is a Program Associate at Global Europe Program. (“A Strategic Compass: The European Union expands its toolbox,” Wilson Center. June 1st, 2022. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/strategic-compass-european-union-expands-its-toolbox>) CTF

In Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s class at Georgetown University, she likened each element of U.S. power - development aid, sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy - to a tool in the U.S. problem-solving toolbox. When faced with a challenge, the United States can employ one or more of these tools. With the launch of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the European Union is adding a handful of new tools to its own toolbox, to better respond to current and future challenges.

Promising a “quantum leap” in decisive security matters in the next decade, the EU is stepping into its role as a security provider and global actor. The document is significant for the EU; it can be seen as a parallel to the United States’ National Security Strategy in its scope.

A comprehensive creation process

This is the first time in EU history that a threat analysis was conducted with each member-state inputting its strategic priorities. The Strategic Compass began in June 2020 as an attempt to align EU defense and security goals between the 27 member-states. Therefore, national priorities were translated into European priorities through the diplomatic process. The major threats the EU faces were identified as great power competition, potential instability in its neighborhood, and transnational threats, including cyber and hybrid attacks.

Staying relevant

Nevertheless, the document realizes the fluidity of the geopolitical environment and the shifting nature and magnitude of threats. Thus, the Strategic Compass promises to be the first step in regular evaluations of the evolving strategic environment, stipulating that a new threat analysis will be conducted every three years, allowing changes to the EU’s strategy.

The document’s existence is proof that the EU is positioning itself to better respond to strategic challenges. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began right at the end of the Strategic Compass process. Although the document acknowledges the crisis in its introduction, it was clearly drafted before war returned to the European continent. As such the document is not a reflection of the war. It is likely that the next iteration of the threat analysis will more prominently feature Russian tactics on display in Ukraine. Nevertheless, many aspects of the Strategic Compass will better prepare the EU for the tense geopolitical environment brought about by the emerging great-power competition.

New tools in the toolbox

The Strategic Compass contains a myriad of timelines and actionable items. Among them is the goal that by 2025 an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 troops will be ready.

The specificity and concrete timelines proposed in this document demonstrate the resolve of the European Union to become a power broker in the next decade. The schedule, while ambitious, is not impossible provided the interest for greater European sovereignty continues among EU member-states.

Further, the Strategic Compass creates a new Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams, enhances the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and Cyber Defence Policy, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox, and an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence. The document notes that hybrid threats are growing in scale and scope, specifically mentioning that China and Russia have utilized hybrid tactics. The Hybrid Toolbox will allow for a faster, coordinated attribution of attacks. The Strategic Compass will further strengthen the existing Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox, which has grown from a budget of €11 million in 2017 to almost double to €21.7 million in 2020. Enhancing the toolbox, solidifying the EU’s Joint Cyber Unit, further developing the EU’s Cyber Defense Policy will be instrumental to deter cyber attacks. The Strategic Compass outlines how information manipulation threatens not only Ukraine but aspiring member-states; as a response, a new toolbox being developed in coordination with the European Democracy Action Plan. Many of the tools highlighted in the Strategic Compass, such as the Cyber Diplomatic Policy and the EU Space Strategy, have either been underutilized or underdeveloped, but the changing nature of conflict, as is prominently on display in Ukraine, calls for the EU to sharpen and enhance these tools.

Geographically, the Strategic Compass references security on a global level. However its emphasis is on the transatlantic relationship and the regions neighboring the EU reflecting their special importance to the bloc. Specifically, it calls for a strengthening of NATO-EU cooperation both on the political and the military level. It also calls for continuing the momentum created by the 2021 EU-US Summit Statement, a political declaration of EU-US partnership across multiple sectors. Further, regarding the EU’s neighboring regions, focus is placed on Africa, particularly the Sahel and West Africa, and the EU’s immediate east. Indeed Africa has repeatedly been identified as a region of primary geostrategic importance for the EU as instability in the continent crosses the Mediterranean; while Europe’s east, from Moldova to Georgia, is facing Russia’s belligerency and destabilizing acts.

#### The EU has resources for cyber defense – it solves the aff

Cerulus 2/21 - Laurens Cerulus leads POLITICO Europe’s team of reporters covering cybersecurity, privacy and data protection issues as Cybersecurity Editor. (“EU to mobilize cyber team to help Ukraine fight Russian cyberattacks,” Politico. February 21st, 2022. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-eu-cyber-attack-security-help/>) CTF

**The European Union will activate a team of cybersecurity experts** to help Ukraine fight off cyberattacks from Russia, officials told POLITICO.

The EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Team includes around 10 national cybersecurity officials of six European countries — Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania — who can provide assistance to countries under cyberattack. The team falls under the EU's defense cooperation program PESCO; it will be its first deployment.

The six “participating member states made a decision to activate the team,” said Margiris Abukevičius, vice minister at the Ministry of National Defence in Lithuania.

The move comes as Ukrainian cybersecurity services warned of incoming cyberattacks and threats on Monday, amid the conflict with Russia in the eastern part of the country.

Abukevičius said European officials will work out the details with Ukraine on how many and which experts it will devote to the operation. Sending the cyber team into Ukraine “is an option we’re considering,” Abukevičius said, adding it will depend on the type of support Ukraine requests.

The Ukrainian government on February 18 asked for the EU’s support of cyber military officials, in a letter to EU leaders seen by POLITICO.

Kyiv’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote to EU leaders that it would "welcome deployment to Kyiv" of the team of experts to evaluate "vulnerabilities of our key computer networks and systems." Kuleba also requested "additional technical equipment and software for strengthening the cybersecurity infrastructure" from the EU.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on Monday evening told reporters that the EU “will send a mission of experts to help Ukraine to face cyberattacks,” after meeting Kuleba at a meeting of European foreign affairs ministers in Brussels.

Kyiv's plea for cyber reinforcements followed two major attacks on Ukrainian government networks in recent weeks. In mid-January, hackers posted messages on government websites and spread malware to wipe out data. Government websites were also taken down by an avalanche of traffic targeted at them last week, which Ukrainian security services called the "largest-ever" attack of its kind in the country.

The country has faced a barrage of major cyberattacks in recent years, many of which were attributed to Russian security services by Ukrainian as well as Western officials. The country suffered attacks on its elections in 2014 and on its energy grids in 2015 and 2016. The country was also the epicenter of a global malware outbreak known as "NotPetya" that quickly spread across the world, crippling multinationals like the Danish shipping giant Maersk, logistics giant FedEx, pharma company Merck and others.

Borrell already suggested **the EU could offer cybersecurity support** in mid-January, saying the bloc would “mobilize all [its] resources to help Ukraine to face these cyberattacks.”

The bloc has poured millions into schemes supporting Ukraine’s cybersecurity and digital infrastructure in past years. The country is seen as a front line in global cyber conflict and a testbed for intelligence services to deploy cyber-offensive and espionage tools.

#### EU cyber programs can fill in for the aff

Liedekerke and Laudrain 3/20 - Arthur de Liedekerke is a Project Manager at political advisory Rasmussen Global and a non-resident fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Arthur Laudrain is a DPhil candidate in Cybersecurity at the University of Oxford (Wolfson College), Rotary Scholar for Global Peace, and Fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative. (“Russia’s Cyber War: What’s Next and What the European Union Should Do,” Council of Foreign Relations. March 20th, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-cyber-war-whats-next-and-what-european-union-should-do>) CTF

What should the European Union do in the immediate term?

The EU has adopted new frameworks, including its much vaunted Strategic Compass, which, in the long term, **will improve cybersecurity in the bloc**, and potentially reduce the risk of catastrophic Russian cyberattacks. However, the EU needs to take more steps in the short term to shore up cyber defenses and mitigate the threat of Russian cyber operations.

First, the EU should get its own house in order. The revised Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive–better known in Brussels circles as NIS 2–should be finalized in the coming months and will aim to further strengthen the security of supply chains, streamline incident reporting obligations, and introduce more stringent supervisory measures for a large number of operators of essential services and enterprises across the EU. While NIS 2 represents a step in the right direction, the EU still has some way to go in implementing harmonized cybersecurity rules across the bloc’s own institutions.

Second, the EU and its Member States have a role to play in discouraging and deterring cyberattacks by demonstrating a willingness to act and impose costs on perpetrators. The first-ever operational deployment of the EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Team to Ukraine, alongside similar teams from the United States, was a welcome signal in this respect. One way to impose further costs would be by pushing for **coordinated attribution of cyberattacks at the EU-level**. On the offensive and deterrent side, the EU should adopt a pooling of capabilities on a voluntary basis. Similar programs already exist among other groups, such as NATO’s Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA) program, which the EU could use as a model for its own programs.

Third, **the EU should ensure it is better prepared by leveraging the tools it already has** at its disposal. Intelligence sharing and situational awareness have proven vital before and during the war in Ukraine, but the future effectiveness of these strategies in deterring and mitigating cyberattacks will be reliant on Member States willingness to contribute with timely and actionable intelligence. In the short term, the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe), a recently created group bringing together the executives of the EU’s twenty seven national cybersecurity authorities, should be used to its full capability and integrated with the rest of the EU cyber ecosystem. CyCLONe, with their wealth of operational-level expertise, should be able to brief political decision-makers in the Council more frequently. On the military side, the EU still lacks a fully fleshed-out cooperation mechanism for military cybersecurity alerts, despite this being an objective since the 2014 EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. Ensuring cooperation among both civilian and military groups is vital given the specter of Russian cyberattacks.

Supporting Ukraine is every democracy’s duty. Russia will attempt to undermine this support through cyberattacks and other means. The EU needs to shore up its cyber defenses at home to ensure all Members can continue to aid Ukraine in the future.

### eu solvency – russia

#### NATO hinders EU-Russia Cooperation

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The sudden demise of the Soviet bloc caught the world by surprise, so no wonder at the time the alliance did not contemplate disbanding itself. And given its continuation, it would have been politically impossible to reject newly independent countries’ wishes for accession. And yes, it took NATO to intervene in the Yugoslav civil war, be it belatedly in Bosnia and controversially in Kosovo. But it is obvious that the original gist has been taken out of the alliance, and judging by the arduous strategy debate it has not been replaced by a successor gist. In essence, NATO has been and is changing from a singleminded military alliance into a multi-purpose platform enabling countries to cultivate their bilateral ties with the US. That is why it will prove impossible to erect a European pillar within NATO, as some commentators suggest should be done. Why else would recently acceded member states, apparently not trustful of NATO’s consensus machinery in article 5 situations, be lobbying so actively with the US for additional security guarantees? And would most allies send their units into Afghanistan because they feel their national security is at stake in the Hindu Kush or because they want to curry favour with Washington? When last February the Dutch coalition government fell over the extension of its Uruzgan mission, the first question raised was whether this implied that the Netherlands would be kicked out of the economic G20 forum.

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy; on the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties.

Revamping the transatlantic relationship

The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the US, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement.

Good old NATO

Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the North, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. And none of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF.

Trading NATO for the EU-US does not mean doing away with the acquis atlantique, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. 4 NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined President Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship with the US which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-World War II integration process.

Third parties

Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the US, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, **Moscow is likely to regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s enlargement agenda**, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘EuroAtlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

#### A European system is key to stabilize Russia

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NATO EXPANSION AND PERPETUAL CRISES IF EUROPE’S SECURITY ORDER EXCLUDES RUSSIA

Not every dispute between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Georgia can be chalked up to NATO expansion.1 Yet the denial of any connection flies in the face of the evidence. Every post-Cold War Soviet and Russian leader (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin) has condemned NATO expansion. Moreover, Russia’s preoccupation with, and antipathy toward, that project reflects a historical pattern: great powers seek spheres of influence and resist adversaries’ attempts to establish a military presence within them.2 That may not be commendable or desirable, but it does mean Russia’s behavior cannot reasonably be viewed as aberrant or indeed wholly different from that of other great powers, including the United States.

Seen thus, the 2014–2015 and 2021–2022 crises centering on Ukraine were not purely bilateral ones between Ukraine and Russia. They resulted, in part, from Washington’s failure to seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War—the “unipolar moment,” when the United States wielded unprecedented, peerless power—to forge a pan-European security order that extended from the Atlantic to the Urals (as the USSR’s last leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, put it) and included Russia. The decision to expand NATO excluded Russia from the new European order, whereas **a Europe-wide system would have laid the foundation for far-reaching arms control and confidence-building measures**, strengthening the security of a Europe, newly conceived.3 Such measures as were taken to include Russia were never so far reaching.4 Instead, the thinking about the continent’s future was timid and, worse, stuck in the past.

American leaders may speak in general terms about the desirability of a European order that integrates Russia, but such an arrangement would diminish, and over time perhaps even destroy, U.S. primacy in Europe. Russia is too large, powerful, and independent to accept a European order in which the United States’ preferences on critical matters tend to prevail. The desire to preserve the United States’ preeminent position within NATO may explain Washington’s choice not to include Russia in the alliance once it began to expand after the Cold War.

Post-Cold War NATO expansion not only obligated the United States to defend countries marginal to U.S. national security, but also contributed to crises with Russia involving Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–2015, 2021–2022).

Russia’s alienation from a European order marked by U.S. primacy and NATO enlargement also contributed to the demise of arguably the most significant arms control agreement in modern European history: the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 550 and 5,000 kilometers from Europe (and, in Russia’s case, Asia as well).5 Opportunities to build upon previous conventional (non-nuclear) arms control treaties, such as the 1990 Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty, were also lost. Russia and the United States charged one another with violating these agreements, but their differences should have been resolved through negotiations, so that those accords could continue to contribute to European security.

A new European security order should include regular diplomatic and military-to-military exchanges with Russia. Discussions within these forums could help prepare the groundwork for confidence-building measures that reduce the risk of the frequent, close, and dangerous encounters between the two countries’ warships and military aircraft in and around the Baltic Sea and Black Sea—something that has occurred on several occasions—creating accidents that could spiral into a conflict between the world’s two nuclear superpowers.6

NATO continually underscores the magnitude of Russian power and the threat it poses to Europe, but maintaining forces required to deter Russia should not preclude steps toward a new European security system in which it acquires a stake. Yet NATO remains divided on whether to engage Russia. Even those members of the alliance who favor engagement are not of one mind on what the agenda for engagement should be, the extent to which engagement should be pursued, and the ends it should seek.

Within NATO, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are the least enthusiastic about formulating a new approach toward Russia that would have a distinctive European stamp.7 They are also the most fervent opponents of strategic autonomy aimed at military self-sufficiency on the continent, or even a reduced U.S. military presence.

The United States and Russia control approximately 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, which makes avoiding direct conflict between them paramount.

The United States nevertheless has good reasons to change course in Europe, among them China’s rise, the relative decline in American economic power, and festering social and economic problems at home.8 And as the 2021–2022 crisis with Russia demonstrated, the American security guarantee to an enlarged NATO has created more demanding defense commitments to its eastern flank now that a stronger Russia has emerged. The consensus in Washington is that China presents the principal challenge to American primacy, and Americans are increasingly concerned about problems on the home front.9 Under these circumstances, better to formulate a new approach to Europe with care and deliberation than to change course abruptly because of events in the Asia-Pacific.

#### A European army is k2 deter Russia

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Now, six years later, the 414 Tank Battalion is finishing its deployment in Lithuania, the first time in post-World War II history a permanently integrated unit comprising two countries has deployed to a third country. That’s surely a good sign given that Macron and various other European leaders—past and present—have for years been advancing the idea of some form of joint European military capability.

If Russian leader Vladimir Putin backs down from the Ukrainian border this time, European countries can thank their lucky star—Washington. In their current setup, they are hardly able to deter Russia. That, of course, is the reason Macron and others argue that **a “true European army” is indispensable**.

But as de Jong and his troops—and indeed European politicians and other officers—know, military integration isn’t easy. Europe’s best efforts to date are otherwise the never-deployed EU Battlegroups and the Eurocorps, which functions as the EU Battlegroup headquarters. The Netherlands and Belgium form a joint navy, whose vessels patrol various waters. That’s no mean feat, but it’s hardly as complicated as having soldiers of two nationalities permanently serving alongside one another.

The integration hasn’t been perfect. Indeed, for its first deployment the 414 Tank Battalion had to borrow equipment from other Dutch and German units, and the 1st Panzer Division is likely to need another couple of years before it’s fully combat-ready with its own equipment. But when the 414th returns on its next rotation, it will be commanded by a Dutch officer.

What’s more, the two allies are in the process of integrating the Dutch Army’s two other combat brigades into Germany’s Bundeswehr. The Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade has already been made part of the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Forces Division; like the fully integrated 43rd Mechanized, it’s even listed on the Rapid Forces’ list of units.

Pending approval by the new governments in Berlin and The Hague, the Dutch Army’s 13th Light Brigade will also be integrated into the Bundeswehr: an army’s whole combat capability, integrated into another country’s army. Logistically, it’s a staggering achievement—and politically, too, considering that a mere 82 years ago the Netherlands was occupied by Nazi Germany.

At the moment, the two armies are even writing a joint Common Army Vision. “The German and Dutch armies are constantly in contact with each other to discuss further cooperation, which they do through a formal entity called Army Steering Group,” a spokesman for the German Army told me.

Such integration requires enormous trust. “The Dutch-German integration is quite unique; it is nearly without caveats and works very well,” noted Bart Groothuis, a Dutch defense expert and member of the European Parliament for the Dutch center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. “But if there were to be a crisis in the Baltics, would we, for example, have the logistics to resupply it? The answer is no. So why are we then so happy about it?”

To be sure, the 1st Panzer Division won’t be supplanting U.S. forces in Europe anytime soon: U.S. European Command has more than 60,000 military and civilian personnel, not to mention superb equipment stored in various European countries. And when crises loom, Washington can send more. On Feb. 6, 1,700 members of the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Poland from Fort Bragg.

To have reached the 1st Panzer Division’s level of integration is, however, a remarkable achievement for any two countries. Building trust (not to mention overcoming language barriers) are just one part of the challenge. “There also has to be the military and political will to make it happen,” de Jong noted. “If politicians are only interested in a picture in a newspaper, the whole thing will fall apart.”

Of course, the whole thing will equally fall apart of the countries disagree on when it should be used. If Germany had wanted to send the 414 Tank Battalion to Lithuania and the Netherlands had refused, it would have been useless. The unit’s deployment, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu told me, “is a strong display of Germany’s and the Netherlands’ commitment and capabilities. At a time of unprecedented security challenges, the ability of allies to act together quickly and effectively remains essential.”

Thanks to the Bundeswehr, the Dutch Army has maximized its striking and rapid-forces capabilities at minimal expense. The Bundeswehr has, of course, gained new soldiers and officers. And both sides share equipment that would otherwise have to be duplicated. Indeed, interoperability and cultural hurdles notwithstanding, integrating one’s armed forces with those of a neighbor seems commonsense. With such integration, Europe’s various armed forces could turn into a mighty force, one capable of looking after the continent and any deserving neighbors.

Imagine what fully integrated European armed forces would be able to do now that Russia is flexing its muscles. Finland and Sweden are, in fact, working hard to combine, for example, defense planning and use of airfields. But integration has the most potential if it involves a larger and a smaller country. Germany is, in fact, working to replicate the 1st Panzer Division success. And perhaps

### at: nato k2 deterrence

#### NATO deterrence fails – Baltics prove NATO isn’t key to stop hybrid war

**Halas 2019** (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”, [https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855 )//MargaretE](https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855%20)//MargaretE)

The increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness and the related security concerns associated with the Eastern Flank of NATO caused a revival of interest in European deterrence after more than two decades of neglect. Yet the absence of a military invasion into the Baltics does not necessarily imply a successful deterrent threat. Quite the contrary: a detailed analysis using Boolean logic suggests that **deterrence does not really work in the Baltics, neither at the conventional, nor at the sub-conventional level.** A lack of capabilities undermines the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrence posture despite its clear effort to communicate the threat to the other side. The only reason why the lack of capabilities on the Eastern Flank has no negative consequences for the Alliance is because Russia has (currently) no need to advance its state interests by resorting to military force. At the same time, deterrence fails repeatedly at the subconventional level and it will probably continue to fail in the future. Incidents like the relocation of the Bronze Soldier Memorial in 2007, the kidnapping of a security officer in 2014 or the violations of airspace in 2018 can escalate to a full-blown crisis. Limiting the number of such incidents should be the main goal of the cumulative deterrence of hybrid threats.

An assertion that a deterrent threat prevented a military attack is probably the closest thing one can have in strategic studies to the article of faith. One might easily claim, and many in fact do, that an absence of evidence documenting the existence of God is not necessarily evidence of its absence. Some of us thus keep believing in God despite the lack of evidence. And it is similar for deterrence: it is notoriously difficult to prove its success, because the absence of an aggressive action might be caused by other factors than the deterrent threat itself. In other words, **the absence of an attack is not necessarily evidence of a successful deterrence.** Most of the scholars recognise that (see Buzan 1987, pp. 163–164, Morgan 2003, pp. 117–129, Paul 2009, p. 3, Rid 2012, pp. 142–143, Freedman 2013, p. 159) and still, we rarely question this article of faith. But one does not have to wait for the invasion to occur in order to investigate the existence of deterrence, and this text aims to do exactly that. It tries to examine the security environment at NATO’s Eastern Flank at both the conventional and the sub-conventional level in order to find out if deterrence works in the Baltics.

The European security is experiencing profound changes resulting from the increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness that Vladimir Putin voiced for the first time in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. It also does not take much effort to recognise a remarkable shift in the attention that NATO paid to deterrence in consequence of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Deterrence was entirely absent from the 2008 Bucharest Summit official declaration (NATO 2008), and merely two paragraphs were devoted to it in the most recent Strategic Concept (NATO 2010). The final communiqu  from the Wales Summit of the Alliance (NATO 2014) still mentioned deterrence less than a dozen times, but the count trebled already at the Warsaw Summit (NATO 2016). Bearing this in mind, the history of the Alliance can thus be divided into three distinct periods. During the first one, the Alliance devoted most of its attention to collective defence and deterrence, while staying open to detente especially after the Harmel Report. Later, after the end of the Cold War, it found a new purpose in out of area operations and crisis management. The last period, which began with Crimea, is characterised instead by a mix of priorities from the previous two periods and a careful rebalancing from crisis management towards a more traditional collective defence and deterrence again. The Baltic region is the best example of this gradual shift back to the basics and thus it became the focus of a case study presented here as well.

Yet this renewed emphasis on deterrence seems incomplete beyond the often repeated rhetorical exercises. It takes sufficient capabilities, solid credibility, and strong communication of threat to make deterrence work, but a closer look at the Baltic region reveals that there is not much of a substance behind NATO’s declaratory statements. The deterrent message of serious consequences in line with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the case of an aggressive action against any NATO member state is expressed clearly enough (Rasmussen 2014, Mattis 2017, Pompeo 2018). However, after disregarding mutual deterrence at the nuclear level, the continuous Allied communication of deterrent threats lacks sufficient conventional capabilities on the Eastern Flank to be credible. Luckily for NATO, the analysis presented here shows that this lack of credibility does not really matter at the moment. Instead of a blind belief in the success of conventional deterrence, which is supposedly illustrated by the absence of a crisis leading to a Russian invasion into the Baltics, the lack of the Allies’ conventional capabilities to back up their own deterrent messaging suggests a need to shift the attention elsewhere. Boolean logic makes it possible to disentangle the argument and to show that the absence of a serious military crisis in the Baltics is not due to the success of deterrence at the conventional level, but rather due to the current lack of Russian interest in repeating the Crimean scenario in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. This conclusion is the only available explanation of the situation on the Eastern Flank of NATO after analysing the communication, credibility and capabilities of the Alliance and its member states.

Deterrence does not work at the conventional level, but it still did not fail thanks to the missing interest of the other side. **Yet at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare, where deterrence matters most today, it failed repeatedly**. **Russia currently does not seem to be deterred by NATO or its individual members at the sub-conventional level, where hybrid threats naturally belong.** Moscow regularly conducts actions which would normally amount to deterrence failure and there are no signs on its part of any intention to change this practice. To put it simply, the insufficient conventional capabilities of NATO on the Eastern Flank (Luik and Jermalavičius 2017, Cornish 2017, p. 9) do not have negative consequences only thanks to the lack of Russian interest in challenging the status quo in the Baltics in the first place. Moreover, where it matters the most, deterrence does not work simply because the number of attacks below the conventional level prove it completely ineffective. However, the most important result of these findings with respect to practical policy and scholarly analysis is that the Alliance has a vital interest in making subconventional deterrence work. That is due to the fact that a possible escalation of a local hybrid crisis might unmask the lack of conventional capabilities in the Baltics and by that also put the overall deterrence posture of NATO into question. The following text offers a similar structure of the argument. After analysing the logic of deterrence at the beginning, it continues by focusing on the conventional level and on shifts in communication in the second part the article. The third part of the text is then devoted to deterrence at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare and to some examples of repeated failures of deterrence at this level. The conclusion then not only summarises the whole argument, but also gives specific recommendation on how to adapt the logic of deterrence to the European security environment after Crimea and to hybrid warfare.

#### NATO cooperation fails to deter hybrid war – empirics

**Halas 2019** (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”, [https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855 )//MargaretE](https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855%20)//MargaretE)

Yet one doesn’t have to look for a long time in order to find a proof of deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level already happening on a regular basis and in line with the third row of Table 1, which depicts the logic of deterrence by using Boolean algebra. The Estonian island Vaindloo in the Gulf of Finland witnessed at least half a dozen violations of its airspace by Russian state-owned aircraft in 2018. Since Estonia has virtually no air force or ground-based air defence systems and relies entirely on the NATO Baltic Air Policing as regards the protection of its airspace, in this case one can hardly expect a use of kinetic force similar to the shooting down of the Russian Su-24 in November 2015 after a very similar incursion into the Turkish airspace. These violations easily stay below the Article 5 threshold in the given context with no risk of conventional escalation under present conditions. But they represent a constant reminder of the limited ability of the three Baltic states to protect their sovereignty. How Estonian military personnel will react to these airspace violations after Estonia procures a medium-range air defence system and how the allies will react if Estonia for whatever reason decides to shoot down the aircraft, remains to be seen.

Another example of the lacking sub-conventional deterrence and intentional pushing and probing below Article 5 is the already mentioned visit of the U.S. President Obama in Tallinn in September 2014 and the events that occurred immediately after his visit. In a rather symbolic move, just two days after Barack Obama declared that “the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London”, Russian FSB agents kidnapped the Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver and took him across the border into the Russian Federation, where he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The abduction helped to cement the reputation of the FSB as “the most aggressive Russian special service targeting Estonia” (EISS 2016, p. 14), although Kohver was then swiftly exchanged in a Cold War-like swap for a Russian spy on a bridge over the border river Piusa shortly before a meeting between Putin and Obama. The border between Estonia and Russia remains an unresolved issue in general. Just about a decade ago and thanks to the territorial changes after WWII, a small part of Estonia could have been reached only by taking a short section of a road through the Russian territory. Although an alternative detour has been built in recent years, the final resolution of the problem by an exchange of territory as proposed in the Estonian-Russian State Border Treaty signed in 2014 is not going to materialise due to the Russian refusal to ratify the treaty.

Maybe the best example of how a full-blown crisis resulting from deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level might look was the riots and cyber attacks following the relocation of a Soviet-era bronze soldier from a square in central Tallinn to a military cemetery in 2007. While the emotionally charged issue of relocating a WWII monument led to two days of rioting, several burned cars and looted shops, dozens of wounded individuals and hundreds of arrests, the subsequent three weeks of distributed denial-of-service cyber attacks from abroad brought Estonia – a digital champion of the world that just introduced electronic voting in parliamentary elections – virtually to its knees. It was not just websites and mail servers of government agencies and political parties that were shut down by an incoming traffic that exceeded the normal level by degrees of magnitude. Online services of major newspapers were disrupted too, as were the electronic operations of the biggest Estonian banks (Joubert 2012). National authorities managed to cope with this onslaught only by digitally cutting Estonia off from the rest of the world and thanks to the lucky coincidence that a few key individuals of global internet security were present in Tallinn at the same time. All of that happened long before NATO started to pay attention to hybrid threats in relation to Article 5 scenarios. The reported disruption of mobile phone networks in some NATO member states during the recent Zapad exercise (Cook 2017) then only shows that the Russian military practices exploitation of electronic and digital vulnerabilities on a continuous basis.

Crises and incidents like that have a significant escalation potential, which is not only the reason for the certain degree of ambiguity on the NATO side that was mentioned earlier, but also the source of a major concern. **Hybrid threats must be dealt with primarily by individual member states** and therefore NATO should not be, strictly speaking, blamed for deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level. Yet due to the possibility of Article 5 activation and a hybrid crisis escalation to the conventional level, NATO might be very much involved in a resolution of the crisis. A challenge to the status quo and a related threat to use military force in order to promote state interests – for example, in the form of protection of ethnic minorities – might then unmask the weak points of a strategy, which the Allied deterrence posture in the region rests upon. “As a tripwire force largely taken out of NATO’s Cold War playbook, the eFP is not automatically suited to the subconventional and conventional challenges” in the Baltics (Zapfe 2017, p. 157) and reinforcements with follow-on forces might not be in place with a sufficient strength soon enough. The Alliance thus has a clear interest in making sure that deterrence of hybrid threats will work as much as possible in the future. The whole situation also illustrates how conventional and sub-conventional levels of deterrence relate to each other in the post-Crimea security environment in Europe, similarly to how the division of Germanymade superpowers realise the linkages between nuclear and conventional deterrence during the Cold War.

#### Deterrence fails – countless empirics

**Ruhle 2015** (Michael Rühle is currently Head of the Hybrid Challenges and Energy Security Section, in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, “Deterrence: What it can (and cannot) do” <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/04/20/deterrence-what-it-can-and-cannot-do/index.html> )//MargaretE

If only it were so easy. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while paralysing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence.

Another important example for the pitfalls of deterrence is provided by the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina, which contests the United Kingdom’s authority over the islands in the South Atlantic, knew only too well about the superiority of the British armed forces. However, over the course of several decades the UK had gradually been reducing its military protection for the islands. Thus, while London kept emphasising that the Falklands were British, the military Junta in Buenos Aires became convinced that such statements were mere lip service. When the Junta faced a domestic crisis that threatened its rule, it tried to generate support by stirring patriotic feelings and occupied the islands. Deterrence had failed because the United Kingdom had ignored an important factor. Striking a tough pose while at the same time reducing the means to make good on it undermines one of deterrence’s most important ingredients: credibility. The story did not end there, however. Much to Argentina’s surprise, the British Navy sailed to the South Atlantic and re-conquered the islands. General Galtieri, the Chief of Argentina’s military Junta, later admitted that he never believed that a European country would be ready to pay such a high price for a few insignificant islands so far away. Argentina, too, had miscalculated.

But could Galtieri and his fellow countrymen not have guessed that a proud nation like the United Kingdom would not stand idly by as part of her overseas territory was being occupied by another power? Should one not have known that remaining passive would have spelled the end for any British government? The answer: yes, in normal times Argentina may well have pondered such scenarios. However, in a crisis humans tend to think along a different kind of logic. Indeed, many studies about human behaviour demonstrate that people who fear to lose something valuable are ready to take greater risks than those who hope to make a gain. In the context of the Falklands War, this means that for the Junta, which was under siege politically, occupying the “Malvinas” was not about a gain, but rather about avoiding losing power. This made them take risks they otherwise would not have dared to take. Rationality – a precondition for a stable deterrence system – had evaporated.

Looking at Russian domestic politics today, the lessons of 1982 are worth reconsidering: stirring nationalism in order to generate political support may lead one to military adventurism which can be self-defeating.

All these cases demonstrate that deterrence is not just about military balances, but also about interests. If the opponent’s interest in achieving a certain objective is higher than one’s own, deterrence may fail. A classic example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When it became clear that Washington was ready to defend its core security interests, the Soviet Union withdrew the missiles it had started to deploy in Cuba. Another example is the Vietnam War. Although the United States was militarily far superior, it ultimately had to withdraw because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were willing to make much greater sacrifices to achieve their goals than the US was willing to make in support of South Vietnam. This asymmetric set of interests not only makes deterrence fail, it also makes big powers lose small wars.

### at: nato k2 democracy

#### NATO fails to spread democracy and enables American adventurism

**Posen 19** - Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program, and serves on the Executive Committee of Seminar XXI. (“Trump Aside, What’s the U.S. Role in NATO?” New York Times, March 10th, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/opinion/trump-aside-whats-the-us-role-in-nato.html>) CTF

President Trump has many bad ideas. Reconsidering America’s role in NATO isn’t one of them.

NATO, a military alliance, was formed specifically to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, whose principal powers — Germany, France, Italy and Britain — had been so devastated by World War II that they were vulnerable to Soviet coercion, subversion or conquest. NATO also became a vehicle for rehabilitating the Axis powers — Germany and Italy — under the victors’ tutelage.

America had an enduring interest in ensuring that the Continent not fall under the domination of a single, capable, hostile power: That could pose a serious threat to America. The Truman administration was clear on this point: The main purpose of stationing American military forces in Europe in the early 1950s was to stay long enough to right the balance of power, not to stay forever.

By the 1960s, the balance was restored. Western Europe’s economies were booming; Britain and France had become nuclear powers; German militarism had been tamed, even as a new, large modern army emerged in West Germany. During the Vietnam War, America was so free of worry about the Soviet threat that it essentially milked its conventional forces in Europe to support its war in Indochina. Its European allies contributed nothing to America’s effort in Vietnam. By 1968, with the collapse of Czechoslovakia’s government and army, the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact alliance also appeared less capable.

In the early 1970s, Senator Mike Mansfield, a Montana Democrat, led an effort to cut the American troop presence in Europe. It lost momentum in part because the Soviet Union conducted an ill-fated military buildup, which contributed to its economic failures in the 1980s. Senator Mansfield’s campaign was also opposed by the Europeans, who preferred to keep their American security blanket, and by President Richard Nixon and his chief foreign affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, who rejected what he considered congressional meddling in foreign policy. Oddly, troop reductions in Europe would have been consistent with the “Nixon Doctrine,” which called explicitly for allies to do much more in their own defense.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the last vestiges of a major security threat to NATO, and with it, the rationale for the American military presence in Europe. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its violent machinations in Eastern Ukraine haven’t improved its ability to threaten NATO. Instead they have placed Mr. Putin in the penalty box. The European Union, like America, reacted appropriately by imposing punishing sanctions on Russia.

The whole misadventure has diminished Russian power. Europeans are able to defend themselves. **France and Germany together equal Russia’s population, enormously outweigh the country economically and outspend it militarily**.

But organizations don’t like going out of business, and NATO was a “good brand,” making it useful for other projects. So NATO took on a new goal: banishing security competition from all of Europe and its periphery, and bringing liberal democracy to former subjects of the Soviet empire. Instead of being re-evaluated, NATO got bigger.

NATO’s expansion now requires the United States to defend all the new member states from both conventional and nuclear threats — a tall order given their proximity to Russia and a strategically unnecessary project since they can contribute nothing to American national security.2

From an organization that could succeed simply by deterring a major military threat, NATO turned into an expansive project to make all of Western Eurasia safe, liberal and democratic — goals that are much more complicated.

NATO’s **wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya all depended on significant American military capability**; none produced functioning liberal democracies. Among three of post-Cold War NATO’s new members — Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria — democracy is now suffering erosion or is in actual retreat. NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO” proved alarming to Russia — and helped pave the way to wars. In other words, NATO’s well-intended political project is an expensive failure.

Ironically, NATO also encourages fecklessness among its members in ways that can be likened to what financiers call the “moral hazard” phenomenon, in which excessive insurance, offered for an ostensibly good purpose, promotes risky behavior by those insured.

America’s wealthy European allies have underfunded their own militaries, secure in the credibility of America’s commitment. Even the most martial European powers, France and Britain, don’t spend enough today to pay for their much-reduced post-Cold War force structures. They barely reach the alliance’s obligation to spend 2 percent of G.D.P. on defense. France and Germany spend roughly half, and Britain two-thirds, of what the United States does per soldier; unless they have achieved remarkable levels of efficiency, they must be cutting corners.

Germany today spends only about 1.25 percent of G.D.P. on defense, leaving the German armed forces a sad remnant of their very capable Cold War incarnation. Until 1990, that army could put a dozen heavily armed divisions into the field a few days after mobilization. Today it would be lucky to get one fully equipped division into the field. Less than half of German military equipment is ready for combat.

While European and American politicians and pundits wring their hands about the Russian military threat, European governments and militaries practice business as usual. The dysfunctional turn in European domestic politics seems to be enabled by elites who fear no foreign threats because the United States dutifully promises to take care of them.

Finally, NATO helps make American military action abroad too easy. The existing base structure in Europe may facilitate intervention in the greater Middle East — but the greater Middle East is another part of the world where the United States should be doing less militarily. When Washington politicians consider military action there, it would be better if they had to negotiate rather than assume access to European bases. It would force policymakers to take a bit more time to think.

Supporters of proposed interventions know that the American public likes the idea of having allies. NATO support helps sell an operation to voters. Europeans can applaud our action, enable our deployment to the theater and contribute small military forces to provide the patina of cost and risk sharing. The Allies did contribute troops — and suffered significant casualties — in the extended Afghan counterinsurgency, but the wars NATO enables are the Americans’ to win or lose.

NATO’s founding mission has been achieved and replaced with unsuccessful misadventures. The United States has urgent business at home, and arguably in Asia. Though President Trump has no strategy for returning the European allies to full responsibility for their own futures, the American foreign policy establishment could better spend its time devising such a strategy than defending the counterproductive trans-Atlantic status quo.

A reappraisal is long overdue.

### at: perm

#### Perm fails -- treaty withdrawal halts cooperation

**Schmidt 2021** (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/meyau/> )//MargaretE

What explains persistent cooperation in the face of withdrawal by some states, but not others? More broadly, how does treaty withdrawal affect the prospects of international cooperation? I argue that the consequences of withdrawal on international cooperation are best explained by viewing exit as a breach of norm-based trust. When states exit treaties they violate the norm that agreements must be kept (pacta sunt servanda), **undermining** the foundation of trust upon which **cooperation** is based. States perceive exit as a violation of international norms and, consequentially, react with indignation. This sense of being wronged drives states to punish the norm-violating state by isolating it internationally and **avoiding cooperation with it in the future.** As a result, state parties to the treaty of withdrawal – those whose trust has been violated – begin to opt out of ratifying agreements to which the withdrawing state is a member.

The implications of this argument differ from other common explanations. One possibility is that withdrawal causes states to develop reputations for unreliability, making it more difficult for them to attract cooperative partners in the future.5 A second explanation is that the consequence of withdrawal on cooperation are a function of the material cost that it exacts on other states: states respond more harshly to withdrawals in issue areas characterized by direct costs as compared to those where the costs of withdrawal are more diffuse or modest.6 A final possibility is that withdrawal has no independent effect on cooperation; instead, both withdrawal and observed changes in cooperation are the byproduct of increased isolationism, populist nationalism, or some other change in the withdrawing state’s preference for international engagement.7 My theory, in contrast, predicts that treaty members will react more strongly to withdrawal than treaty non-members, that this reaction does not depend on the costs of withdrawal, and that the change in cooperation is driven by other treaty members’ actions rather than the withdrawing state itself.

#### Withdrawal wrecks cooperation – breaches trust and wrecks negotiation credibility

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My central argument begins from the premise that unilateral exit entails the violation of the type of moralistic trust known as **particularized trust**.13 Trust is the willingness to put one’s wellbeing in another’s hands. Moralistic trust is trust based on the belief that others share your normative commitments. Trust of the moral variety exists on a continuum from generalized to particularized trust. Generalized trust is a belief that others are inherently trustworthy, because everyone is part of the same moral community. It reflects an optimistic disposition toward human nature. Moving down the continuum from generalized trust toward particularized trust involves narrowing the inclusivity of one’s community. Particularized trusters are those who trust members of their community and regard others with skepticism. They divide the world into in-groups and out-groups defined in terms of their normative commitments. The etymology of particularized trust is that “A trusts B,” whereas the etymology of generalized trust is simply that “A trusts.”14 Generalized trust is dispositional. Particularized trust is relational.

Recent research has linked generalized trust to the emergence and design of multilateral institutions.15 This research demonstrates how variation in trust can explain state entry into international agreements. Decision-makers high in generalized trust are more likely to negotiate, conclude, and ratify multilateral agreements than those with less generalized trust. This suggests that trust – and the proclivity of states to enter into agreements with one another – is a function of who is sitting at the negotiating table. But this account is hard-pressed to explain what happens when trust is broken. As a dispositional characteristic, individuals’ level of generalized trust should not change because another party walked away from its treaty commitments. As a result, explanations based on generalized trust are limited in their ability to explain how international cooperation evolves following unilateral exit.

The concept of particularized trust addresses this limitation. Because particularized trust entails categorizing actors based on whether they belong to one’s moral community, it offers a framework for understanding what happens when someone exits this community. Particularized trust is central to constructivist accounts for the emergence of cooperation. When Wendt writes that trust is the solution to “the fundamental problem of collective identity formation” he is suggesting that particularized trust provides the basis of norms and intersubjectivity.16 Trust is relational for constructivists, particular to groups and pairs of states. Hemmer and Katzenstein, for instance, use variation in particularized trust to explain US preferences for the creation of multilateral security institutions in Europe and the creation of bilateral institutions in Asia.17 By this logic, when particularized trust decreases, states identify with each other less and, consequentially, enter into fewer multilateral agreements.

**Unilateral exit violates particularized trust**. Although states often include provisions for flexibility, escape, and exit in the design of international agreements, meaning that unilateral exit is lawful, rule-bound behavior,18 there is a distinction between the letter of the law and the spirit of the deal.19 Even if states agree on the language of a treaty, they may have differing expectations concerning how a treaty will work in practice, especially its duration and the circumstances that would justify exit. The one-sided nature of unilateral exit suggests that divergent beliefs exist.

Although unilateral exit is lawful behavior, it violates particularized trust because it transgresses group-based norms. When states ratify multilateral treaties with one another, they self-categorize into a group of states defined by a shared commitment to the treaty. The norm that agreements must be kept provides that it is inappropriate to walk away from this commitment, even if the costs of compliance exceed expectations.20 These norm-based in-group expectations stand in contrast to the unbridled behavior of non-treaty members. When a state exits a treaty unilaterally, it violates the expectations of appropriate behavior shared by treaty members, but does not transgress a shared understanding with non-members. Such “collective experiences” are capable of changing the moral basis of trust.21 Even though treaty members and non-members observe the same behavior, only one group has experienced a breach of trust.

The consequences of violating particularized trust stem from its normative basis and unique etymology. Breaking particularized trust involves the violation of group-based norms; therefore, in-group members should respond with indignation and out-group members should not. These sentiments should be expressed by foreign policy decision-makers, especially those negotiating with the withdrawing state and relevant domestic stakeholders. Following a logic of appropriateness, treaty members should respond to norm transgression with social sanctions; out-group members, in contrast, should take no such action.22 **One of the ways treaty members enforce social norms is by “opting out” of future cooperation with the withdrawing state**. As a punishment, opting out is similar to outcasting, which “involves denying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership.”23 But rather than expelling a state from the community of benefits, opting out occurs when states systematically avoid cooperating with a state because of its past norm transgressions. To opt out is to ostracize. The etymology of particularized trust – that “A trusts B” – suggests that the scope of ostracization should be wide. As a result, unilateral exit should correspond with a decrease in the extent to which treaty members are willing to enter into agreements with the withdrawing state across issue areas.

#### Leaving NATO ends security cooperation – material goods and wrecked credibility halts negotiations

**Schmidt 2021** (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

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Even if unilateral exit is lawful, it can impact the distribution of material benefits across states by producing an asymmetric change in states’ legal obligations. Prior research has shown that the nature of strategic interactions varies by issue areas, shaping the emergence and design of international agreements.41 Koremenos draws a theoretically motivated distinction concerning the nature of cooperation in the issue areas of security, economics, human rights, and the environment.42 I build on this research by considering how the distributional consequences of unilateral exit varies across these issue areas.

Security cooperation is often modeled as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma marked by a concern for relative gains. States make themselves vulnerable to opportunism when they abide by security agreements, because other states may gain an advantage by exploiting their cooperation.43 Similar issues pertain in the areas of trade and economic cooperation, where states adjust their trade policies in order to gain the benefits of comparative advantage, but in doing so make themselves vulnerable to protectionist policies if their trading partners renege on their commitments. While some economic agreements create excludable goods that can be denied to withdrawing states, exit nonetheless has direct economic consequences for other treaty members. **In the areas of security and economic cooperation, there are thus direct costs to treaty members if another state exits** unilaterally from an agreement.

The distributional consequences of unilateral exit are different in the areas of human rights and the environment. In the area of environmental cooperation, the costs of withdrawal are more diffuse and long-term, such as those resulting from other treaty members bearing the costs of pollution or overfishing. Unilateral exits from human rights agreements, in contrast, tend to produce fewer negative externalities for other states, because these agreements are primarily designed to resolve domestic-level commitment problems.

If unilateral exit exacts a cost on other treaty members, then theories that explain how states respond to defection can suggest plausible hypotheses for the consequences of withdrawal on subsequent cooperation. One way states punish the withdrawing state is by **withholding future cooperation**. This claim is consistent with the mechanism of reciprocity which emphasizes the sequential and symmetric exchange of items by actors.45 Reciprocity suggests that when a state withdraws from a treaty, their former partners will withhold cooperation in kind. Unlike opting out, which predicts that states will abstain from ratifying agreements with the withdrawing state across issue areas, reciprocity suggests that states will meet like with like by withholding cooperation in the issue area of withdrawal.

#### NATO withdrawal halts cooperation – backlash towards France proves

**Schmidt 2021** (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/meyau/> )//MargaretE

French withdrawal was also costly and politically salient. French withdrawal undermined the deterrent threat at the core of NATO’s mission, damaging the credibility of the alliance. Withdrawal also brought direct material costs. It removed the legal basis for the presence of allied military officers in France, expelling the alliance’s headquarters from Paris and forcing the relocation of NATO to Brussels.78 French withdrawal from NATO was also well publicized. It garnered global media coverage and formed the context of de Gaulle’s visits to Moscow and Phenom Phen in the summer and fall of 1966 in which he asserted French independence in foreign affairs, challenged US supremacy, and sought to establish France as a broker in the Cold War. Non-NATO states were aware of de Gaulle’s withdrawal and capable of incorporating the event into assessments of the reliability of France’s treaty commitments, factors that favor withdrawal as unreliability.

How did entry into multilateral agreements with France change following withdrawal? Figure 7 presents ratification trends graphically, representing (as before) the average number of joins by treaty members with a solid line, the same average for treaty non-members with a dotted line, and the post-withdrawal period as the grey shaded area. Figure 7 reveals that NATO members tended to ratify more treaties with France than non-NATO states in the pre-withdrawal period, as would be expected. Nonetheless, both groups’ trends in ratification behavior are similar during the five years prior to 1966, when France withdrew from the NATO SOF agreement. There is then an abrupt drop during the next three years in the average number of treaties ratified by NATO members that include France as a state party relative to this average among non-NATO states. This relative decrease persists through de Gaulle’s death in 1970, before returning to pre-withdrawal levels of cooperation.

This differential shift in the average number of joins by NATO members and non-members combined with the parallel trends in the pre-withdrawal period provides suggestive evidence consistent with breach of trust theory. If anticipation of withdrawal or existing acrimony in diplomatic relations explained the shift in ratification behavior (as expected by the byproduct hypothesis) the shift would have occurred prior to withdrawal. If the change in ratifications was a result of states learning about the unreliability of France’s treaty commitments, as would be expected by withdrawal as unreliability, then there would be corresponding shifts in both groups’ ratification practices.

Figure 7 departs from the aggregate trends presented in Figure 2 in an important respect: NATO states’ entry into treaties with France returned to pre-withdrawal levels six years following withdrawal, whereas aggregate trends never rebound. Some scholars argue that the “surprisingly benign” consequences of French withdrawal suggest that de Gaulle did not intend to subvert the alliance.79 The historical record indicates, however, **that withdrawal set in motion mechanisms capable of undermining the long-term cooperation between NATO members and France.**

Because French withdrawal was anticipated, President Johnson attempted to pre-empt retribution by US officials. On March 2, 1966, after de Gaulle held a press conference suggesting that major decisions were forthcoming, but prior to an official announcement of withdrawal, the State Department issued a circular telegram to all NATO missions, Brussels, and USEC noting that: [W]e should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to President de Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation... We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts.80 The telegram attempted to preclude US officials from ostracizing France. Johnson thus anticipated and sought to guard against the processes set underway by a breach of trust and the damage that it could do to broader US foreign policy objectives.

Although France’s withdrawal was expected, NATO members nevertheless perceived it as a violation of pacta sunt servanda. In a March 31 memo analyzing France’s exit, US Ambassador to France Charles (‘Chip’) E. Bohlen concluded that de Gaulle announced the withdrawal in advance of his June trip to Moscow so that his decision to “betray the Alliance” would not also be seen as colluding with the enemy and that French negotiations over the structure of NATO initiated by de Gaulle’s 1958 letter had all been in bad faith, merely a “[r]use” meant to feign allegiance to the alliance and deflect blame for withdrawal.81 Prior to withdrawal Bohlen had urged civility and restraint toward de Gaulle; after withdrawal he advocated a harsh punitive approach to the French president.82 Withdrawal provoked anger from other senior policymakers as well.83 In a White House meeting to formulate a policy response to de Gaulle, Under Secretary of State George Ball argued that de Gaulle had “repudiated a solemn agreement.”84 After de Gaulle told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that American troops must leave France, Rusk replied, “Does that include the dead Americans in military cemeteries as well?”85 Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson later told President Johnson that he had asked de Gaulle the same question.86 **Policymakers perceived withdrawal as a violation of France’s normative commitments**

## aff

### nato good / withdrawal bad

#### NATO withdrawal fails – lack of deterrence, irreplaceability, and unchecked Russia risks global conflict

**Sweeney 2020** (Mike Sweeney is a Governmental Relations Professor at Colorado Tech with a BA and a masters in political science from Cal State, “What is NATO good for?”, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge?author=5e0b0db7a5b0832cb771a63e> )//MargaretE

NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. **Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes**. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence. Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, **it could make it more likely.** Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO? Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures. This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy. NATO’s advocates are also prone to hyperbole, but one word that is not an overstatement is irreplaceable. **It would be difficult—if not impossible—to recreate NATO or something like it from scratch.** Still, even irreplaceable doesn’t imply permanence if the alliance’s value cannot readily be established and sold to the populations of its constituent members, especially Americans. Demography is not on the alliance’s side. Should NATO survive to celebrate its centennial, the generation being born at that time will be as far removed from the end of the Second World War as someone born in 1969 was from the conclusion of the American Civil War. Even the September 11th attacks—and NATO’s ensuing invocation of Article 5—will be a half century in the past. In short, shared historical experience or even simple nostalgia will not be enough to sustain the alliance through the twenty-first century. NATO needs to show that it is not just relevant, but crucial to continued security in Europe and, to be blunt, the broader interests of its essential member, the United States. The most effective way of doing that is reinforcing the image of NATO as a vehicle for stability, something which has been recently diminished. There are legitimate arguments to be made that NATO now endangers American security by having antagonized Russia through enlargement and increased the likelihood of confrontation, possibly a nuclear one, rather than decreasing it.[15] That relations between America and Russia—and overall stability in Eastern Europe—might be far worse without the alliance is also true, but is a difficult sell in trying to promote the alliance’s relevance. NATO needs to be an active participant in visibly promoting stability, beyond the important day-to-day but low-key role it plays in this regard. Some potential steps are obvious, the most high profile of which would be a public declaration on closing the alliance to further expansion after the current candidacy of North Macedonia is vetted. To be clear, such a move need not be taken in a vacuum. In general, NATO must engage with Russia and some sort of quid pro quo shouldn’t be ruled out on ending further expansion of the alliance. Cessation of Moscow’s support for separatist activities in Transnistria and the Donbass certainly should be on the table as should guarantees from Russia that Belarus and Ukraine would be free to pursue their own independent relationships with the West, perhaps to someday include the possibility of membership in the European Union if either state wants it.[16]

#### Withdrawal blows up the world--causes Russian SOI AND balkanization.

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What would a world without NATO look like? It is a useful question to ask. For the end of NATO would mean far more than merely the disappearance of a bureaucracy at the outskirts of Brussels. The end of NATO would mean the end of a unique institutionalized political and military link between Europe and North America—with consequences that range from merely uncomfortable to outright dangerous.

The end of NATO would be the end of transatlantic collective defense. Europe would have to provide for its security without the United States. Establishing a purely European defense, however, would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially, and militarily. Not only would it require significantly higher defense expenditures, but also massive investments in defense research and development and much more rationalized defense procurement – just when the United Kingdom, Europe’s biggest defense player, is distancing itself from the EU. It would ultimately require a genuine European security policy, including a consensus on a European nuclear deterrent. In short, it would require a quantum leap in the process of European integration that is utterly unrealistic.

At the same time, the end of NATO would dramatically increase Russia’s weight and influence in European security. Without the American commitment to the old continent, the opportunities for Russia to divide and marginalize Europe would grow. This would be a strategic disaster in particular for many countries in the post-Soviet space, who would be condemned, once again, to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence.

#### NATO key to Russia deterrence, prosperity, and democracy – outweighs economic costs

**Lloyd 2019** (Lindsay Lloyd is the Senior Advisor, Freedom and Democracy at the George W. Bush Institute. He previously served as Director of the Human Freedom Initiative at the Bush Institute, where he led original research and programmatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy in the world, “NATO: still relevant in a dangerous world” <https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/global-challenges/lloyd-nato-still-relevant-in-a-dangerous-world.html)> //MargaretE

This year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization marks its 70th anniversary. In the world of international statecraft, such long-lasting alliances are exceedingly rare. NATO’s longevity is due in part to the fact that it combines national interest, which can be fleeting, with national values, which are hopefully more lasting. The initial alliance between the United States, Canada, and 10 European nations founded in 1949 has grown to encompass 29 countries. Once ratified by all current members, North Macedonia will join as NATO’s 30th member. Some, though, most notably the president of the United States, have questioned whether NATO membership is still in the U.S. national interest. **While the White House avers that the U.S. commitment to NATO remains solid, even the perception of a breach between Europe and America would foster Russia’s longstanding desire to rupture the alliance.** The Trump administration’s concern over burden sharing is by no means a new issue – it has been an off-and-on irritant over much of the alliance’s history. In the 1970s, Europe was spending approximately 45 percent of what the United States was spending on defense. The Center for Transatlantic Relations notes that three factors combined to address the disparity: Moscow was becoming more belligerent, America was preoccupied in a longstanding conflict in Vietnam, and Europe was enjoying a period of relative prosperity. By the end of the Cold War, Europe was spending approximately 78 percent of U.S. levels. Today’s situation is somewhat analogous: Moscow is becoming more belligerent, America is engaged in a 17-year war in Afghanistan (side-by-side with our NATO allies), and Europe is enjoying relative prosperity. And European defense spending is beginning to rise. As Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for Europe from 2005 to 2009, put it, “By all means, America should push for greater allied defense spending. But today (and everyday) let’s also remember — and respect — the sacrifice that others have made for us.” The values that bind the alliance have remained constant, but NATO has not been static. In fact, its durability is linked to its flexibility – changing and modernizing as threats have grown and receded. It’s important to recognize that NATO succeeded in its core historical mission – deterring an aggressive rival and keeping the West strong and free. Established in the first phase of the Cold War, NATO was one response to the vacuum created after World War I, when America sought to disengage from Europe’s power struggles and conflicts. In contrast to the Senate’s refusal to approve the treaty establishing the League of Nations, America sought after World War II to fashion a new and lasting international architecture. That included the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the forerunner of the World Trade Organization), and a host of security agreements and alliances, most notably NATO. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman and continuing through the Cold War, presidents and Congresses of both parties embraced this American-made architecture that helped the United States realize historic prosperity, saw freedom expand across the globe, and prevented a devastating nuclear war with an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. While regional conflicts were frequent and often bloody, the theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) contained the 50-year standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The uneasy peace was costly and often tense – the Cuban Missile Crisis, conflict in the Middle East, Vietnam – but a cataclysmic third world war was avoided. Western resolve, expressed in the alliance, prevented Soviet aggression and victory. The reduced tensions of détente largely fell apart after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, awakening Americans and Europeans alike to the fact that the Soviets still posed an existential threat. The decision to deploy a new class of missiles in Europe spawned the nuclear freeze movement and severely strained the alliance. But the fact that NATO held together was a key moment in the Soviet Union’s defeat. Western resolve placed unsustainable pressure on the Soviets and their allies. The system collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a new Soviet leader found it impossible to compete. The rise of the independent labor union Solidarity in Poland led to free elections, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused to intervene. The fall of the Berlin Wall and a series of mostly bloodless revolutions rolled out across Central and Eastern Europe. And long suppressed nationalism within the Soviet Union – in Lithuania, Ukraine, and elsewhere – led to the dissolution of the USSR itself on December 26, 1991. The map of Europe was remade. Fifteen states emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Most of them, including Russia, sought a democratic and free market future. Many declared their ambition to join the European Union and NATO. Over the next two decades, 13 post-communist nations took their rightful places as full members of the North Atlantic Alliance. But the question arose – what was the purpose of NATO when its main foe was no longer a threat (or even existed)? Since the fall of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, NATO has reinvented itself. The alliance built to face down the Soviets has taken on new challenges and missions, proving it remains **the most important U.S. alliance.** NATO’s current mission was laid out in 2010. The alliance remains a mutual defense pact – each member commits to defend the others against attack, including against “new threats to the safety of our citizens.” It also maps out the importance of conflict management – preventing and managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations. NATO is committed to working with partners around the globe, to working toward a world without nuclear weapons, and to allow European democracies that meet the standards for membership to join the alliance. One of the first major tests for the post-Soviet NATO occurred after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. NATO took the leading role in ending the fighting and bringing stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1999 on, NATO has played a similar role in Kosovo. Ending the bloodshed was a key U.S. political priority during the Clinton administration. While the United States could have addressed these crises alone, our NATO partners worked with us and carried some of the load. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO’s Article V was activated for the first and only time in the alliance’s history. Article V of the NATO Treaty commits each member to defend the others when under attack. For America’s NATO partners, the attacks on Washington and New York were just the same as an attack on Rome, Berlin, Toronto, or Oslo. Invoking Article V was more than just a rhetorical expression of solidarity – our NATO allies, along with other partners like Australia, have fought with the United States in Afghanistan. More than 1,000 soldiers from NATO partners have been killed. While you may disagree on the merits of American involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan – they were national security priorities of the U.S. government. In each conflict, America’s NATO partners took up arms in American-led engagements. Having allied support lessened the burden and furthered the security priorities of the United States. Sadly, the original rationale for NATO has returned in new, insidious ways. The Russian experiment with democracy that begin in the late 1980s has been all but extinguished. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has moved away from liberalism and democracy toward a state now best characterized by authoritarianism, crony capitalism, and corruption. Most importantly, Putin has acted aggressively to restore power and land lost when the Soviet Empire imploded. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, on the south of Ukraine. Moscow has sought to encourage separatist movements in several former Soviet republics. In 2014, Russia stepped up its longstanding military interference in Ukraine by annexing Crimea. And in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has pursued aggressive policies, aimed at restoring its influence. Countries across the region have faced new kinds of threats, as Moscow works to manipulate and discredit democratic institutions. Moscow has also sought to silence critics and boost its influence in longstanding democracies. In 2006, former intelligence agent Alexander Litvinenko was assassinated in the United Kingdom. Cyberattacks have been detected in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and elsewhere. And in the United States, Russia undertook an unprecedented campaign to stoke divisions and influence the 2016 election campaign. While the immediate threat of military conflict between Russia and the United States is low, Russia and other states pose a serious and changing threat to America and its allies. **NATO is an essential first line of defense.**.NATO’s mission remains first as a military alliance, but from the earliest days, it was also a community of values. And while at times NATO has chosen to look the other way, promoting democracy among its members has always been a consideration. Article 10 of the NATO Charter states that by unanimous agreement, any other European state that can further the principles of the alliance and contribute to its security may be asked to join. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, even though both countries underwent long periods of military rule. Even today, with rising concerns about democratic backsliding in countries like Hungary and Turkey, both countries remain active members of the alliance. But NATO’s commitment to values became much more explicit as the former communist nations began jockeying for inclusion. Would-be members must demonstrate they are market economies and stable democracies based on a respect for human rights and the rule of law. Aspirants must live in peace with their neighbors, peacefully resolving disputes. And joining NATO requires civilian and democratic control over the military. Seventy years on, NATO remains a vital partnership and resource for the United States. It has contributed blood and treasure to the two most recent major conflicts – Iraq and Afghanistan. It has adapted in response to the new threats emanating from Moscow, shoring up defenses in the Baltic region, partnering with states in Russia’s crosshairs like Ukraine and Georgia, and providing important communications and coordination to defend against the ongoing cyberwarfare. NATO’s critics are not wrong to urge increased defense spending across the alliance. Most American presidents have done so and our NATO allies are responding to the call. But the United States as a global power will always shoulder a greater share of the burden. As this history shows, **we should look at NATO not as a drain on our resources, but rather as a net plus**. America and its NATO allies have faced tensions and estrangement over policy issues. But even when tensions have been high, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have always recognized that the alliance is mutually beneficial. Fundamentally, NATO has endured because it is a community of shared values – of democracy, freedom, market economics, solidarity, and mutual respect. The United States and our partners share a strong interest in preserving this partnership – it has worked to our common benefit for 70 years and continues to do so today.

NATO strength is an impact filter – extinction

Gallagher and Dueck 19 – (Mike Gallagher and Colin Dueck; "The Conservative Case for NATO"; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/; 1-30-2019, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-AZ

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

**American presence in NATO is crucial to Chinese and Russian deterrence**

Gallagher and Dueck 19 – (Mike Gallagher and Colin Dueck; "The Conservative Case for NATO"; National Review; https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/; 1-30-2019, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-AZ

Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

The irony is that the Trump administration actually has a success story to tell about its policies toward NATO and Russia, particularly in Europe. Under this administration, the U.S. has provided lethal aid to Ukraine to fight off Russian-backed insurgents. It has made no concessions to Moscow regarding that conflict. It has increased sanctions against Russia and boosted America’s military presence in Eastern Europe. It has increased funding to the European Defense Initiative, bolstered U.S. defense spending, held Russia accountable for its breach of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) Treaty, and explored the place of low-yield nuclear weapons as a necessary component of the American arsenal to deter Russian aggression. At the same time, the president’s calls for increased European defense spending have had some useful effects. Virtually all NATO allies have increased their levels of defense spending over the past two years. As president, Mr. Trump has regularly reiterated his support for NATO. The concomitant emphasis on allied burden-sharing is not unreasonable, as Eisenhower regularly insisted.

In keeping with its treaty powers under the U.S. Constitution, Congress should not be passive on this issue. Last week, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a bill to express continuing congressional support for the NATO alliance. The bill passed by a vote of 357 to 22 in the House of Representatives. The Senate is working on similar legislation.

Public-opinion polls taken over the last three years show that a solid majority of Trump supporters, conservatives, Republicans, and Americans continue to back the NATO alliance. Conservative voters in heartland states such as Wisconsin certainly expect Europeans to do their fair share in defending themselves. But they do not oppose NATO. On the contrary, they support it.

An overarching support for America’s Western alliance has been a key component in the conservative foreign-policy approach since Eisenhower’s time. It remains relevant to this day. As conservative Republicans and other Americans consider the costs and benefits of the U.S. alliance system, recall Ike’s wise recommendation: “Now boys, let’s not make our mistakes in a hurry.”

### perm: do both

#### Perm do both: US can leave NATO and cooperate with NATO countries independently – US and EU ties prove

**EU 2022** (European Union official statement on cooperation with the United States, “EU – US cooperation”, <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/international-activities/cooperation-governments/eu-us-cooperation_en> )//MargaretE

**The EU and US economies are the most integrated in the world.** While broadly acknowledging that this privileged relationship holds more potential for both sides, the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs has been working for many years to further promote transatlantic economic cooperation by reducing regulatory obstacles to doing business across the Atlantic. The cooperation focuses on diverging regulations or duplicative requirements that often cause unnecessary barriers and costs for companies, including small businesses.

The transatlantic economic and trade relationship remains the backbone of the world economy, contributing to growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Total US investment in the EU is 3 times higher than in all of Asia, whereas EU investment in the US is around 8 times the amount of EU investment in India and China together.

### at: russia

#### NATO is not to blame for the Russian invasion

**Stemplowska 22** -- Zofia Stemplowska is a Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. Published April 27, 2022. “NATO enlargement is not to blame for Russia’s war in Ukraine” <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/04/27/nato-enlargement-is-not-to-blame-for-russias-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

Is NATO enlargement partly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine war? Zofia Stemplowska argues that rather than blaming countries in eastern Europe for their desire to join NATO, we would be better served by examining the role Russian energy exports to western Europe have played in propping up Vladimir Putin’s regime.

**Many** voices in the UK and US press – in the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Guardian, and others – **suggest that NATO is partly to blame for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine**. The argument is that by accepting NATO enlargement up to Russia’s borders, and by failing to decisively rule out Ukrainian membership, NATO holds some responsibility for Russia’s invasion.

Does it matter whether NATO is partly to blame now that the war is underway, and all reasonable people condemn the aggression? I would argue that it does. First, we owe those who are defending themselves the correct moral evaluation of the causes of the war. Second, our views about who is to blame for a war influence our views on what is permissible as part of it, what is to be done after it has ended, and – crucially – how to behave in similar situations in future, when, for instance, Finland and Sweden apply for NATO membership.

However, blaming someone does not merely mean attributing to them causal responsibility for an outcome. It involves suggesting that things should have been done differently and that there are things to answer for. **The reality is that western states do hold some blame** for making the invasion possible, **but not because of NATO enlargement**. **By buying Russian energy** on Russian terms, **western states have effectively facilitated** corruption and authoritarianism inside **Russia**, strengthening Vladimir Putin’s regime despite its treatment of its neighbours.

Russia’s fears

Supporters of the ‘blame NATO’ argument offer the following rationale. Russia saw the enlargement of NATO as a threat to its security. Nonetheless, NATO proceeded to admit new members right up to Russia’s borders and refused to rule out further enlargement. The resulting war is unjustified since it is an act of aggression. But this act of aggression is in part an expression of Russia’s legitimate fear for its interests which it views as threatened by NATO.

When talking about Russia, I have in mind the Russian ruling group – chiefly Vladimir Putin – whose world view may be inaccurate but whose access to information is not restricted. Ordinary Russian citizens, in contrast, now find it increasingly difficult to learn what the world is like as opposed to what Putin would like them to believe.

When it comes to Russian officials, there can be no doubt that they have repeatedly expressed fears concerning NATO enlargement. It is worth noting that Russia has talked of NATO ‘expansion’, but that language carries connotations of territorial annexation. The Russian Federation ‘expanded’ when it annexed Crimea. NATO was enlarged, just as the EU was, when the new member states willingly joined.

Boris Yeltsin is quoted as saying that NATO enlargement would be ‘nothing but humiliation for Russia.’ He suggested a pan-European peace force. Regarding Ukraine in particular, the head of the CIA, William Burns, wrote in 2008 that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO ‘is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players…I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.’

In light of the present-day expressions of fear from Russia about the allegedly genocidal government in Ukraine, we know that Russia’s assertions about its fears can be entirely made up. But even if we credit the past and present statements about NATO enlargement as genuine, we can ask ourselves how legitimate or reasonable they were or are. If the fears express a desire to dominate Russia’s neighbours then those who indulge in them are to blame when those neighbours seek protection.

Russia’s fears express expectations of domination of the region

So how reasonable was Russia’s fear of NATO enlargement in the 1990s and since? NATO invaded Afghanistan and a US-led coalition of states invaded Iraq. But these wars were not against Russia. What of the fact that Russia was previously invaded from its western borders? Napoleon tried to conquer it. Hitler invaded it two years after both him and Stalin together invaded Poland (an act of long-planned aggression that the Soviet Union presented at the time as a defensive move). The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth captured the throne in Moscow in the early 17th century.

But it is not reasonable to assume that the past and disavowed conduct of a country is bound to be repeated no matter how the country has changed. NATO members do not celebrate the past Polish, French and German aggressions on Russia. They cannot be reasonably seen as indicative of any current aspirations. If we thought countries could not change, we would have to conclude that France currently poses a threat to the UK and Germany to Poland. Instead, Poland rejoiced when in the first week of the Russian war against Ukraine, on 27 February 2022, Germany announced its rearmament.

It is difficult to understand why Russia would fear its neighbours joining NATO if it cared about its own safety rather than its control of the region where it once had an empire. Why is it a ‘humiliation’ for Russia, as Yeltsin suggested, to have NATO members as its neighbours? A humiliation, moreover, that has to be dealt with, by Putin, with military attacks.

Why was there not a single voice in Russia in 2008, as Burns reported, that argued it would be acceptable for Ukraine to join NATO? If the fear in Russia is, as sometimes stated, that Ukraine’s nationalist policies threaten a civil war in Ukraine, which in turn threatens Russia’ border security, then we should expect at least some voices arguing for Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. Russia’s borders are the most stable where its neighbours have managed to join NATO and the EU.

So how does **the Russian government** portray NATO as a threat to itself? It **falsely claims that its own aggressions towards its neighbours are defensive**. In effect, Russia attacks with lethal force and claims to be defending itself. **It is the equivalent of an abuser justifying the murder of their victim** on the grounds that they both have a right to defend themselves. **The ‘blame NATO’ argument obscures this asymmetry in NATO-Russia relations. It does so when it credits Russia’s fear as legitimate.**

Blaming the victims

The ‘blame NATO’ argument also fails to credit the claims of the new, and aspiring, NATO members that Russia’s threat fully justifies NATO’s enlargement. Ukraine’s sovereign and democratic aspirations to join NATO, though unsuccessful, were purely defensive. Ukraine was occupied by Russia up to 1991 and for centuries beforehand.

It suffered the Holodomor in the 1930s: the deaths of millions as a result of Soviet policies that created a famine in Ukraine. The occupation and the brutal treatment of Ukrainians has not been disavowed by the current government of Russia, which sees itself as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and the Tsarist imperial vision beforehand. Ukraine has also suffered malicious interventions from Russia in its politics and ongoing attacks and coercive controlling of some of its territory – all within the last decade.

Russia’s insistence that Ukraine is not allowed, on pain of invasion, to democratically decide to join NATO and the EU amounts to insisting that countries that share a border with Russia are not entitled to be sovereign. For the same reason, those who mention what Russia allegedly was or was not ‘promised’ about Ukraine by the US or NATO miss the fundamental point that Russia is not entitled to decide what that future will be.

Some countries that had been dominated or controlled by the Soviet Union have succeeded in joining NATO. The narrative of NATO ‘expansionism’, which presents it as a negligent or even offensive strategy, obscures how difficult it was for those new member states to join. The fact that Russia continued to be feared by those states despite the demise of the Soviet bloc reflected Russia’s insistence that it would not accept their democratic decisions; that there was either going to be a new world order approved by Russia or no order at all.

This unwillingness to grant agency to the new member states is visible in much of the media coverage of the war in Ukraine. Questions such as ‘should NATO fear Putin?’ are sometimes posed and answered in the negative. It is true that Putin does not threaten the sovereignty of the old NATO members through the conventional method of territorial war. But if we see NATO as composed of all its current members, including those that have good reason to fear Putin, then **blaming NATO enlargement for Russia’s aggression** – and blaming Ukraine for aspiring to be in NATO – **means blaming the victims.**

#### Russian aggression not due to NATO

**Popova and Shevel 22** -- Maria Popova is Jean Monnet Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University. Oxana Shevel is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University’s School of Arts and Sciences. Published February 24, 2022. “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine is Essentially Not About NATO” <https://www.justsecurity.org/80343/russias-new-assault-on-ukraine-is-not-entirely-maybe-not-even-largely-about-nato/> //DG

In his Feb. 15 Just Security article “Ukraine: Unleashing the Rhetorical Dogs of War,” Barry Posen argued that NATO and Ukraine should have cut a deal with Russia because the Ukrainian military would surely be defeated by Russia without direct U.S./Western military participation and U.S. offers of equipment were only encouraging a potential Ukrainian insurgency against Russian occupation that would be as bloody as it would be futile. The prescription depends entirely on Posen’s assumption that to satisfy Russia, all Ukraine would have had to do would be “to swallow the bitter pill of accepting armed neutrality between NATO and Russia, rather than NATO membership.”

This assumption contradicts events of recent months and the historical record. While Vladimir Putin has claimed that his goal is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, he also insisted that he was just conducting military exercises. Instead, he is invading Ukraine again. He likewise insisted in 2014 that he wasn’t capturing Crimea, despite the presence of his unidentified “Little Green Men” and his subsequent annexation of the peninsula, or that he was not fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas area in the east all these years, despite all evidence to the contrary. There is no reason to take Putin at his word. His Feb. 21 diatribe conferring Russian recognition of independence for the two eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and his order for Russian troops to move in as ostensible “peacekeepers” shows clearly his disdain for diplomatic resolutions.

Moreover, **this is not even primarily about NATO**.

NATO’s eastward expansion may have played a role in straining the relationship between Russia and the West, but mainly because, for Russia, seeing former satellites eagerly abandon it for the greener pastures of Euro-Atlantic integration stung. However, **Putin’s rhetoric and actions over almost two decades reveal that his goals extend beyond imposing neutrality on Ukraine or even staving off further NATO expansion. The larger objective is to re-establish Russian political and cultural dominance over a nation that Putin sees as one with Russia**, and then follow up by undoing the European rules-based order and security architecture established in the aftermath of World War II. **Given these goals, Ukrainian neutrality is a woefully insufficient concession for Putin.**

**If Russia’s main concern had been NATO enlargement, it would have reacted with rhetoric and/or hostile actions in its neighborhood after each step in the NATO expansion process**. The largest wave of NATO’s eastward expansion took place in March 2004, when seven Eastern European countries joined, including the formerly Soviet Baltic states. Russia “grumbled,” as the New York Times put it then, by adopting a Duma resolution criticizing the expansion, but **no hostile and sustained rhetoric followed about NATO enlargement** as a Western plot against Russian interests.

### at: finland/Sweden turn

#### Non-unique or no link – negotiations are taking time but have nothing to do with mistrust

**Gumrukcu et al 6/20.** Tuvan, and Ali Kucukgocmen; Additional reporting by Anne Kauranen in Helsinki; Editing by Alex Richardson and Angus MacSwan “Turkey says summit is not deadline for talks on Finland and Sweden's NATO bids” https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-says-talks-finland-swedens-nato-bids-continue-summit-not-deadline-2022-06-20/

ANKARA, June 20 (Reuters) - Discussions between Turkey, Finland and Sweden about the Nordic countries' NATO membership will continue and an alliance summit in Madrid next week is not a deadline, Turkey said after talks in Brussels on Monday. Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But the bids have faced opposition from Turkey, which has been angered by what it says is Helsinki and Stockholm's support for Kurdish militants and arms embargoes on Ankara. Last week, Turkey said documents it received from Sweden and NATO in response to the earlier written demands it presented the two candidates were far from meeting its expectations and any negotiations must first address Turkish concerns. read more Speaking to reporters in Brussels alongside Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Onal, Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said Ankara was expecting Sweden to take immediate steps regarding actions by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militant group in its country. Any progress on the Nordic membership bids "**now depends on the direction and speed at which these countries will take steps**," he said. The talks in Brussels with officials from Sweden, Finland, and NATO were held in an "open and sincere atmosphere," he said. "As we see these steps, we will all have the opportunity to evaluate the direction of this process," he said. Onal said Turkey expected a change of approach from Sweden and Finland, and Ankara needed "binding promises" to address its concerns. "We don't see ourselves limited by any timetable. The speed, scope of this process depends on these nations' manner and speed of meeting our expectations," he said. Petri Hakkarainen, foreign and security adviser to Finland's president and the head of the Finnish delegation at the talks in Brussels, said the sides had made "clear progress" on certain issues. But it would take time to reach an understanding on others, he said. NATO leaders will convene in Madrid on June 29-30. Any NATO membership requires approval of all 30 members of the alliance. Turkey has been a NATO ally for more than 70 years and has the alliance's second biggest army.

#### Non-unique – Turkey won’t get in the way of Finland joining

**Falk 5/18.** Thomas, journalist and political commentator. “How long will it take for Finland and Sweden to join NATO?” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/18/finland-and-swedens-fast-tracked-nato-membership

And all NATO members have to vote unanimously in favour of the candidates for this to be possible.

Analysts said this is **highly likely despite the latest news that Turkey is opposed** to the new potential members.

“There have been some rumblings of discontent or even objections in Hungary and Turkey, but in the end, they will accept their membership of NATO,” Shepherd noted.

Once the invitation is received, official accession talks are held at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, followed by meetings with Sweden and Finland.

Then, declarations of commitment are sent in which they agree to fulfil NATO obligations.

In some cases, potential candidates must indicate a timeline if reforms are required, to meet all eligibility criteria.

NATO then prepares for the adaptation of its treaty by means of the accession protocols, which have to be ratified.

“All members, including the candidate countries, would need to ratify their joining the Washington Treaty according to their own national procedures. In the case of the US, which is where the Washington Treaty is deposited, that requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate,” Lanoszka explained.

#### Non unique—Turkey dropped objections to Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids

Aljazeera 6/28 (Aljazeera, “Finland, Sweden on path to NATO membership as Turkey drops veto,” 6/28/2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/28/erdogan-to-have-bilateral-talks-with-world-leaders-at-nato-summit)-> LH

NATO ally Turkey has lifted its veto over Finland and Sweden’s bid to join the Western alliance after the three nations agreed to protect each other’s security, ending a weeks-long drama that tested allied unity against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The breakthrough came on Tuesday after four hours of talks just before a NATO summit began in Madrid, averting an embarrassing impasse at the gathering of 30 leaders that aimed to show resolve against Russia.

The lifting of the veto means that Helsinki and Stockholm can proceed with their application to join the military alliance, cementing what is set to be the biggest shift in European security in decades, as the two, long neutral Nordic countries seek NATO protection.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and Turkey’s presidency confirmed the accord in separate statements, after talks between the NATO chief, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, and Finnish President Sauli Niinisto.

#### Non-UQ: Finland and Sweden already invited into NATO and Turkey doesn’t care

Erlanger et. al 6/28/22 (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels, Valerie Hopkins is an international correspondent for The New York Times covering the war in Ukraine, as well as Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union, Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times, Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winning reporter in the Washington bureau, where he covers President Biden, with a focus on domestic policy, the regulatory state and life at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, In Blow to Putin, Turkey Won’t Bar Sweden and Finland From NATO, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/28/world/europe/nato-finland-sweden-ukraine.html?amp%3Bemc=edit_nn_20220629&amp%3Binstance_id=65309&amp%3Bnl=the-morning&amp%3Bregi_id=72546077&amp%3Bsegment_id=97102&amp%3Bte=1&amp%3Buser_id=4ba8174c20c87fea97e02e5885b4d9f9&campaign_id=9> )//MargaretE

MADRID — NATO’s top official said Tuesday that **Turkey had dropped its objections to the membership of Sweden and Finland**, two historically nonaligned nations that, alarmed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have asked to join the military alliance. Turkey’s reversal is a blow to President Vladimir V. Putin, who in justifying the invasion of his neighbor bitterly protested previous expansions of NATO — and Ukraine’s efforts to join the alliance — as a threat to his country’s security. Should Finland and Sweden be formally adopted into the alliance, as is widely expected, Russia will look across 800 miles of border with Finland at one of NATO’s newest members. The announcement came after Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met for four hours with Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of Sweden and President Sauli Niinisto of Finland, as NATO heads of state gathered in Madrid for an annual summit. The 30-nation alliance operates by consensus, which meant that Turkey effectively held a veto over their membership applications. “I’m pleased to announce that we now have an agreement that paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO,” the secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, said Tuesday evening. “Turkey, Finland and Sweden have signed a memorandum that addresses Turkey’s concerns, including around arms exports, and the fight against terrorism

#### Finland and Sweden already invited into NATO – Turkey dropped its objections

Erlanger and Shear 6/29/22 (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels, Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winning reporter in the Washington bureau, where he covers President Biden, with a focus on domestic policy, the regulatory state and life at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NATO formally invites Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/world/europe/nato-sweden-finland.html?searchResultPosition=5> )//MargaretE

MADRID — NATO leaders on Wednesday formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, one day after Turkey dropped its objections to their membership, clearing the way for what would be one of the most significant expansions of the alliance in decades. The historic deal, following Turkey’s agreement to a memorandum with the two Nordic countries, underscores how the war in Ukraine has backfired for President Vladimir V. Putin, subverting Russian efforts to weaken NATO and pushing Sweden and Finland, which were neutral and nonaligned for decades, into the alliance’s arms. After weeks of talks, capped by an hourslong meeting in Madrid, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey agreed to lift his block on Sweden and Finland’s membership in return for a set of actions and promises that they will act against terrorism and terrorist organizations. “As NATO allies, Finland and Sweden commit to fully support Turkey against threats to its national security,” NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, said, providing some details of the agreement. “This includes further amending their domestic legislation, cracking down on P.K.K. activities and entering into an agreement with Turkey on extradition,” he added, referring to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which seeks an independent Kurdish state on territory partly within Turkey’s borders.

### at: bri

#### BRI has no plan and causes massive debt – it fails to do anything

**Wan 19** – Andrew Wan is a research assistant. (“A ROAD TO NOWHERE? PROBLEMS WITH CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE,” Baker Institute. June 27th, 2019. <https://blog.bakerinstitute.org/2019/06/27/a-road-to-nowhere-problems-with-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>) CTF

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be the most talked-about development plan of the century. Xi Jinping’s signature plan has captured the world’s attention since its announcement in 2013, with comparisons drawn to the ancient Silk Road and the Marshall Plan. But recently, worldwide coverage of the BRI has grown less favorable and more critical. Has BRI lost its luster?

The BRI now includes around 3,000 projects, according to official Chinese sources. The majority of the BRI projects involve constructing infrastructure to facilitate trade, which requires collaborating with partner countries to secure lending agreements and territory rights. BRI’s flagship project and biggest success is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a road and cable link between Pakistan’s Gwadar port to Xinjiang, China. China’s BRI relies on projects financed by Chinese policy and commercial banks rather than FDI, which requires massive capital flow to partner countries in the form of Chinese loans. This model makes sense when considering China’s industrial overcapacity dilemma; facing economic setbacks, China has already begun consolidating manufacturing companies to prevent defaults on loans. China sees foreign projects as an easy way for its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to secure contracts and minimize losses.

However, these massive lending projects have led to partner countries accruing extreme debt. This problem was brought to the forefront of China’s second Belt and Road Forum in April. Several previous delegations refused to attend this year, protesting growing concerns that China both has unethical standards and leverages debts as a diplomatic bargaining chip in its BRI strategy. Notably, Turkey also cited concerns for China’s blatant oppression, through heavy policing and internment camps, of Uighurs living along BRI pathways. Malaysia’s prime minister, during renegotiations of nearly $23 billion in rail/pipeline deals, called BRI agreements “unequal treaties” and “a new version of colonialism” before cancelling the deals altogether. Other countries have already paid the price. Sri Lanka’s inability to resolve an $8 billion loan for its Hambantota Port in 2017 led to a debt-for-equity swap accompanied by a 99-year lease for managing the port. Even Pakistan’s CPEC venture has necessitated a $6 billion bailout from the IMF. Debt distress is a common trend with BRI projects, and although asset seizure is rare, this trend raises valid concerns about the sustainability and methods of BRI projects.

It remains unclear the degree to which BRI, a Chinese-led bilateral initiative that employs some multilateral mechanisms to achieve financing goals, will be guided by multilateral standards on debt sustainability. A key factor in creating and maintaining successful deals lies in the stability of partner countries. BRI’s partners tend to welcome China’s “no strings attached” style of investment compared to lending by Western powers conditioned on environmental concerns, human rights, and other obligations. Although China’s system is appealing for many developing countries, it has enabled corruption while allowing governments to burden their countries with unpayable debts. The reality is that, apart from pushing its political agenda, the West’s requirements were attached in order to lower the risk of failure. The BRI’s lack of requirements signals either an absence of educated, informed planning or a deliberate decision to create debt stress in BRI’s partners.

The instinct may be to accept the latter conclusion, believing criticism that the BRI’s underlying motive is to expand China’s geopolitical influence through a veil of economic development. But the former seems just as plausible. For all of its hype, no one, not even China, seems to know exactly what the BRI is. Aside from vague policy objectives, there are no concrete policies that define the BRI. This lack of vision and cohesion has already led to widespread inefficiency. Studies have demonstrated that BRI projects do not align with the BRI’s proposed “geographic corridors.” This incoherence, combined with looming industrial overcapacity, paints a credible picture that the BRI is demand-driven and opportunistic rather than supply-driven and centrally planned. Additionally, the vague nature of the BRI allows its brand to be extended to almost anything, from fashion shows to dentistry to projects that lack any Chinese involvement, all of which damage the credibility of BRI. Distrust of the BRI brand, in turn, stifles private investment domestically (only 12% of FDI goes to BRI countries) and abroad (former UK PM David Cameron’s UK-China fund is struggling to secure investors), which ensures that the BRI continues to rely on precarious sovereign lending projects.

### at: climate

#### NATO is on track to reduce emission and challenge conflicts that arise from warming

IISD 21 – The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) is a think tank oriented around promoting green growth. (“NATO Adopts Climate Change Actions for 2030,” IISD. June 24th, 2021. <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/nato-adopts-climate-change-actions-for-2030/)> CTF

The Heads of State and Government of the 30 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have adopted NATO 2030, “a transatlantic agenda for the future,” as well as a Climate Change and Security Action Plan. The Action Plan provides a framework to deliver on the Climate Change and Security Agenda endorsed by NATO Foreign Ministers on 23-24 March 2021. The NATO Deputy Secretary-General said the decisions make the fight against climate change an important task for NATO for the first time.

The leaders gathered for a one-day meeting on 14 June 2021, in Brussels, Belgium, resulting in the Brussels Summit Communique. In the Summit outcome, the leaders identify climate change as a “threat multiplier that impacts Allied security” and say it tests resilience and civil preparedness, affects planning and the resilience of military installations and critical infrastructure, and “may create harsher conditions for our operations.

In the Communique, the leaders agree to:

Aim for NATO to become the leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security;

Significantly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from military activities and installations, formulate a target for reducing GHG emissions by NATO political and military structures and facilities, and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by 2050;

Initiate a regular high-level dialogue on climate and security to exchange views and coordinate further action; and

Incorporate climate change considerations into NATO’s full spectrum of work, including defense planning, capability development, and civil preparedness and exercises.

Also adopted on 14 June, the action plan explains that climate change makes it harder for militaries to carry out their tasks, due to greater temperature extremes, sea level rise, rapid changes in precipitation patterns, and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. The effects of climate change (e.g. desertification and the opening up of new shipping lanes) may influence the behavior of national governments in ways that increase instability and competition. In addition, the disproportionate impacts of climate change on women and girls and poor, vulnerable, or marginalized populations can create conditions to be exploited in ways that threaten or challenge the Alliance, the action plan states.

The action plan includes conducting annual assessments of the impact of climate change on NATO’s strategic environment as well as on missions and operations. It says NATO must account for impacts of climate change on security in order to perform its three core tasks: collective defense; crisis management; and cooperative security.

NATO will issue its first Climate Change and Security Progress Report at the 2022 Summit to track progress and re-assess the level of ambition.

### at: china deterrence

#### NATO cohesion key to deter China – aff turns the net benefit

Odgaard 2022 (Lisa Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on US-China-Europe relations, NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145> )//MargaretE

The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. **NATO is key** to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the **US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China** sufficiently.

### at: eu

#### [A](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imagining-a-world-without-nato/) collective EU defense is impossible

Rühle 18 - Michael Rühle heads the Energy Security Section of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. (“Imagining a world without NATO,” Atlantic Council. August 18th, 2018. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imagining-a-world-without-nato/>) CTF

What would a world without NATO look like? It is a useful question to ask. For the end of NATO would mean far more than merely the disappearance of a bureaucracy at the outskirts of Brussels. The end of NATO would mean the end of a unique institutionalized political and military link between Europe and North America—with consequences that range from merely uncomfortable to outright dangerous.

The end of NATO would be the end of transatlantic collective defense. Europe would have to provide for its security without the United States. Establishing a purely European defense, however, would **overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially, and militarily**. Not only would it require significantly higher defense expenditures, but also massive investments in defense research and development and much more rationalized defense procurement – just when the United Kingdom, Europe’s biggest defense player, is distancing itself from the EU. It would ultimately require a genuine European security policy, including a consensus on a European nuclear deterrent. In short, it would require a quantum leap in the process of European integration that is utterly unrealistic.

At the same time, the end of NATO would dramatically increase Russia’s weight and influence in European security. Without the American commitment to the old continent, the opportunities for Russia to divide and marginalize Europe would grow. This would be a strategic disaster in particular for many countries in the post-Soviet space, who would be condemned, once again, to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence.

With the end of NATO, Europe and North America would also lose an important framework for legitimizing the collective use of military power. Ambitious long-term stabilization operations like the one in Afghanistan are only possible in a transatlantic context. While ad hoc military coalitions between the United States and some European states would still be possible, the end of joint military planning and regular exercising within NATO would rapidly downgrade military interoperability.

The end of NATO would also encourage a regionalization of European security. Without the Alliance as a strategic framework for balancing different regional concerns, Southern European nations would likely concentrate on the Maghreb and the Middle East, while Eastern European states would focus on Russia. None of these regional groupings, however, would be politically coherent and militarily powerful enough to exert decisive influence in these areas. The result would be a further weakening of European security.

By contrast, the end of NATO would not achieve what some may hope for: to free the United States of a major financial burden. Since the US defense budget reflects the country’s global reach, the end of NATO would provide only marginal savings. By ceding its role as a “European power,” however, the United States would not only lose strategically important military bases on the old continent, but also its political influence in European security affairs, and the stability generated through daily consultations with its NATO Allies. The geopolitical winners would be Russia, China, and all those who seek to weaken the role of the United States in upholding international order. This would not just be a bad deal, a term that is now increasingly used in international relations. It would be an awful deal.

#### EU military fails and can’t

Naumann 19 - Klaus Naumann is a retired German general who served as chief of defense of the Bundeswehr from 1991 to 1996 and as chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999. (“Even if prudent, there will be no European army any time soon,” The German Times. February 15th, 2019. <https://www.german-times.com/even-if-prudent-there-will-be-no-european-army-any-time-soon/>) CTF

Concerns are growing in many European countries that they can no longer depend on the United States and the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. President Trump’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria marked the end of US reliability. Doubts about America’s trustworthiness have produced a flurry of driveling speeches in 2018 on the idea of a European army. So – what about it?

It is an old idea, which failed first in 1954 when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the European Defence Union treaty. It has since resurfaced from time to time but was never agreed upon and implemented. Will it fare better now, five years after the wake-up call produced by Russia’s illegal seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine?

Quite a few initiatives have been launched in recent years. Twenty five EU members agreed on establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Its tiny steps towards building common force components compelled some to rekindle dreams of a European Defense Union. Within NATO, a similar German initiative was agreed upon: the NATO Framework Concept (NFC). Other political ideas have popped up, such as the creation of a European Security Council, the establishment of a Defense Committee of the European Parliament and the suggestion – a ridiculous one considering its legal impossibility – that France renounce its permanent membership in the UN Security Council and hand it over to the EU. While all were well-intended, there is simply no coherent political will to establish a common defense of Europe, to accept majority decisions or to transfer the defense portion of national sovereignty to a supranational organization – even a European one.

At any rate, such a body would have to be more inclusive than the EU. Defending Europe is politically impossible without the inclusion of the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland and even Turkey. And in terms of geostrategy, it is not feasible without control of the North Atlantic and adjacent parts of the Arctic Ocean.

As long as this reality persists, there will be no meaningful European Security and Defense Strategy leading to command and control arrangements, to joint operational concepts and to a common and, above all, comprehensive planning process encompassing all political and diplomatic tools: economic instruments, police capacities, security and disaster relief elements and military forces that can operate throughout Europe and its periphery on land, in the air, at sea, in outer space **and in cyberspace.**

None of the steps taken so far make much of a difference. The sad European reality will thus continue. Our armies will comprise 17 different tanks, 26 different howitzers, 20 different combat aircraft and 29 different frigates or destroyers. Europe’s defense budgets combined total approximately 50 percent of the US budget, while the military manpower of the Europeans is close to 50 percent greater than that of the US, yet the combat power of the Europeans is at best 20 percent of what the US armed forces can marshal.

Moreover, a unanimous decision on the use of European military power is rather unlikely; if such a decision were made, the command arrangements would be patchy at best. The EU Battlegroups established in 2004 is a telling example: They never saw action.

#### The EU cannot fill in – failed on Ukraine and are reliant on NATO

**Vicente 5/4/22** -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

**The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed Europe’s inability to protect the Ukrainians and to deter Russia** from invading Ukraine, as happened in the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Why did Europe fail to prevent this war?

First and foremost, due to *security idiosyncrasies****.* Europe is not a collective security guarantor**. It dismissed this opportunity in 1954 when France refused to establish a European Defence Community (EDC). Thus, despite continuous efforts ever since, Europe does not have an army nor a deterrent capability. **It is, in fact, highly dependent on NATO** and individual nuclear powers (predominantly the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK and France) to guarantee its collective security.

However, the Russo-Ukrainian war displays the Euro-Atlantic community’s inability to maintain security assurances previously given to Kyiv under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. In this political agreement, the US, the UK and Russia pledged not to use military force against Ukraine in exchange for it renouncing the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia violated this agreement at least twice – with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the Euro-Atlantic guarantor countries failed to protect Ukraine.

However, the Memorandum’s greatest weakness lay in the fact that it was only politically, and not legally, binding. This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demands legally binding security guarantees instead of the Memorandum’s politically binding security assurances.

As a non-nuclear weapon state, which is not protected under a security guarantee by a nuclear weapon state or a nuclear alliance such as NATO, Ukraine was exposed to aggression or intended regime change carried out by an NPT-recognised nuclear weapon state. Hence, Europe and NATO could not have provided a nuclear umbrella to a non-allied state such as Ukraine. Without security guarantees or NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence, Ukraine was on its own in its direct confrontation against Russia.

Given the inability of major nuclear powers to uphold the Budapest Memorandum and the difficulty of enforcing credible security assurances due to Moscow’s actions, Ukraine proposed, on 29thMarch, security guarantees in which guarantor countries (such as the P5) must consult each other within three days after the beginning of military aggression or hybrid war. Within this scheme, after consultations, this group of countries must provide aid to Kyiv by sending troops, supplying weapons, and protecting Ukraine’s airspace. Ultimately, this proposal would exclude security guarantees potentially given by NATO or the EU and would ‘deresponsibilize’ Europe as a collective security guarantor of Ukraine.

The second reason Europe failed to prevent Putin’s war in Ukraine is because of nuclear policy choices. **The EU is basically a non**- **actor** (in proliferation not a nuclear deterrent one) who supports the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the EU has shown that its interests lie primarily in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials of the former Soviet states, leading to the establishment of TACIS. Indeed, **Brussels** **proved to be more concerned about the energy aspects** of nuclear security, generated mainly by the outcome of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, **than with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.**

It was only in the aftermath of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea and Donbass in 2014 that the EU’s Russia policy took Ukraine’s security seriously into account. But Brussels did not provide nuclear deterrent capabilities against Russia for the reasons stated above and, most importantly, as it is a de facto NPT regime guarantor.

The EU is critical of the view that more nuclear weapons can induce stability and decrease the chances of crisis escalation (nuclear stability theory), prominently defended by neo-realist Kenneth Waltz. As an NPT regime guarantor, Brussels supports the idea that nuclear proliferation is potentially the greatest threat to international and European security, requiring a concerted and multilateral response. For example, the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD stated that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states not only increases the likelihood of interstate nuclear conflict but increases the chances of nuclear material falling into the hands of violent non-state groups who are free from the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Therefore, **the EU has been more politically engaged** in ensuring Kyiv would not obtain nuclear weapons (mentioned, for example, in Article 11 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement) **than in providing Ukraine with** some kind of ‘**security** (nuclear) umbrella’.

The third reason is due to divergent political interests among EU member states. Since March 2014, the **EU** has adopted a strict non-recognition policy regarding Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. This policy led to substantive sanctions against Russia and prompted the EU to agree on five guiding principles to punish Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, these **actions did not deter Moscow** in Ukraine nor prevent the EU from negotiating trade and energy deals with Russia. **A lack of coherence among EU members affected the effective implementation of** the guiding principles and restrictive **measures** due to different political interests and positions towards Russia conditioned by threat perceptions, economic interests,and energy dependence.

#### Turn: The EU is too reliant on Russian energy to effectively deter – without NATO, no deterrence

**Vicente 5/4/22** -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/> //DG

Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, four key threat perception conclusions emerged: 1) a state geographically close to an adverse nuclear power increases threat perception (e.g. Finland and Sweden); 2) a state geographically far from an adverse nuclear power decreases threat perception (e.g. Portugal and Spain); 3) a shared history of conflict increases threat perception (e.g. the Baltic States and Poland); 4) a non-shared history of conflict decreases threat perception (e.g. Italy). In sum, the different degrees of threat perception of each European state towards Russia undermined the idea of European solidarity and cohesion and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the EU as a political player with regard to Ukraine.

**Europe’s energy dependence is another** conditioning **factor** of political divergence **within the EU.** For example, **the impact of Russia’s policy over EU** politics towards Ukraine, especially through its bargaining power **in the energy sector** (namely through Russian business proxies Nord stream and Gazprom), **led the Union to become more inactive and less effective**. **Other Russian activities** – such as increased activities of Russian funded media, intensified contact between Brussels and other European countries with Moscow, the spread of disinformation, and the sponsoring of Eurosceptic political forces – **impacted the ability of the EU to act effectively in opposition to Russian aggression.**

Furthermore, while the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement served as an important display of the EU’s economic and political force (soft power) towards Kyiv, **Russia continued to be one of the EU’s main economic and trade partners**. In fact, **European countries with different economic interests continued to negotiate large trade and energy deals with Russia at least until February 2022.**

This contrasting dual **approach led to**, even if indirectly, **the continuous funding of Moscow’s aggression machine** in Ukraine. For example, despite the 2014 EU arms embargo, according to a recent report, ten EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Finland, Slovakia and Spain) exported weapons to Russia until at least 2020. These countries relied on the use of a legal loophole in EU regulations that allowed the continuation of arms exports “contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts”. These legal loopholes, combined with other conditioning factors of political divergence, contributed to the half-hearted implementation of the EU sanctions policy.

Ultimately, **Europe could not prevent a Russian military invasion** of Ukraine **because of the EU’s** security idiosyncrasies, nuclear policy choices, **divergent political interests, energy dependency and ineffective** sanctions **policy on Russia**. Despite its failure to prevent the war, Europe has taken relevant steps over the past two months to respond to the invasion: They have rapprochement with their Atlantic allies (the UK and the US) and, among other initiatives, have established a Strategic Compass on Security and Defence, which could represent a unique opportunity for the EU tobecome a “more assertive and decisive security provider”.

#### The EU cannot fill in for NATO – the US is key to European defense capabilities

Meijer and Brooks 21 -- Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies and the Founding Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, and Stephen Gallup Brooks is a Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Published 2021. “Illusions of autonomy: Why Europe cannot provide for its security if the United States pulls back” [https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/7/1910610/isec\_a\_00405.pdf //](https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/7/1910610/isec_a_00405.pdf%20//) DG

The European ambition to seek strategic autonomy amid rising concerns over U.S. commitments to the continent and over Russia’s revisionist behavior raises an important counterfactual question: **Could Europeans develop an autonomous defense capacity if there were** a complete **U.S. withdrawal from Europe**? Although a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely in the short term, it is hardly a far-fetched scenario for the longer term. Examining this counterfactual is useful for two key reasons. First, a complete U.S. withdrawal—one entailing an exit from NATO and the withdrawal of all U.S. conventional and nuclear forces from the continent—is the strongest possible incentive that could drive the Europeans to pursue strategic autonomy, and is therefore the best way to assess their capacity to do so. Second, examination of this counterfactual advances the U.S. grand strategy debate in light of the prominent theoretical argument from U.S. “restraint” scholars such as Barry Posen, who argue that a U.S. withdrawal is warranted on the grounds that Europe can quickly and easily create an effective deterrent to Russia.9 As we explain, Europe is the key fulcrum in the grand strategy debate between these restraint scholars and “deep engagement” scholars, who favor maintaining current U.S. security commitments in Europe and elsewhere.10

Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of defined categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deficiency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Our analysis shows that **European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by** two major **constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls** that will be hard to close, **and** “strategic cacophony,” that is, **profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies,** most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, **if the U**nited **S**tates **were to withdraw** fully, **the continent would become significantly more vulnerable to Russian** meddling and **aggression**. Furthermore, **if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe** (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. **This**, in turn, **would make** institutionalized, intra-**European defense cooperation appreciably harder**.

Ultimately, we conclude that **the notion that Europeans would be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback is illusory.**13 And if even the major shock of a complete U.S. pullback would be very unlikely to move Europe away from its current strategic cacophony and capability shortfalls, a partial U.S. pullback—a much more likely counterfactual—would be more unlikely to do so. The policy implication is straightforward: if the United States wants European stability, it needs to stay in Europe.

European Defense Capacity Shortfall

European national assessments thus diverge profoundly regarding the prioritization among different threats. Significantly, Europe’s strategic cacophony greatly exacerbates a second overarching **constraint on Europe achieving strategic autonomy: severe military capacity gaps that cannot be closed anytime soon.** Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s defense capacity has markedly decreased.88 Operationally, the 2011 European military action in Libya revealed a severe shortage of key enablers for offensive military operations: the United States had to provide critical capabilities that the Europeans otherwise lacked, such as air-to-air refueling; suppression of enemy air defenses; and intelligence, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.89 Indeed, a recent systematic study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations found that, **because their capability shortfalls are so significant, Europeans would struggle to autonomously undertake operations even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict** (such as peace enforcement missions).90

### at: nato unsustainable

#### NATO is united now – invasion of Ukraine proves cooperation and strength are key

**Seçkin 22.** Barış, Anadolu Agency şirketinde Rome Bureau Chief, Experienced Foreign Correspondent with a demonstrated history of working in the media production industry. Skilled in Photography, Politics, Turkish, Italian, and Communication. Strong media and communication professional with a Master's degree focused in Cultural Heritage communication from Università degli Studi di Firenze. “Cohesion of NATO reinforced by Russian president: Defense College commandant” https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426 JH-NCP

The commandant of NATO Defense College said the cohesion of the alliance has been even reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent actions, now that the region sees the Russian threat.

Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann told Anadolu Agency in an interview that Ukraine was a partner of NATO and so there is a difference between a partner and an ally.

"Cohesion of NATO has been even reinforced by what President Vladimir Putin has been trying to achieve in Russia. Because now he **proved that Russia is actually a threat** for Europe and the whole area and it has really reinforced the cohesion and the solidarity between allies," Rittimann said.

Commenting on the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, he said Ukraine was a partner of NATO and the college has been working quite a lot with Ukraine for the last 20 years.

"In fact, if the recent events had not happened, we would have gone to Ukraine to work together in two weeks. Of course, we had to postpone this under the current conditions. I hope we just postponed it," he added.

He also stressed the Russian aggression that started in 2008 in Georgia and which continued in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas.

"So what it proves is that ... if you are a NATO ally you are still safe because we are (in) a solidarity with 30 allies working together and defending us together," he said.

Rittimann said the common response by every NATO member, every ally was to reject "this Russian invasion of Ukraine."

"I think that enlargement is something that needs to be decided first by NATO if they are accepting somebody to become a member and then by the nation which is interested in becoming a NATO member it is definitely not Russia nor China nor any others who has to decide whether Ukraine can become a NATO member or not.

"It is something that has to be discussed between the thirty members of NATO and the applicant. It's not to be interfered by anyone else," he added.

#### Russian invasion unites NATO now – provides a common enemy and security risk

**Boot 5/17/22.** Max, historian, best-selling author and foreign-policy analyst who has been called one of the “world’s leading authorities on armed conflict” by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a columnist for The Washington Post. “Opinion | Thanks, Vladimir Putin, for greatly strengthening NATO” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/17/thanks-vladimir-putin-nato-stronger-than-ever-sweden-finland-russia-ukraine/> JH-NCP

Less than three years ago, while President Donald Trump was threatening not to defend allies who didn’t pay enough for the privilege, French President Emmanuel Macron was lamenting the “brain death of NATO.” Things hardly seemed to improve when President Biden pulled U.S. troops out of Afghanistan (a NATO mission) after scant consultation with allies. As Kabul was falling, the Wall Street Journal ran an editorial headlined, “How Biden broke NATO.”

It turns out NATO is neither brain dead nor broken. The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has given the alliance a new lease on life, making it more politically united and militarily formidable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

NATO stands as one against Russian barbarism in Ukraine. Even Germany is boosting its anemic defense spending and finally sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Other states are doing far more, with the United States, Poland, Canada and Britain leading the way in providing arms and ammunition. NATO is doubling the number of battalion-size “battlegroups” deployed to the front-line states of Eastern Europe, from four to eight, while the United States has increased its troop deployment in Europe from 80,000 to 100,000 personnel.

Now even Sweden and Finland, which have long maintained their neutrality, are declaring their desire to join the alliance. They are almost certain to be admitted, despite Turkish reservations and predictable hand-wringing from pseudo-“realists” about provoking the Russian bear.

With Sweden and Finland as members, NATO will hit the strategic jackpot. Admitting them to NATO isn’t an act of charity. They are formidable military powers in their own right that can substantially contribute to deterring further Russian aggression.

Finland has a massive artillery force of 1,500 cannons along with F-18 fighter jets, multiple launch rocket systems, armored howitzers, a variety of precision-guided munitions and other high-tech systems. Helsinki is increasing its defense spending and recently finalized a deal to buy 64 F-35 fighters. Its active duty military is small (only 22,000 personnel), but it maintains conscription and can quickly mobilize 280,000 troops — a far larger force than what Russia sent into Ukraine.

The Kremlin made all sorts of threats to dissuade Finland from joining NATO, but the Finns aren’t deterred. They remember the heavy losses they inflicted on Russian invaders in the 1939-1940 Winter War and are not impressed by the poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine. Finland was even prepared for a cut off of Russian electricity that began on Saturday. Seeing that his bluster wasn’t working, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin was already backing away from his threats on Monday.

Sweden has roughly twice Finland’s population and a larger defense budget but a smaller military, with an active-duty force of 24,000 and only 31,800 reserves. But Stockholm is also increasing defense spending and expanding its armed forces. Its air force has ordered 204 of the domestically produced, top-of-the-line JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft. Sweden also manufactures quiet diesel submarines, and its navy plans to increase its submarine fleet from four to five while also buying new corvettes.

Sweden’s most important asset may be the island of Gotland, an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the middle of the Baltic Sea. With Gotland as a NATO base, the Baltic can become a NATO lake, just as British control of Malta turned the Mediterranean into an Allied lake in World War II. NATO planners have long feared that, in a war, it would be hard to resupply Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania because of all the weapons systems that Moscow has stockpiled in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania. Having Sweden and Finland in the alliance is a game changer and tilts the Northern battlefield in NATO’s favor.

NATO should continue to bolster front-line states with permanent, rather than rotational, troop deployments. The Baltic republics are particularly vulnerable because they are adjacent to Russia and have their own populations of Russian speakers, whose presence gives Putin a built-in excuse for aggression.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution argues that the United States should bolster its presence in the Baltics: “Something in the range of 10,000 American troops in the Baltic region — a brigade combat team (some 4,000 soldiers, plus support), an Army combat aviation brigade, and two to three squadrons of Air Force tactical aircraft — likely would be sufficient.” That commitment would be sufficiently small to not interfere with the imperative to deter China but large enough to substantially bolster the defense of these small democracies.

The supreme irony, of course, is that Putin justified his attack on Ukraine by claiming that Russia could not have another NATO state on its border — even though Ukraine was not going to be admitted to the alliance. Now Russia’s border with NATO will triple, from 316 to 952 miles. Putin has no one but himself to blame.

Good going, Vlad. Thank you for strengthening NATO. If only the price, measured in Ukrainian pain and suffering, weren’t so high.

#### Russia renews NATO’s purpose – overcomes friction over democracy and unites the alliance

**Erlanger 22.** Steven, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels. “Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again” <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/nato-russia-ukraine-europe.html> JH-NCP

The talks allowed Mr. Putin to revisit Russian grievances over how the Cold War ended, in hopes of placing them back on the table for renegotiation 30 years later. His deputy foreign minister, Aleksandr V. Grushko, even warned the alliance off a “policy of containment” of Russia and insisted that “free choice does not exist in international relations” — suggesting that Ukraine would have to bow to Russian wishes.

But the more the discussion evoked the Cold War — with its firm dividing line through Europe, and its competing Russian and Western systems and spheres of influence — the more it reminded European and American allies of NATO’s purpose.

“Deterring Russia is in the DNA of NATO, because Russia is what can bring existential threats to European nations,” said Anna Wieslander, chair of Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development.

That threat now is more than territorial, she said. Russia is also trying to undermine NATO’s democratic cohesion. “Russia is targeting our elections, our social media, our parliaments and our citizens, and it is become more obvious now that Russia is not part of our value system,” Ms. Wieslander said.

As it drafts a new strategic concept to be ready this year, NATO is concentrating on “resilience” against new hybrid and cyberthreats, highlighting its defense of the democratic institutions of member states, not just their territory.

“NATO is its member states, and it’s what allies make of it,” said Sophia Besch, a defense analyst in Berlin for the Center for European Reform. “It’s not out of business because we didn’t let it, and we’ve changed its raison d’être to what are the major strategic concerns of the day.”

The old joke was that if NATO is the answer, what is the question? Ms. Besch responded: “We’ve changed the question over the years to make NATO the answer. And now we’re back at the old question again, where NATO is more comfortable.”

NATO is especially important now for those states bordering Russia, like the Baltic nations and Poland, a country which has had [deepening strains with its European partners](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/world/europe/eu-poland-rule-of-law.html) over the protection of core democratic principles, which Brussels has accused the government in Warsaw of eroding.

But the current crisis is a reminder, even in Poland, of the importance of the alliance as a whole, and not just the country’s bilateral relationship with the United States, said Piotr Buras, head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Ukraine has proved especially vulnerable to Russian threats perhaps precisely because it is not a NATO member.

“In Poland there was concern that NATO would lose its focus on Russian security threats, but now it’s obvious that this is the only framework that can protect us and provide long-term security,” Mr. Buras said.

There was also anxiety that President Biden, in trying to stabilize relations with Russia to [pivot toward China](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html), would bargain away forward-based NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics that were deployed after 2014.

“But there is no sign that the United States will give in on fundamental issues to NATO,” like its open-door policy and its right to deploy forces in any member state, Mr. Buras said, and Washington has been rigorous in briefing its allies about all of its discussions with Russia.

Still, he said, the current crisis “is a very clear consequence of the U.S. pivot to Asia and the realization of Russia that it might now take advantage of that reorientation of U.S. fundamental security interests,” he said. “And that issue will not go away soon.”

Russia will continue to press for a new security framework in Europe, and Europe without the United States is not prepared to play any significant role, he said, so “for Poland, NATO is the key and irreplaceable element.”

Even as Poland’s battle with the European Union over the rule of law still festers, it is not an overt issue in the military alliance of NATO. But it was very noticeable that as the crisis over Ukraine mounted, President Andrzej Duda of Poland chose to veto a law, criticized by Washington, which would have stripped majority ownership of an independent television station from an American company.

As the security situation in Central Europe has worsened with Russian aggression and threats, Poland “got what we finally wanted when we joined NATO, which is allied and American troop presence on our soil — to finally bring NATO deployments beyond Germany,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund.

That is precisely one of Russia’s current demands — that those deployments in Poland and the Baltic States be removed, a demand rejected by Mr. Biden and by NATO, to Poland’s relief.

Still, Mr. Baranowski said, the Russians have mobilized the largest military force in Europe since 1989, “and that’s scary.” The alliance, he said, “is closer to military confrontation, but at least we have not folded.”

But the crisis has also highlighted the continuing dependence of NATO on Washington. For Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, what is striking is how much “this is the old NATO, where the U.S. is the glue, linchpin and indispensable leader of the alliance,” bringing allies together, informing them and “putting on the table the strategy we will pursue.”

What is extraordinary, he said, is that more than 70 years after the alliance was founded, “there appears to be no independent European strategy or even a European point of view different from what Washington brought to the table.” NATO has divisions, of course, Mr. Daalder said. “But all the divisions are dissolved, at least for today.”

Whether that unity will last should Mr. Putin move farther into Ukraine is yet to be seen, said Kadri Liik, an analyst with the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. She sees an unwillingness in Europe to understand that the world is shifting.

“The wider public is not prepared for any change in the arrangements we’ve lived with for the past 30 years,” she said. “People think we can still sanction Russia into obeying the European security order, and that all it takes is Western unity and principles.”

But the United States is leading the world differently, Ms. Liik said. “I’m just not sure we can expect to continue to live in the world that corresponds to rules and norms and expect America to enforce them.”

That applies to Russia and Europe, too, she said. “We’re slowly headed back to a world” of confrontation between systems with different views about obeying the rules and the use of power and force.

Ms. Kendall-Taylor believes that Mr. Putin saw an opportunity to take advantage of a shakier trans-Atlantic alliance, a divided Europe and a polarized America with a weakened president.

NATO unity is real but untested, she said. “It’s too early to declare all restored, because Russia not done anything yet,” Ms. Kendall-Taylor said. “It’s a bit the calm before the storm.”